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Traditionally, improvements in the quality of life in Britain 
i~:!sul.ted from the temporary fusion of sometimes opposite interests 
which spurred Parliamentary action. Therefore, refonn was rarely a 
party iasue.. Each refor:n question was t.reated separately and nev9r 
as a part of a body of similar measures. Individuals were :free to 
support or oppose particular reforms according to their own intereats 
and motivations. The result of this lack of ::itrong consistent reform-
ist sentiment was a pattern of piece-meal legislative action with a 
notable absence of comprehensive social planning. The First World War, 
however, brought new challenges to British society. As the traditional, 
haphazard method of dealing with problems of social organization failed 
to meet the needs of a nation enga§ed in a total war, British society 
came to accept a high degree of central control and guidance under the 
banner of national efficiency. This acceptance of social planning opened 
up new opportunities to those reformers who had long sought to undertake 
the cure or Britain's social ills on a massive scale. 
The reformers saw the establishment of a ministry or health as the 
key to their success in the struggle against poverty and disease. After 
more than two years of political infighting the ministry- was-finally 
established in June 1919, and a housing program which promised to provide 
500,000 new homes was placed under its authority. Launched with the 
approval of every political interest in the nation, the housing scheme 
proved to be a rout from the beginning and by the spring of 1-921 the 
project came to an ignoble end. With it came the end of the national 
commitment to social planning. The movement for planning failed because 
old political and social differences proved to be a much more potent force 
than what remained of war-time harmony. While the nation was willing to 
tolerate rigid economic and social control in the name of victory over 
the Kaiser, no matter how much reform was desired, it would not accept 
centralized control and be swayed by appeals for national sacrifice in 
peacetime. Without the impetus provided by total warfare, massive social 
planning, rooted in a desire to use all the nation's resources efficiently, 
collapsed, drained of its political vitality. 
The research and the writing of this study was carried out during 
the summer of 1974 in th6 Ur1iversity of Washington library system. The 
university's libraries offered all of the most important prim&ry source 
reaterial needed for the completion of the thesis, either in bol.Uld copy 
or on microfilm. Wide use waa made of contemporary .1ournals ar.d ne~s..,. 
papers. In addition$ personal diaries and memoirs of several of the 
central characters of the period pro7ided a wealth of material. The 
libr~ry also ma.de availabl1t a large variety of official British Govern-
ment documents without which this study could not have been completed. 
The only source materials not avail.able- were tre officia.l cabinet records 
of the period and certain private papers which are ae yet unpublished 
or unavailable in this country. Fortunately, secondary works provided 
enough information to bridge major gaps between available prim&ry source 
materials or point to new routes around unans~erable questionse 
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PREFACE 
.A.ny attempt to evaluate the impact of the First World War on 
British society is perhaps a futile effort to measure the immeasurable. 
'Ihe sheer magnitude of the struggle, the sacrifice of life and the loss 
of wealth overwhelm even the most casual observer. Despite this, h::.s-
torians have been unable to escape the "siren song" produced by the 
unmistakable death of one world and the birth of another in four short 
years. As a result uncountable studies have been done which attempt to 
retell the losses to Britain and the vorld duriLg those bloody years. 
Yet while mourning the terricle waste of modern warfare, few have recog-
nized the war as an agent for domestic social reforJil in Britain. 
Traditionally, improvements in the quality of life in Britain 
stemmed from the temporary fusion of sometimes opposite interests which 
spurred Parliamentary action. Therefore, reform was rarely a party issue. 
Each reform question was treated separately and never as part of a body 
of similar measures. Individuals were free to support or oppose particular 
reforms according to their own ir.terests and motivations. The result of 
this lack of strong consistent reformist s~ntiment was a pattern of piece-
meal legislative action with a notable absence of comprehensive social 
planning. The First World War, however, brought new challenges to British 
society. As the traditional haphazard method of dealing with problems of 
social organization failed to meet the needs of a nation engaged in a total 
·...-ar, British society came 'tO accept a high degree of central control and 
guidance under the banner of national efficiency. This acceptance of 
social planning opened up new opportunities to those reformers who had 
long sought to undertake the cure of Britain's social ills on a massive 
scale. The aim of this present study is to trace, during the war years 
and after, the struggle for social pl&nning which received its impetus 
from the wartime desire for national efficiency. 
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CHAPTER I 
BUSINESS AS USUAL 
Britain entered the First World War completely unprepared to meet 
its demanc1.s on her military forces, industrial machinery, or civilian 
population. In response to the emergency created by the war, the Liberal 
government, serving under Herbert Asquith, devoted the bulk of its ener-
gies to the task of recruiting and training additional men for the army's 
expeditionary force. In August 1914, British land forces numbered little 
more that 250,000 regular troops, the bulk of which were spread ~hinly 
around the world in the various crown colonies. The active territorial 
force was limited to a garrison of 63,000 soldiers backed up by a 150,000 
man reserve force and a separate ready reserve army that a.mounted to no 
mor.e than another 63,000 trained officers and men.l Conscription, modeled 
after the continental system, was not the "British way", and the cabinet 
realized that all new recruits had to be volunteers. 
Traditionally the War Office had been responsible for the raising 
of new recruits. However, the resignation of J. E. B. Seely during the 
Currah trouble in Ireland left the nation without a Secretary of State for 
War. Upon Seely's departure, Asquith had himself taken the War Office 
temporarily to avoid making a new appointment tmtil the lnternal trouble 
was over, but the outbreak of hostilities made a new appointment im-
lArthur Marwick, The Deluge (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1970), 
p. 15. 
t . 2 pera ive. In order to fill the ranks of the royal army, a full-time 
secretary for war who could inspire confidence in victory and attract 
volunteers to the colors was needed. Asquith's first thought was to send 
R. B. Haldane back to the War Office. Haldane had been responsible for 
organizing the expeditionary force under a general staff and Asquith felt 
that his experience and proven ability would be ideal for the post. 
Nonetheless, the politically sensitive Asquith found that he could not 
appoint Haldane to the War Office. The popular press had turned against 
Haldane, suggesting that his well-known interest in German philosophy 
meant that he was pro-German.3 The temper of the early days of the war 
was such that this wholly unfounded claim was enough to prevent the 
appointment. 
Public opinion, while rejecting Haldane, turned to Lord Kitchener, 
an authentic military hero. Kitchener, who was known as the conqueror of 
the Sudan, had been Commander-in-Chief of British Forces during the last 
two years of i.he Boer War, and still had a high standing in the public 
mind. Furthermore, Kitchener happened to be on leave from his post in 
Egypt when the war began. His presence in the country made him the 
natural focal point of popular attention. Christopher Addison, then ser-
ving in the government, observed that 
When the country had recovered from the feeling of unreality 
engendered by the declaration of war, all eyes were instinctively 
turned towards Lord Kitchener 'the strong, silent man'. No man 
in the empire probably possessed the confidence of the 'man in the 
2Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years, Vol. II (New York: 
Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925), pp. 69-70. 
3rbid., p. 70. 
2 
street' quite the same way as he did. Pu.bJic opinion clearly 
said that he was the man to organize the country for war.4 
Even if the public was convir.ced of the necessity of Kitchener's appoint-
ment to the War Office, many within the governmen~, ir.cluding Asquith, 
were not. Politically, Kitchener was a Tory and had strong support among 
3 
the conservative opposition. Asquith, in spite of the war, still intended 
to play party politics, and the thought of diluting his cabinet with a Tory 
did not sit well with him. The Prime Minister was also aware of Kitchener 1 s 
lack of practical political experience a.~d his reputation for being something 
less than a brilliant administrator. Public pressure, though, had rallied 
behind Kitchener and Asquith, in the name of national unity, decided that 
Lord Kitchener should go -co the War Office. 
Asquith had hesitated for so long that Kitchener had already reached 
Dover and was preparing to return to his command. He was called back to 
London and, amid a great deal of popular excitement, was installed as Sec-
retary of State for War. Asquith, despite his concessions to public opinion, 
still had strong doubts about Kitchener's abilities. Asquith, who thought 
it strongly possible that Kitchener would bungle the job, wanted to be sure 
that the blame would not fall on the Liberal party. He publicly made it 
clear that Kitchener was appointed in light of the national emergency, as 
a non-partisan member of the government. He delicately reminded all parties, 
in the House of Commons on August 6, that 
Lord Kitchener, as everyone knows, is not a politician. 
His association with the Government as a Minister of the 
Cabinet for this purpose must not be taken as in any way 
identifying him with any set of political opinions. He 
has, at a great public emergency, responded to a great 
public call.5 
4christopher Addison, Politics From Within, Vol. I (London: 
Herbert Jenkins, Ltd., 1924), p. 41. 
5House of Commons Debates, August 6, 1914, (col. 2082). 
l+ 
Asquith was hedging his bet, but his reservations would prove to be a 
shrewed political judgement. 
Kitchener set to work immediately. Within hours of his appointment, 
he recommended to the cabinet that the initial call for volunteers be fixed 
at 500~000 men. He also made it known that an additional 500,000 troops 
would be needed in the following months, raising the number of new recruits 
needed to one million men. This request caught the cabinet totally off 
guard and Lord Grey commented afterwards that 
Kitchener foresaw, to an extent that no one else did at first, 
the need for raising a great Army, larger than anything that had 
yet been contemplated. He based his demand for men on the opinion 
that the war would last for three years. That seemed to most of us 
u...11likely, if' not incredible. We thought only of a war of movement, 
that would bring a military decision one way or the other in less 
than three yea.rs; it also seemed to many of us that the terrific 
output of men and treasure that modern conditions made possible 
would bring exhaustion to every belligerent in much less than three 
years. 6 
The cabinet, doubtful of the need for such a huge army, approved Kitchener's 
proposal anyway, thinking that before a million men could be trained, 
equipped, and put in the field, the war would be over. That same day, 
August 6, Parlia.'llent accepted the proposal and authorized an initial 
;bl.00,000,000 in war credits.7 The next day the first recruiting posters 
were put up throughout the country, calling for an initial 100,000 volun-
teers to join "His Majesty's Regular Army". Within hours, men in large 
numbers began to line up in front of recruiting offices ready to give 
service. 
The vol~u1teers came forward so rapidly that the whole of the recruit-
ment machinery was partially paralyzed and Kitchener was unwilling, if not 
6Grey, 2P.· cit., p. 71. 
7House ot> Commons Debates_, August 6, 1914, (col. 2100). 
unable, to straighten out the problems. "'.Jay after day, men were forced 
to queue and stand, moving at a snail's ps.ce towards the recruiting 
of'fice, only to be frustrated and sent home at the close of the day.8 
The lines soon became permanent and the volur..teers stayed the night, 
hoping to enlist the next day. Addison, complaining in his diary about 
Kitchener's leadership in the War Office and the general inefficiency 
of' his staff, concluded that "They have probably sent their best staff 
men on the E. F. (expeditionary force), but some of the retired colonels 
and majors whom they have put in charge of recruiting are 'the limit'". 
Rather acidly he pointed out that "If anybody could dampen down the en-
thusiasm to enlistment, these a.re the men to do it. 119 
The conditions in the standing camps,as the enlistment lines ca.me 
to be called, grew worse as more and more men decided to join the ranks. 
The Local Government Board and some private charitable organizations, 
notably the YMCA, approached Kitchener and asked permission to organize 
5 
concerts and educational lectures for the men. Grumbling something about 
not wanting civilian interference, Kitchener and his War Office staff re-
fused all offerH of aid.10 
As a result of this confusion and inadequate planning, the first 
8John Redmond, the leader of the Irish nationalists, spoke before 
the House of Commons on August 3, offering the aid of the Nationalist Army. 
The Irish Unionists did the same a few days later. The War Office, in a 
:miscalculation that would cost Britain dearly later, refused the support 
put forward by the Nationalists and accepted that of the Unionists. From 
this point on relations with the Nationalists, who were at first willing 
to delay Home Rule, grew more strained. House of Commons Debates, August 
3, 1914, (cols. 1828-1839). A. J. P. Taylor, English His to.EX_, 1911+-1945, 
(Oxford, 2965), p. 21. 
9christopher Addison, Four and a Half Years, Vol. I, 3rd ed. (London: 
Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1934), diary entry, October· 21, 1914, pp. 37-39. 
lOil?id., diary entry, October 22, 191L., pp. 38-39. 
6 
100,000 men were not recruited u.~til August 2). A call for another 100,000 
men was issued on August 28. The response was so great that by September 
15 500,000 men had volunteered for service, and the War Office asked for 
an additional 500,000 men.11 The new flood of men now not only taxed the 
recruitment procedures, but also the facilities i'or training new soldiers 
for combat. Men moved from standing camps in front of recruitment offices 
to standing camps at training centers. By October, despite the high patri-
otic feelings and willingness to sacrifice, the standing camps were quickly 
falling into disorder. Finally, unable to make the War Office act, the 
government put together an advisory committee to investigate the possibi-
lity of having the County Education Authorities organize activities within 
the camps. The afternoon of October 22, the Committee on Standing Ca..~ps 
met with representatives of all the departments and several local authori-
ties to draw up plans for recreational and educational activities in the 
camps. The Admiralty and the War Office were also invited, but only the 
representatives from the Admiralty were present. Al though the navy only 
had men at the Crystal Palace and at camps in Dorset, they promised to 
cooperate with any efforts made by civil authorities to alleviate ca.mp con-
ditions. The primary purpose of the meeting was to create some sort of 
coordination between the War Office and civilian authorities; the absence 
of a representative from Kitchener was more than just a conspicuous over-
sight. 
Mid-way through the meeting a messenger arrived saying that the 
representatives from the War Office were on their way. A few minutes 
11Arthur Marwick, Britain in the Century of Total War (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1968) , p. 5 8. 
later a letter from Kitchener arrived. Joseph Peas·:::, chairman of the 
committee, reportedly read the note and then nsat tight for a few minutes 
to collect himself and then read the material parts r'or the Committee. 1112 
The letter from Kitchener, "in not over-polite language", said that "he 
had not understood the general composition and purport of the Committee". 
Addison asserts that 
The purport of the letter was that he did. not want civilians 
interfering! He did not think the Committee was necessary, 
and the War Office could do all that was required. He intended 
to build some huts; to give the men military lectures in the 
evenings and, as he was going to keep them at work all day, 
they ought to go to bed when they had finished.13 
7 
Kitchener's obstinance had put the committee in a delicate position. They 
could not openly challenge his authority because of his great popularity. 
On the other hand, they could not allow conditions to continue as they 
were or, what might be worse, to let Kitchener's proposals be implemented. 
There was a general fear that Kitchener's "woeful lack of imagina-
tion" might hinder recruiting and take the edge off' the volunteers' "keen-
ness". To keep the men at military duties from dawn to dusk would, as the 
committee rightly argued, quickly tire the men of military life, even if 
Kitchener were able to organize such an operations staff. As yet, the War 
Office had not even managed to provide shelters against the rain, which 
led many on the committee to believe that any plan of Kitchener's would 
probably end in folly. Having no other rec0urse, Pease concluded that 
the committee's only hope was to appeal directly to the Prime Minister. 
This course of action won the support of the committee and immediately 
12 Addi son , Four and a Half Years, £2.. cit.· , diary entry, October 
22, 1914, pp. 38-39. 
13Addison, Politics from Within, £2.· cit., p. 43. 
8 
after the meeting ended, Pease went to see Asquith to ask for his personal 
interventio~. Asquith was found ~o be in full support of the committee's 
position and consented to see both Kitchener and Pease the next day, follow-
ing a cabinet meeting, in order to secure the War Secretary's ,~ooperation.14 
The following day the conference between the three was held as Asquith 
promised. After the meeting Pease told Addison that the meeting was qcite 
stormy, but the Prime Minister had supported him. Later in the day, after 
the anger of the meeting had worn off, Kitchener informed Asquith that 
the War Office would cooperate with civil authorities through a committee 
established to coordinate civil and military actions. This committee would, 
he promised, consult the Board of Education and the Local Education Authori-
ties in an effort to make the standing camps more orderly. Furthermore, 
he agreed to establish local camp com_m.ittees w"'..th laymen as members. These 
committees would organize activities for off-duty soldiers. Despite these 
concessions, Kitchener still dragged his feet on the matter. On Monday, 
November 16, Addison's diary reveals that KitchenP.r was still recalcitrant 
with regards to military and civilian coopera~icn. Addison commented 
Every day that goes, however, shows what a terrible stumbling 
block Kitchener and his methods are to a real rallying of 
national enthusia3m. Our National patriotism is coming to the 
rescue of Europe not as the result, but in spite of the War 
Office.15 
Later, on November 24, Addison adds to his evaluation that "there is no 
fathoming the thick-headedness of the War Office. 1116 
14Addison, Four and a Half Years, op. cit., diary entry, October 
23, 1914, p. 40. 
15Ibid., diary entry, November 16, 1914, p. 45. 
16Ibid., diary entry, Novemcer 24, 1914, p. 47. 
9 
Even though those inside government circles continued to bemoan 
Kitchener's obstinate presence in the War Office, they really could do 
very little but learn to work around him. By mid-November, the recruit-
ing effort seemed to be going well and measures were being taken by civil-
ia.n authorities to provide outside activities for the huge number of new 
recruits. The difficulties first encountered because of Kitchener's 
ineptitude and later as a result of his stubborness seemed to slowly 
resolve themselves as Britain adjusted to war. 
The war not only brought chaos to the War Office; it also played 
havoc with the home economy. The uncertainty that accompanied the out-
break of hostilities caused a near panic throughout British industrial 
life. G. D. H. Cole commented, in his contemporary account, Labour in 
the War, that 
When the war broke out, the workers,the capitalists and 
the government seem to have been equally in the dark as to 
its probable effects upon industry. No one knew what would 
be its reaction upon the credit system and external trade; no 
one knew how far the home demand was likely to suffer con-
traction; no one foresaw the scale on which the war would be 
carried on, or the immense demands it would make upon production.17 
At the same time as the first calls for volunteers for the army were being 
made, the war was making itself felt on the home front. Domestic consurner 
goods, and especially food prices, began to rise rapidly. On August 8, 
prices averaged 15 percent higher than those during· the same week the month 
earlier. It was not, however, a uniform increase for all commodities. 
Milk rose an average of only a single percentage point, whereas sugar, in 
the larger towns, shot up 83 percent over its July price in a matter of 
days. This uneven advance was due partly to hoarding and shortages of 
17 G. D. H. C·Jle, Labour in the War, (London: G. Bell and Sons, 
Ltd., 1915), p. 63. 
10 
certain goods, but as things calmed down after the initial shock of the war, 
prices fell off again. By the end of the first month of the war prices had 
slipped to an average of 11 percent higher in the larger towns and had 
retreated to an increase of only 9 percent in those with under 50,000 in-
habitants.18 
The unsettling effects of the war were not limited to a rapid increase 
in consumer goods; they also affected the rate of unemployment. Although 
certain industries, such as ship building, saddlery and harness, boot and 
shoe, military clothing and the hosiery trades, found that overtime was 
needed to keep up with the orders, generally the level of employment fell 
in most industries during August. Trade union 1memployment jumped from 
2.8 percent in July to 7.1 percent in August. The total number of unem-
ployed people on the labor exchange registers as of August 14, 1914, was 
194,580, in comparison to 112,622 on July 17 and 89,049 during the same 
week in August 1913. Moreover, in the insured trades, where the number 
of insured individuals was 2,341,508, 6.2 perceat of the workers found 
themselves unemployed at the end of August. In comparison, only 2.6 per-
cent of the insured workers had been unemployed at the end of July and 3.1 
percent were out of work at the end of August the year before.19 
The unemployment statistics alone do not indicate the full dimensions 
of the crisis. Many industries, rather than lay people off, chose to put 
them on short time until the domestic situation settled down. This was 
especially true in the tin plate and steel sheet, engineering, printing, 
bookbinding, building, pottery, and textile industries. Individual earn-
18M. B. Hammond, British Labor Conditions and Legis.lation During 
the War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1919), pp. 32-33. 
19Ibid.' p. 34. 
11 
ings, as a result, dropped and this decline did not appear in lUlemploy-
ment statistics. One figure that is available, for example, reveals that 
during one week in August, earnings in the cotton manufacturing trades 
were 58.8 percent less tha.i1 the corresponding period in July and 60.9 
t b 1 th k th . 20 percen e ow e same wee · e previous yr;:a:r. 
The hardship of unemployment, however, was very unevenly distri-
buted between men and women. While the heavy industries, in which mostly 
male labor was employed, suffered from the early wartime industrial con-
fusion, trades employing primarily women suffered the most. The cotton, 
linen, silk, lace, tailoring, dressmaking, rdllinery, and hat making 
trades all were forced to lay off their workers, mostly female, in large 
numbers. The demand for luxury goods plummeted during the first month 
of the war, as people found inflation cutting into their spending power. 
The rate of unemployment in other industries. further reduced the market 
for luxuries. Although no figures are available for August, when the 
situation was at its most chaotic, in September only, 53.5 percent of 
all women employed in full time work in July were working full time the 
second month of the war; this is in comparison to 60.2 percent for men. 21 
This sudden surge of unemployment among both men and women meant 
that the number of people seeking public relief increased. Claims for 
unemployment benefits under Part II of the National Insurance Act amount-
ed to 180,233 during the first four weeks in August. This was in compari-
son to 103,730 claims made during the five weeks of July. The insurance 
fund was well able to meet these claims, but many people who were not 
20Tuid.' p. 35. 21cole, 2£· cit., p. 68. 
1 0 "-
covered by the insurance act were also faced with unemployment. On August 
4, the Prime Minister, fully expecting some dislocation to take place as 
a result of the war, appointed a cabinet committee that would be respon-
sible for the prevention and relief of distress. 23 The committee's chair-
man, Herbert Sa.nmel, President of the Local Government Boa.rd, put the 
committee to work immedia.tely,dividing it into four sub-committees: 
Committee for London, Committee for Agricultural Districts, Committee on 
Urban Housing, and Committee on Women's Employment. On August 6, a memo-
randum was sent out to local authorities throughout the country, encourag-
'"'4 ing the establishment of local relief committees.c These committees were 
to be operated by each local authority and composed of representatives 
from the Board of Guardians, trade unions, philanthropic organizations, 
and soldiers' and sailors' families' associations. 
By August 11, numerous local committees had been established and 
the central government committee began to ·issue a series of memoranda 
outlining the role of the local committees. These emphasized that working 
people, as far as possible, were to be kept working full time at their 
usual trades or on short time if this were impossible.25 If this could 
not be accomplished, the local committees were 
urged to use every effort to keep labour in the normal 
channels; where the demands of the normal labour market 
are inadequate the Committees are advised to consult the 
23
cmd. 7603, "Memorandum on the Steps Ta.ken for the Prevention and 
Relief of Distress Due to War," Session.al Papers of the House of Lords, 
Accounts and Papers, Vol. 14, 1914. 
24Manchester Guardian, August 7, 1914. 
25Percy Allen, "War and the Wage Earner," The Contemporary Review, 
September 1914, p. 379. 
local authorities as to the possibility of expediting schemes 
of public utility, which might otherwise not 9e put in hand 
at the present moment; it is only when these fail that recourse 
should be had to relief works and only in the last resort that 
relief should be given without work.26 
In order to finance the relief committees the Prince of Wales made an 
appeal for public contributions and appointed a special committee to 
oversee the distribution of relief money. The Executive Committee of 
the Prince of Wales' Fund placed themselves under the control of the 
cabinet committee, agreeing to act only on their recommendations. 27 
As money poured into the Prince of Wales' Fund and the network of 
13 
local committees swung into operation, complaints began to be heard from 
representatives of the trade union movement. The committees, it was 
charged, were largely composed of "social workers" who 
had long been connected with the Poor I.aw, the Charity Organization 
Society, and other relief agencies. The labour representatives, 
even where they were given seats on the committees, were nearly 
always swamped by the mass votes of the officials and charity-
mongers. The social workers, long used to the relief of a peculiar 
type of distress, could not realize that the special distress 
created by the war was of a quite different character and demanded 
different treatment. Accustomed to bullying the very poor, the 
Committees set out with eagerness to bully the regular wage-earners 
whom the war had thrown out of work.28 
In some cases the committees prepared case reports and made house-to-house 
visitations in order to gather more information concerning those who were 
receiving benefits. The unemployed workers, always distrustful of any 
charity that seemed to be like the Poor Law, often refused to ask the 
local committees for aid, preferring instead to "exhaust savings and 
accumulate debts 11 ,29 
26emd. 7603, 2£· cit., Appendix No. 3. 
27The Nation, August 22, 1914, p. 251. 
28cole , 212.. cit. , p. 86 • 
29Ib·d 
__ 1_.' p. 
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The relief committees ~ay have represented a cold a...~d rather cal-
culating approach toward the problem of unemployme'nt, but in the long 
run they did help to ease the crisis while the nation's industries re-
tooled for war. The Central Com.'Ilittee on Women's Employment gave 
assistance to the local committees in the formulation of women's relief. 
Workrooms were established for the purposes of re-training women and 
girls for work in industries other than those which produced luxury 
goods.30 Grants were made by the central committee to road boards, 
which in turn allotted repair and construction money to highway authori-
ties in areas of high unemployment. For this purpose, grants amounting 
to b209,259 were made. The relief committees also received bl58,266 for 
the purposes of employing and training persons experiencing distress.31 
The government, a.side from the format ion of the relief COl"lmi ttees, 
made an effort to encourage war contractors to use the maximlllil nlllilber 
of workers in their factories. In late August a memorandum was issued 
from the War Office to all contractors, making certain suggestions for 
the minimization of unemployment. The note asked all employers to act 
upon the following as quickly as they reasonably could: 
(1) Rapid delivery to be attained cy employing extra hands 
in shifts or otherwise, in preference to overtime, subject 
always to the para.mount necessity of effecting delivery within 
times requisite for the needs of the army. (2) Subletting of 
portions of the work to other suitable manufacturers situated 
in districts where serious unemployment exists, although con-
trary to the usual conditions of army contracts, is admissable 
during the present crisis. 
30 Arthur Patterson, "War Funds Co-orJ.iriation of Chaos , " The 
Nineteenth Century, October 1914, p. 740. 
31Hammond, ~· cit., pp. 42-44. Lord Riddell, Lord Riddell's War 
Diart (Ivor Nicholson: Watson, 1933), diary entry, August 10, 1914, p.12. 
The memorandum also issued e. stern warning t.o employers, telling them 
that the government would not tolerate those who ~oak advantage of the 
labor situation. 
(a) The main contractor to remain solely responsible for 
due execution of the contract as regards to quality, dates 
for delivery and in every respect. (b) The fair wages clause 
to apply strictly with the exception of the passage permitting 
subletting. •rhe main contractor will undertake to observe the 
other provisions of the fair wages clause. (c) Na.mes and 
addresses of all firms to whom it is proposed to sublet work 
to be submitted for approval before work is actually given out 
to them.32 
The object of the memorandum to contractors was to make use of as much 
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manpower as possible until the industrial situation calmed down. During 
the early days of the war the government was primarily concerned with the 
worsening military situation in France and had little time for home affairs. 
It was hoped that the limited measures taken would enable the economy to 
recover from the shock of the war by itself. 
The government's attempts to deal with unemployment at home seemed 
to do the trick. By the end of August, it appeared as if the panic had 
passed and the economy was readjusting itself to wartime conditions. Trade 
unions, which had experienced a 7.1 percent unemployment rate during August, 
reported that the total had decreased to 5.6 percent of their membership 
by September. Near the end of October, it had again declined to 4.4 per-
cent, in November to 2.9 percent, and by the end of the year it had fallen 
off to 2.5 percent. The December figure was about the same as the rate of 
unemployment for the Decembers of 1912 and 1913.33 In the uninsured trades 
recovery was even more rapid. From a high of 6.2 percent in August, the 
unemployment rate slipped to 4.2 percent in October and by the end of 
32Ha.mmond, 2£.• cit., p. 36. 33Ibid., p. 38. 
December, it had fallen to 3.3 percent. 
The economy had not collapsed as many bad predicted it would 
during the early part of August. As the governnent began to place its 
war contracts, industry began to come out of its depressed condition. 
More and more labor shifted to the boom industries and in many cases 
unemployment proved to be short-term. The Manchester Guardian report-
ed on August 25, 1914, that the 
Government and other orders arising out of the war itself are 
exerting a widening influence on the engineering trade. Naturally 
the direct government orders fall mainly to regular contractors 
who are as a consequence, exceptionally busy. As a result they 
are leaving to other firms a proportion of the work they normally 
compete for, aI1d are, to a certain extent, passing work to sub-
contractors. Like the ring waves created by the dropping of a 
stone into a pool, the influence of the Government orders is 
spreading through in aiminishing strength to the farthest boun-
daries of the trade.3 
The elimination of foreign competition, especially that of Germany, 
further stimulated Eritish industry and enabled it to pick up the slack 
in the employment statistics. Moreover, Lord Kitchener's recruiting 
efforts siphoned off large numbers of men into the army. Soon the sur-
pluses in the labor market had, in some industries, become labor short-
ages and some skilled men in the engineering trades and the cloth trades 
were turned out of the army in order to return to work.35 The way in which 
the economy was recovering created a sense of confidence in the minds of 
many that Britain would adjust easily to the demands of war time. 
As early as August 11, H. E. Morgan of W. H. Smith and Son, sug-
gested, in a letter to the Daily Chronicle, that the country's best 
34Ma.nchester Guardian, August 25, 1914. 
35Lord Askwith, Indust:r.ial Problems and Disputes (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1921), pp. 360-361. 
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economic policy would be to allow business to perform much as it always 
had. Government~ he pointed out, ought to practice non-'interference. 
It was hoped that after the initial shock and dislocation caused by the 
war, conditions would settle down to normal. The market, Morgan co:i.-
eluded, would be self-adjusting to both the needs of the war and those 
of the home economy. Later in August, a meeting of business leaders 
"resolved that together in tuli ty, they would fight the war on the slogan 
'business as usual 111 .36 Soon the snappy phrase, "business as usual", 
was being promoted by the government and the press.37 At first the 
government espoused the concept in order to rebuild confidence in the 
home economy. There was a natural desire by the public to return to 
what seemed to have been d~ys of stability and normalcy before the 
terrible convulsions of the war. The government played up to this pub-
ic nlood and "business as usual" caught on amazingly and everybody felt 
that to carry on as usual was a patriotic duty.38 
By mid-September "business as usual" could be heard on every corner. 
As it became evident that.the economy, £:.lthough badly rocked by soaring 
inflation and a high unemployment rate, would not collapse, "business as 
usual" became more than calming rhetoric. The Liberal government, seeing 
that the economy was slowly recovering and that its emergency relief 
measures were working, adopted a "'business as usual" economic policy. 
Already the protectors of free trade a.~d governmental non-interference, 
the Liberals readily accepted the suggestions made by the nation's 
36Marwick, Deluge, 52£.· cit., p. 39. 
37Ibid.' p. 38. 
38Addison, Four and a. Half Years, 2£· cit., diary entry, August 4, 
1914, p. 36. 
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business leaders who were "anxious to unite dt!.ty with profit. 11 39 The 
government was told that industry could meet the demands of war and that 
industrial readjustment would take place rapidly if only the government 
would stay out of industrial affairs. By November, the economy had 
clearly regained some of its lost strength and a.ny temptations the gov-
ernment might have had to tinker with the economy disappeared. 
The first official endorsement of a "business as usual" economic 
policy came on November 16, when Lloyd George unveiled the government's 
first war budget to the House of Commons. On that occasion he told the 
House that the government would propose to "levy no taxes that will in-
terfere with any productive industry".40 Rather, he proposed that 
additional revenues be raised from increased personal taxes a..."ld duties. 
Lloyd George, standing before the House, asserted that 
It does not require very much courage to tax ourselves, 
to give part of our incomes to fight the enemy, but let us 
show that we civilians of all classes are perfectly prepared 
to take our share of the burdens of this war. It is for 
these reasons that the Government propose to submit to the 
House of Commons proposals for raising a substantial sum by 
means of taxes. On the ground of policy, as well as justice, 
it is expedient that a great war, involving national honour 
and existence, should be financed by contributions lf:vied upon 
a section--upon a minority of the population. It is peculiarly 
a case for every class, every condition, every grade, to bear 
their share of the burdens. I therefore submit proposals which 
will bring in, so far as we are able, all classes of the 
community.41 
The new budget proposal sought to raise an extra ~225,000,000 for the 
purpose of prosecuting the war. This of course was in addition to the 
I.100,000,000 already voted by the House. 
The money was to come from two sources. War loans could have 
39Marwick, Deluge, .2E.· cit., p. 39, 41Ibid., pp. 357-358. 
40House of Commons Debates, November 17, 1941, (col. 357), 
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probably raised the total o.;nount, but the gcv~rnment felt that, if at all 
possible, the war should be put on a pay-as-you-go basis. Therefore, 
only part of the a.mount was to be raised through loans. Lloyd George, 
in his memoirs, claims that at the time he (the govern.~ent) reasoned 
that 
War-time demands would stimulate our industries to unprecedented 
activity; ai.~d in addition, the closing down of the international 
commerce of Central Europe and the crippling of the industrial 
capacities of France and Belgium, would, for the time being, 
mean that a heavy extra demand for goods by other countries 
would fall on us.42 
The result of this furious industrial activity, Lloyd George concluded, 
would be that more money would be circulating in the economy, thus making 
it easier "to pay for the war while this ste.te of things lasted than later 
on". With this reasoning in hand, and the ideological palatability of 
raising the income tax schedule and commodity duties, the goverrunent put 
before the House a budget which was designed to maintain ''business as 
usual". 
Before the war, people earning between ±.160 and :i;,500 per year were 
taxed at a rate of 9d. per pound. Those with incomes above b500 but below 
b3,000 paid a rate of ls. 3d., and all incomes exceeding ~3,000 were 
charged with an additional super-tax. Lloyd George proposed that all 
income brackets should have their rates doubled. This new rate would be 
payable until the conclusion of the fiscal year which ended on March 31, 
1915. This meant that the new rate of taxation would apply only to in-
comes received the last third of the year. The other two-thirds were to 
be taxed according to the old, pre-war rate schedule. In order to supple-
42navid Lloyd George, War Memoirs of Da-vid floyd George, vol. I, 
3rd ed (Boston: Little, Brow11 and Company, 1935), p. 106. 
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ment the increased income taxation, the governmer.t further moved to 
raise the tax on certain commodities. The duty on beer was raised the 
equivalent of a pP.nny a pint, increasing the average price per pint to 
4d. In a show of national unity, the Liberal government, to placate 
the Tory brewing interests, also placed a heavier tax on tea. The 
rate was increased from 5d. to 8d. per pound. 
The government arg1.ied in the case of beer and tea that although 
they were asking consumers of those two products to bear a heavy burden, 
for the most part they, in the past, had escaped added taxation. In 1909 
tax on spirits, Lloyd George said, had at first caused a decline in 
revenue from the sale of hard liquor.43 He noted that 
Inasmuch as we are raising taxes for the immediate necessities 
of the time--for the conduct of the war, I am advised that to 
attempt to raise money by means of putting a co11side:::-able addi-
tional duty on spirits would be futile, and that you would not 
get your revenue but, on the contrary, F~ght lose by it.44 
Lloyd George further argued before the House that any tax on wine might 
damage the economics of wine-producing colonies and Portugal, France, 
and Spain. Pointing this out he suggested that a heavy tariff on wine 
might be "undesirable for diplomatic reasons and would not be very pro-
d t . 11 45 UC l.Ve , • • The wine market, moreover, was primarily the preserve 
of the monied classes within society, and the government did not wa.'1.t to 
appear to be asking one class to sacrifice more than others. 
As to the proposed tax on tea, the government assumed that "tee-
totalers" were not beer drinkers and therefore it was a tax on hereto-
43House of Commons Debates, November 17, 1914, (col. 367). 
44Ibid.' p. 367. 45Ibid.' p. 368. 
fore untaxed class of people. Lloyd George claimed that "one's only 
chance at getting at the teetotaler is by taxing ;ea".46 He reminded 
the House that in 1904 the rate of taxation on tea had been at Bd. per 
pound and only recently had the rate fallen to 5d. The government, he 
said, "regretted having to propose an increase of this duty". But he 
added that if he "could find any other way of levying a contribution 
upon every class of the community I would ~ertainly adopt it as opposed 
to this particular levy". 47 .tv'.tr. J. E. Allen expressed the view of many 
who thought that new taxes might be needed when he suggested that 
The Cinematograph, s.n exceedingly foolish kind of entertainment 
and one which, in the opinion of elementary school teachers, 
is specially bad for children, cries out for taxation. Travelling 
shows and 'roundabouts' are undertakings which ought to pay in 
taxes what they save in rates, and music-halls should not be 
overlooked.48 
Despite Mr. Allen's suggestions and those of others, Lloyd George and. 
the government refused to impose new taxes, choosing rather to increase 
those already in existence. 
Most orthodox opinion in the country felt that the government's 
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proposals were reasonable and prudent. Money could be raised to finance 
the war through the regular channels and business could proceed as usual. 
The Econorrdst remarked that the 
Government deserves all credit for having boldly faced an 
unprecedented emergency by calling upon the nation to make 
46The Liberal government was politically expected to tax tea, if it 
planned to tax beer, in order to prove that both Liberals and Conservatives 
were going to pay for the war. House of Co:rmnons pebates, November 17, 1914, 
(col. 368). 
47rbid., p. 369. 
48J. E. Allen, "How to Pay for the We..r," The Con~orary Review, 
December 1914, p. 765. 
a.~ u,.~precedented sacrifice. And we must commend Mr. Lloyd 
George, not only for promptitude and courage,. but also for 
the directness and simplicity of the scheme which he laid 
before the House of Commons on Tuesday. 
The journal concluded that 
There is no nonsense about it, no dodging, no attempt to 
impose taxes which will be profitable to certain interests 
and therefore popular with a section of the community. There 
are none of those pe~ty devices which hamper trade without 
helping revenue and above all none of those protective duties 
in which the Exchequer shares with favored im:;erests the 
plunder of the poor.49 
22 
From the other side of the political spectrum, The Nation noted in its 
November 21 issue that the budget seemed "admirably devised11 ,50 The budget 
was the affirmation of the official acceptance of "business as usual" as 
an economic policy. The government intended to let the economy float 
through the war adjusting "naturally" to each new situation as it ca.me 
along. 
In lat.e 1914 it seemed to the government as if all the immediate 
problems had been worked out. Although prices continued to rise at a 
steady rate, the shock to home industry which had caused so many people 
to be thrown out of work was wearing off, The efforts to relieve dis-
located workers and their families had been largely funneled through the 
normal agencies and they, as far as the government was concerned, had done 
a more than adequate job. Kitcheqer's problems in the War Office, despite 
the friction between the Secretary and civilian authorities, also seemed 
to be moving towards settlement. The question concerning the position of 
labor during the war, although widely discussed, was generally shunted 
into the background during the first month of the war. Patriotism demanded 
49,l'he Economist, November 21, 1914, p. 907. 
50"P8.ying for the War," The Nation, November 21, l• 14, p. 237. 
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that labor should try to cooperate with the government and industry 
during the war. Moreover, the position of labor at the beginning of the 
war was not exactly a strong one. Massive unemployment was the major 
threat to the working cle.ss, not exploitation. Hopeful of a short war, 
labor closed ranks with the rest of the nation, ·willing to make its share 
of sacrifices. 
As soon as the war began, industrial and labor leaders with some 
prodding from the government moved to conclude an industrial truce. At 
the beginning of August there were over one hundred ongoing labor disputes 
in Britain. By the end of the month only twenty remained unsettled. Lord 
Askwith, Chief Industrial Commissioner for the g::ivernment, claims that 
"disputes melted away as fast as the hours of the day and often of the 
night".51 The London building trade dispute and the employers threatened 
nation·-wide lockout was averted and both employers and the union asked for 
arbitration. The Marine Engineers' Union proclaimed a truce and their men 
went back to work. Electricians, shop repairers, boilermakers, and dock 
laborers all made quick settlements in the name of national unity, or at 
least went back to work. Electricians, shop repairers, boilermakers, 8.Ild 
dock laborers all made quick settlements in the name of national unity, 
or at least went back to work pending further negotiation.52 The Times 
reported to its readers that by Auglist 8, 
The coal trimmers and tippers in South Wales have intimated 
that they will work at any time, during day or night. The 
General Workers' Union are getting their men to remain at 
work, ar.d are avoiding the raising of new questions. In 
South Wales the Miners' Federation have decided that a.11 
existing questions, inc:uding those relating to non-unionism, 
should be dropped. The Scottish coalowr.ers have intimated 
51Askwith, ~· cit., p. 358. c:-2 ~ The Times, August 8, 1914. 
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to the miners in Scotland that in view of the existing position 
they will no~ proceed with their claims for a ~eduction in wages.53 
All over the nation it looked as if the trade unions and the industrial-
ists were prepared to postpone their long-standing conflicts. Patriotism~ 
common sacrifice, and a desire to do one's bit was in the air. 
On August 28, a con~erence of top labor leaders was held in orde+ 
to more fully develop a wartime industrial policy. It was agreed by the 
representatives at the meeting 
• • • that an immediate effort be made to terminate all 
existing trade disputes whether strikes or lockouts, and 
whenever new points of difficulty arise during the war 
period, a serious attempt should be made by all concerned 
to reach an amicable settlement before resorting to a strike 
or lockout.54 
Fully expecting the war to be short aud the peace a temporary one, the 
unions, e,s a rule, quickly moved to settle all outstanding trade disputes. 
Even as the truce was being worked out, many in the trade unions 
were beginning to reconsider the concessions that had been made in the 
name of patriotism. Rising food prices and the abuses some experienced 
at the hands of the relief committees made the unconditional truce that 
labor had agreed upon look less than advantageous by October. 
The results of the first half-million and then the second 
half million men being withdrawn from industries, the knowledge 
slowly sinking into some minds that the war would not end with-
out a long and bitter struggle~ the hope in other minds that it 
would soon end and business must be preserved, losses in one 
business, profits in another, competition for skilled men, efforts 
to fulfill contracts at any price, all the many dislocations of a 
sudden great war began to have an effect.55 
53Ibid., August 8, 1914. 
54Askwith, ~·cit., pp. 358-359.55co1e, .212.· cit., p. 108. 
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Labor opinion bega.."'1 to become unsettled and nervous over the prospects of 
a prolonged war. The industrial truce had been proclaimed primarily on 
impulse without much forethought. There had been no attempt to lay down 
any conditions and 110 provisions had been made in case of inflation or 
profiteering by industrialists. "They did not go to the government and 
the employers and sa~, 'If you wish us to keep the peace these are our 
terms.' Rather they said, 'We will keep the peace, 1 and then went to the 
Government, cap in hand. 1156 The realization of this tactical error caused 
some of the union leaders to challenge the peace treaty with capitalism. 
The Chief Industrial Commissioner, who had helped to settle many of the 
August disputes, stepped in on behalf of the government in order to patch 
up the deteriorating industrial harmony. Ask:with's efforts were generally 
designed to shore up the status-quo and insure uninterrupted production. 
Thus, the government's "business as usual" policy was being extended to 
mean "labor as usual 11 , but the trade unions were slowly coming to the 
conclusion that the policy was asking them to make all the sacrifices. 
As a result, industrial tensions gradually inc~eased during the fall months 
of 1914.57 
In the ship-building and engineering trades, conferences had been 
held between employers and employees in order better to organize the 
industry. Attempts were made to deal jointly with questions concerning 
production, work restrict~ons, and better use of increasingly short man-
power. However, the series of meetings failed to produce any significant 
recommendations. In December ship-builders and unions met again, this 
time to discuss the suspension of work rules, but here again the two 
56 ... 4 Cole,££• cit.,~· 7. 57.fbid. , p. l'+o. 
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parties failed to reach common gr01md. Near the end of the year the 
general industrial situation appeared to be "a complete deadlock, and 
something like despair in the minds of those who had been most energetic 
in attempting to effect an agreement. 11 58 Perhaps the most dangerous 
problem was developing in the munitions industry where skilled men were 
needed everywhere, not only because of the soaring demand but because 
in the first days of the war many munitions workers had rushed off to 
enlist. Although many of them were being turned out of the military 
and returning to their old jobs, the increasing demands for munitions 
by the army could not be met. Long hours were being required and 
workers were often pirated by competing firms. In all industries by · 
the end of the year there was conf'usion, hardship and uncertainty. 
Anxiety had generally replaced the almost rabid patriotism of most 
English working people and the government did very little to ease their 
conf'usion. 
By the end of 1914 the industrial situation had become increasing-
ly more critical, though the government and many observers were still 
painting pictures of industrial peace. John B. C. Kershaw, writing in 
the Fortnightly Review in December 1914, suggested to his fellow coun-
trymen that "We may face the f'uture with some degree of confidence that 
during the period for which the war lasts we will be able to maintain our 
mills and factories in fairly regular operation."59 This widespread 
belief was based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the war in which 
59John B. C. Kershaw, "The Effects of Warfare Upon Commerce and 
Industry,"Fortnightly Review, December 1914, p. 1024. 
England fom1d herself. Most planning, except Kitchener's, had been 
geared to a short war. Addison, in his diary, -writes of a dinner in 
late November, at which goverrurcen.t officials were still counting the 
months until peace would be declared. 
There was an interesting little group at dinner in the House--
L. G., Simon, the Reas and l'Jeedham (Sir George). The whole 
talk, of coll!'se, was of the war. Simon has a fixed notion that 
peace will be declared on July the 18th of next year, whilst 
Montagu has decided on August 13th. Lloyd George thought it 
might be some time between the end of the summer and Christmas 
--probably nearer Chri stma.s. An;yhow, he felt it would last 
longer than most people thought.bO 
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Few people were speculating on the effects of an extended war on British 
domestic life. A prophetic exception to this prevailing attitude was 
Ramsey MacDonald, who in a letter to 'rhe Nation on September 8, wrote 
In every respect, we have gone to war without counting the 
costs. We a.re to be menaced with military domination in 
Great Bri ta.J.n including compuJ.sory !n.ili tary service, and 
with financial obligations--including debt to the depend-
ants of the dead and to the maimed themselves--which are to 
be colossal •.. Peace appears to be far off, and national 
disaster threateningly near.61 
MacDonald, however, was on the fringes of the political spectrum and most 
refused to listen. Instead, the government continued to pretend that 
society could cperate as usual long after it should have become clear that 
the war wouid demand much more of British society.62 
The experiences of' the first four months of the war had shown the 
Liberal government that wartime domestic problems could work themselves 
6oAddison, F'our and a Half' Years, SE.· cit., diary entry, November 23, 
1914, pp. 46-47. 
61Ramsey Mac:Donald, Letter to the Editor, The Nation, September 12, 
1914' p. 841. 
62Askwith, 2l'.· _9.it., p. 259. 
out through normal channels. A huge: new arm;y had been raised and was 
being put in the field despite the initial confusion in the War Office. 
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The economy, severely shaken, had not collapsed and appeared to be re-
adjusting to the war. Moreover, the U..Tlem:ployment among the working class 
had prQved to be short-term and the resulting distress had been eased by 
the regular authorities. The government had also watched labor disputes 
melt away in a great expression of patriotism, self-sacrifice, and 
national llllity. This course of events blinded those in the government 
to the danger signals and they concluded that the domestic situation 
would care for itself and adjust to each new situation. They ignored in 
December the rising dissatisfaction among the working class and especially 
the trade lUlions. The government also closed its eyes to the growing in-
ability of industry to meet production schedules. Under the banner of 
"business as usual" the government pursued what was in reality a non-policy 
towards domestic affairs. Planning was on a short term basis only. The 
Liberal government all but ignored the possibilities of a protracted con-
flict requiring national organization and maximum efficiency at home as 
well as on the battlefields in France. 
Despite the general tendency during the first four months of the 
war to let the domestic situation drift and readjust itself to wartime 
conditions, a body of war laws was created by Parliament. The government 
saw that some measures were needed in order to ensure domestic security 
against enemy subversion and possible sabotage. In response to this need, 
the government introduced in the House on Au~st 8, 1914, the first 
Defence of the Realm Act, otherwise affectionately known as D.O.R.A. The 
act was passed amid a landslide of other war-related legislation, receive-
ing little in the way of individual attention, either in the House, by 
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the major journals, or the large daily newspapers. However, the first 
D.O.R.A. would soon take on a much larger role within British society 
than any of its sponsors had anticipated or imagined. 
The Secretary of State for the Home Department, ~tr. McKenna, in-
traduced the Defence of the Realm Bill on August 8, saying that its 
purpose was to make regulations during the war for the defense of the 
realm. The bill was simple and straightforward, having two goals. They 
were: 
(a) to prevent persons communicating with the enemy or 
obtaining information for that purpose or any purpose 
calculated to jeopardize the success of the operations 
of any of His Majesty's Forces or to assist the enemy; 
(b) to secure the safety of any means of communication or 
of railways, dock or harbours.63 
The bill was broad. and. wide open, allowing the military to see that these 
two goals were met. After a short explanation of the bill the House passed 
it without debate. The new act did not allow the imposition of the death 
sentence and the government promised that sufficient safeguards against 
the more abrasive qualities of martial law would be erected. Nonetheless, 
judgement for those accused of violations was to be based on military law. 
Almost no concern about the vagueness of the act was expressed; it seems 
that all parties in the House were convinced that the act would be used 
only against spies and saboteurs and could not possibly affect loyal 
Britishers. 
On August 25, :Mr. McKenna again went before the House, this time in 
order to propose an amendment to the original bill. The amendment was a 
63 
House er Commons De bat_-=.§_, August 8, 1914, (col. 2192) • 
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refinement of the earlier version, providing for an even wider exercise 
of military authority on British soil. Under the first act, power was 
given to enable the military, in conjunction with the civilian govern-
ment, to exercise a degree of control over communications and transpor-
tation. The addition to the act extended these povers "to all areas in 
which trade is being carried on". The government's newest proposal 
sought to amend the earlier act by adding to paragraph (a) the words, 
"or to prevent the spread of reports likely to cause dissaffection or 
ala.rm". Following paragraph (b) the government asked that the phrase 
"or of any area which may be proclaimed by the Admiralty or Army Council 
to be an area which it is necessarily to safeguard in the interests of 
the training or concentration of any of His Majesty's Forces" be added. 
A third paragraph (c) was also proposed. This would enable the A.."'filY or 
Admiralty to re~uisition vacant buildings for military barracks or 
storehouses.64 The only objections raised to these amendments to the 
act had to d.o with the position of the press. Mr. C. P. Trevelyan asked 
if the bill might be used to "prevent the expression in speech or in wri-
ting of any political opinions on the actions of the government 11 .65 ~~. 
McKenna replied by giving his assurances, noting that the provisions would 
be used only in the most blatant of cases, "which may cause disaffection 
and do cause harm". 66 This explanation satisfied Mr. Trevelyan and the 
amendment to the Defence of the Realm Act passed easily. 
64 11Defence of the Realm Act," Sessional Papers of the House of 
Commons, Public Bills, Vol. I, 1914. 
65House of Commons Debates, August 26, 1914, (cols. 87-88). 
66Ibid., (cols. 88-89). 
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On November 16, the DE::.~ence of the Healn Consolidation Bill, which 
sought to combine D.O.R.A. with the Aliens Restriction Act, was introduced, 
It received its second reading on November 23, with the government's rep-
resentative, Mr. McKenna, again in the House. During the debate, attention 
was ce~tered on the possibilities of government censorship of the press as 
a result of the bill. Already some correspondents had complained bitter-
ly·that they were unable to observe the fighting at the front because of 
the army's failure to cooperate. Moreover, the press in general and 
especially the Liberal press, had become extremely sensitive to what it 
considered to be overzealous censors.67 Lord Robert Cecil said of the 
previously enacted clause of D. 0 .R.A., that "They practically enable the 
Government to suppress any reports of any kind of which they ~he govern-
ment censorsJ disapprove". He added to this that, "It does not matter 
whether or not the reports are true or untrue. They may be perfectly 
true, but the Government are still entitled •••• to suppress them al-
together, and not only to suppress them, but to bring anyone who spreads 
them before a court-martial 11 .68 To this McKenna replied that the govern-
ment had been ve~y careful and felt that it had exercised its powers with 
extreme discretion. He noted that the only time so far the government 
had attempted to "muzzle" the press was in the case of one newspaper that 
was preparing an issue which declared there were 250,000 Germans in London. 
McKenna added that he did not think it was abuse of power for the government 
6711The Press Bureau", The New Statesman, November 21, 1914, pp. 156-
157. 
68YJouse of Commons Debates, November 23, 1914, (col. 910). Riddell, 
~· cit., diary cnt:!'y, November 20, 19li+, p. 41. 
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to pre-empt that particular issue of the newspaper in question.69 
Action on the bill wa.s deferred for two days until November 25, when 
the House again took up the issue. During the debate, McKenna put forward 
two new amendments to the Defence of the Realm Act. He proposed that 
it shall be lawful for the Adrn.iralty or A:rmy Council: 
(a) to require that there shall be placed at their disposal 
the whole or any part of the output of a..~y factory or 
workshop in which arms, ammunition or warlike stores or 
equipment, or any articles required for the production 
thereof, are manufactured; 
(b) to take possession and use for the purpose of His Majesty's 
Naval or Military Service any such factory or workshop or 
any plant thereof? and Regulations under this Act may be 
made accordingly. 0 
McKenna commented after presenting the government's proposal that these new 
powers were being requested so as to ensure an abundant supply of munitions 
for the war effo::::-t. The amendment was quickly approved with only one voice 
of dissent. One M.P., a Mr. Holt, representing Northumberland, noted that 
the military, when given control of anything, "are most unreasonable". 
While pointing 01it to his fellow members that "the requirements of the 
civil population are just as important to the Crown as any other section 
of the population", he was shouted down with a loud "NO!". The motives 
for Holt's objection are not clearly defined. What is clear, though, is 
.that most of those in the House overlooked the possible wider applications 
of the amendments proposed by the government. 
Following the passage of the consolidation bill, an article appeared 
in the December 12 issue of 'I'he New Statesman, entitled "War Law". This 
69House of Coillillons Debates, November 23, 1914 (col. 914). 
70Ibid. , November 25, 1914 (cols. 1274-1275). 
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remarkably perceptive i;iece seated. simply a larger view of the Defence of 
the Realm Consolidation Act, which the House, for the most part, had over-
looked. The commentator wrote that, "Put shortly, the point of the Act 
lies in the fact it gives the Cabinet pcwer to legislate, within certain 
wide limits, without the cumbersome necessity of passing Acts through the 
House of Parlia.ment. 11 71 Adding a hopeful prophecy, the writer supplements 
his evaluation by saying that 
It would appear, therefore, that so far at any rate as quite 
a large sphere of the national life is concerned the democratic 
fabric of our government has been quick~y, decently and legally 
transformed into a bureaucracy with wide legislative and judi-
cial powers. There is, however, not much reason to anticipate 
that the actual exercise of these new drastic powers will itself 
be unduly drastic . . . . The Government have simply allowed a 
wide margin for contingencies; they have given themselves an ell 
in order that they may take several inches. 
Continuing the analysis, the article is concluded by the author, who notes 
that 
They have abolished trial by jury, the liberty of the subject, 
the liberty of the Press, but they have proceeded with a 
certain commend.able discretion, masking the howitzers of their 
martial law behind the theoretically inviolate citadel of the 
British Constitution.72 
The shroud of the constitution, however, was not to cover the howitzers of 
D.O.R.A. for long. The government, during the first months of the war, had 
not finally resolved any of its domestic problems and it had failed to dev-
elop an effective policy towards either hone industry or labor. As a result, 
industry was totally unorganized and not meeting the production demands of 
the War Office, whereas labor was growing increasingly restless with infla-
tion and low wages. As these factors threatened to impede the war effort, 
D.O.R.A. would take on a new importance by the spring of 1915. 
7l"Wa.r Law", The New State~~. December 12, 1914, p. 239. 
721oid., p. 246. 
CHAPTER II 
THE END OF BUSINESS AS USUAL 
The two issues of production and labor persistently pl~gued the 
Liberal government during the first four months of the war and these 
problems were carried into the new year. Labor, led by the trade unions, 
began to bring the industrial peace to an end, while at the same time the 
government was discovering that the troops on the front did not have 
enough munitions to carry on the war. Each of these problems had differ-
ent root causes, but as they grew they tended to inflame each other, 
overlap and become a single complicated issuP.. Tne government, after 
months of try:Lng to deal with them separately, found that its efforts 
had been fruitless. Finally, in the spring of 1915, the government 
dropped its ·"business as usual" policy towards the home front, realizing 
that, in modern tota..l warfare, domestic efficiency was as important to 
victory as the soldi~rs in the trenches of FrA.nce. 
Af'ter the outbreak. of the war in August, labor had agreed to parti-
cipate in an industrial truce. It was expected by workers, but never 
guaranteed by the government or industrial employers, that existing rates 
of real wages and profits would be maintained. Prices from the beginning 
of the war corrtir.ued to climb unabated, at a steady inflationary rate, 
whereas wages ror the vast majority of workers did not keep pace with the 
increased cost; of living. Using ~Tuly 1914 as the normal price standard, 
prices on the first day of each month until June 1915 rose by the follow-
ing percentages: 
September, 1914 
October, 1914 
November, 1914 
December, 1914 
January, 1915 
• 10% 
12% 
• • • 13% 
••• 16% 
18% 
Februacy, 1915 • 
March, 1915 
April, 1915 
• • 22% 
. 24% 
24% 
May, 1915 
June, 1915 
• • • 26% 
32% 1 
Though organized labJr had lain down the sword of industrial action, in 
an effort to do their bit during the war, it was always suspicious of 
both government and industry. As early as August 5, 1914, a group of 
labor leaders met to form an ad hoc group to voice the concerns of the 
English working class.2 The Workers' National Committee proposed that 
the responsible central authorities should take measures for officially 
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controlling " (a) the purchase and storage of food; (b) the fixing of maxi-
mum prices of food and trade necessities; and (c) the distribution of food." 
The committee further promoted the idea that citizen committees be set up 
to "guard against the exploitation of the people by unnecessarily hi.gh 
prices."3 Later in the fall these demands were expanded to cover the full 
range of working class consumer goods, but the call for controls went de-
cidedly against the grain of the government's expressed domestic policy. 
As a result the connnittee's demands concerning prices and profits "were 
treated either with a bare denial of their possibility or with a contemptu-
ous 'wait until June'".4 ' 
Labor could not wait. Many among the working class, noting that the 
rapid advance in the price of necessities, especially foodstuffs and coal, 
1M. B. Hammond, British Labor Conditions and Legislation Dm·ing the 
the War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1919), p. 61. 
2G. D. H. Cole, Labour in the War (London: G. Bell and Son, Ltd., 
1915), p. 118. The committee was made up of trade unionists but they en-
visioned that their role was to speak for all members of the working class. 
3Ibid.' p. 99. 4Ibid., p. 115 • 
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were not accompanied by ru1 equal rise in their wages, began to suspect 
many industries of profiteering. Opinion differs·as to how widespread 
profiteering was, but the psychological impact of the confirmed cases on 
an already doubting working class began to sheke the foundations of the 
industrial truce. I'he trade unions took up the battle to bring prices 
down by ending what they saw as an inequality of sacrifice. While they 
were being asked to absorb a cut in real wages, they charged that their 
employers were making huge wartime profits. On January 14, 1915, the Work-
er's National Committee reissued a series of demands they had first made 
on October 5, 1914. The resolution declared that 
The price of wheat having risen to a figure (38s. to 45s. per 
quarter) which allows a reasonable margin of profit for home-
growers, who are being advised, against the truest interests 
of the nation, to refrain from growing more wheat until prices 
rule considerably higher, this Committee is of the opinion that 
the Government should appoint a Royal Corrunission on Wheat • . • 5 
The resolution suggested that the objectives of the royal commission should 
be to commandeer all stocks of English-grown wheat at prices from 35s. to 
40s. a quarter. The committee also asked that the proposed cormnission then 
sell all the wheat at the current prices, paying a 5 percent bounty to the 
growers, and that the balance of the profit should be placed in the nation-
al treasury. Finally, the workers' cormnittee insisted that one-fifth of all 
cultivated lands, other than market gardens under 5 acres, be set aside 
exclusively for wheat production. In addition to these specific recommen-
dations, the committee reasppointed the Food Prices Sub-Committee, which 
had been previously aba.~doned. The sub-committee was charged with making 
an intensive investigation into the causes o~ high food and coal prices. 
5Ibid., p. 241. 
37 
Two days later, the Manchester Guardiem, in a rather lengthy ar-
ticle, condemned the government for its inaction ifith regard to the rate 
of inflation. Th~ paper told its readers thc.t 
Whatever the causes may be, the result is a serious addition to 
the burden which the poorer classes of the country have already 
been called upon to bear. The Government has dcne m~ch to safe-
guard the producing interests of the community. For the consumer 
they have so far done little. 
The article continued to name what it assumed to be the causes of the con-
tinuing advance in the price of constuner goods, noting that 
The employment of a very large number of ships on transport 
work and the loss by capture or internment of other ships (equal 
probably to the new construction of two or three years) have re-
duced the merchantile marine of all the belligerent colL~tries 
to such an extent that ship owners are able to dictate terms as 
they have never been able to do before. This is a kind of mono-
poly profit wrung from the shipper of goods and through him from 
the consumer, for which there is no moral justification at all.6 
Tb.is conclusion was echoed by the Sub-Committee on Food and Prices, which 
within a week of its reappointment delivered its first report.7 The commi-
ttee conceded in their memorandum that shipping costs had indeed gone up 
due to dockside congestion and the shortage of ships, but they pointed out 
that this alone did not justify the prevailing high shipping charges. In-
flated food prices, the committee charged, were exacted by the ship owners 
from shippers, and therefore from consumers . 8 
6Ma.nchester Guardian, January 16, 1915. 
7.An interesting, but rather callous response to labor's and the 
Liberal Press' charge of profiteering is, Edwin Cannon, "The Good Si de 
of Hig..'1 Prices, 11 The Contemporary Review, March 1915, p. 312. He likens 
Britain to a siege town and argues that high prices eliminate the need 
for rationing by eliminating the waste from the diets of the people. He 
notes that "nearly as much has been eaten". 
81ord Askwith, Industrial Problems and Dis utes, (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Company, 1921 , pp. 372-373. A more moderate view is presented 
here but he explicitly denies that excess profits were being made. 
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After issuing their initial report, the committee turned their 
attention to the question of high coal prices, the subject of their 
second report published on January 28. The committee's investigation 
revealed that three distinct groups were ma.king larger than usual profits 
from the sale of coal to the public: ~line owners, coal merchants, and 
coal shippers who had all unduly raised their prices. In most cases, the 
committee suggested that the greatest profits were being made by the coal 
merchants and manufacturers who sold their excess or low quality coal to 
the public. The committee also discovered that nearly all the coal being 
sold for household use in London had been contracted for at pre-war coal 
prices. When the war-inspired inflation began, those with existing coal 
contracts raised their prices even though they were still paying pre-war 
wholesale prices.9 
Though the committee reported that the retail coal dealers were 
making larger than usual profits, they found that the mine owners and the 
coasting shipowners were not gaining as much. Even so, the report argued 
that they too were ta.king advantage of the situation. The workers' commi-
ttee, as a result of these findings, issued a series of recommendations 
to the govermnent for its consideration. They urged 
1. That maximum prices for coal should be fixed by the Government. 
2. That railway trucks, belonging both to the separate railway 
companies and to private traders should be pooled to run 
at their fullest economic use. 
3, That in fixing shipping freights for vessels under their 
control, the Government should have regard to normal 
rates, rather than the excessive rates inflicted 
by private shipowners. We also reiterate 
9cole, 912.· cit. , p. 127. See comparison chart of both retail and 
wholesale pric~s before and after the beginning of the war. 
our demand for public control of general merchant shipping. 
4. That the Government commandeer coal suppiies and distribute 
to the household consumers throu~Jl mu....~icipsl er co-~perative 
agencies. 
5. That district conferences on this and kindred subjects be 
organized in various industrial centers.lO 
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The fifth point was added in order to force the findings of the report 
into the public view and to create pressure on the government which would 
force it to act. It was hoped that the meetings, which were slated to 
be held on February 13, would help to solidify working class opinion 
around the committee's report and behind the larger actions of the Work-
er's National Committee. 
Events, however, began to move much faster than the workers' com-
mi ttee or anyone else had anticipated. Labor disputes during most of 
January had been kept at a minimum, but near the end of the month new 
disputes began to break out. The day after the committee's final report 
was made public a long festering coal miner's controversy in Yorkshire 
became infla.rned.11 The mine owners had proposed a cut in wages for the 
miners, while the workers demanded more money to meet the rising cost of 
living. A strike was threatened but the miners had mixed feelings about 
breaking 7.he industrial truce. One of the leaders of the miners' union 
is quoted by the M3.Ilchester Guardian as saying that 
At this moment of national crisis the men are exceedingly 
reluctant to take drastic action, but after months of delay 
a.nd the failure to obtain anything definite we feel the time 
has come to enforce the carrying out of our agreements, even 
·at the risk of a strike. Our one desire from the beginning 
of the war has been to maintain the industrial truce, but the 
lOib·d 
_i_. -·, p. 129. 
llThe New Statesman, February 6, 1915. 
actions of the coal owners has compelled the men to insist upon 
the carrying out of agreements.12 
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Prior to the war, certain wage agreements had been made between the miners 
and their employers. The miners' claims were dropped at the start of the 
war, a.rid further negotiations took place. As the union leader noted, 
nothing came of the meetings and the trade unions felt they had no choice 
but to demand that employers honor all previous agreements. 
On January 26 the Engineers' Union refUsed to go along with a sus-
pension of their trade rules, despite a shortage of labor. They feared 
that an influx of cheap labor into their shops might destroy the power of 
the unions which would result in lower wages. The Salford section of the 
Dockers' Union threatened to go out on strike if they did not receive a 
raise amounting to ls. a day. The Ship Canal Workers announced that they 
too were considering asklng 'for higher wages and called a meeting of their 
members to discuss the issue .13 Finally, on February 2 the Executive 
Cou.~cil of the National Transportation Workers' Federation announced that 
they had decided to call an emergency conference of their affiliated 
unions. The purpose of this meeting was to consider "the necessary measures 
_to obtain such an advance of wages amongst transport workers as to meet 
the increased cost of living".14 This announcement presented the prospects 
of the most serious breach of the industrial peace yet. The Federation, 
which consisted of 28 different unions with a total membership of 400,000 
workers, were moving towards a strike that could play havoc with the 
war effort. 
12Manchester Guardian, January 25, 1915. 
13Ibid., January 27, 1915. 14Ibid., February 3, 1915. 
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In February the rank e.nd file membership of the railway workers, a 
member 1i.rlion of the Transport Workers' Federation·, demanded that their 
leaders secure for them an increase in wages. In November the union had 
agreed to suspend their long-standing demands for better conditions, but 
by February they were asking the ra.ilowners for a.n increase in wages. 
The hesitant union leadership was pushed by their membership into threat-
ening a strike if the employers did not come forward with an advance, which 
the companies flatly refused to do.15 Fearing the consequences of a nation-
al rail strike, which might easily spread to the entire transportation 
industry, the government stepped in and proposed a system of war bonuses. 
At first the union balked, arguing that the bonuses were only temporary 
and not permanent raises, but by mid-February the railway men accepted 
the compromise and entered into the nation's first war bonus agreement, 
thus avoiding a strike. The railway companies agreed to pay a 3s. bonus 
per week to all me~ earning less than 30s. weekly and an extra 2s. each 
week to all men whose incomes exceeded 30s. This increase was not enough 
to bring the men back to pre-war real income levels, but, still swayed by 
patriotism, the men settled their dispute in the national interest. 16 
The more radical labor leaders objected to the war bonus compromise 
settlement, fearing that it would set a new precedent and make it much 
harder for unions to bring real wages back up to pre-war levels. Robert 
Williams, Secretary of the Transport Workers' Federation, commented at 
the time that 
In London the position was certainly not helped by the settle-
ment of the Railwaymen's proposals. Fo~ us as transport workers, 
l5Hammond, ~· cit., p. 63. 16cole, ~·cit., p.143. 
the position has been app:!'.'eciably worsened by this example. 
In Hull, Bristol, Leith, Cardiff, advances have bee~ secured 
ranging from )+s. to 7s. per week. In London, "the Employer's 
Committee countered the claim by the Dockers' Union for an 
increase of 2d. per hour by saying that the cost of living 
had not increased more for dock labourers than for railway 
men, and the increase was accordingly fixed at 3s. per veek 
for the permanent men and 7d. per day for casuals. 
Williams continued by complaining that an unsatisfactory precedent had 
been established by the railway workers. He rather gloomily forecast 
that 
There is not the slightest doubt that the Manchester Ship 
Canal Co. will adhere to their similar offer to the Salford 
Dockers, en the same lines, and there is a warrentable pre-
sumption that the demands submitted in Liverpool for an in-
crease of ls. per day will be dealt with similarly.17 
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The fears expressed by Williams proved to be well founded. Throughout the 
first two weeks in February the government advised employers to make simi-
lar settlements with their employees in order to assure uninterrupted pro-
duction.18 
Patriotism was a strong restraining factor among most of the working 
class. They hesitated to resort to the pre-war tactics of work stoppages, 
slow downs and strikes, even though as each day passed they were being 
asked to accept a reduced salary despite overtime. The promise of ws.r 
bonuses helped to ease the sting of inflation, but they- were insufficient 
to keep up with its steady advance. If there had been any doubt about the 
reality of profiteering in the minds of the working class, it had disappeared 
by early February. Mr:-. H. I. Mitchell, a contemporary commentator, pointed 
out that "the labour difficulty has been largely ce.used by the men being of 
the opinion that, while they were being called upon to be patriotic and 
l 7 Ibid.' p. 144. 18The New Statesman, Feb. 20, 1915, p. 475. 
refrain from using the strm~s economic positi:)n they occupied, employers, 
merchants, and traders were being allowed. perfect· freedom to exploit to 
the fullest the nation's needs. 1119 "The Government," The Nation wrote, 
"might prove its good faith by intervening to prevent the exploiting of 
the workers • • . • It should now be possible to consider the interests 
o"i' the workmen and offer them a wage in some way commensurate with the 
r~se in prices. 1120 
Two days before the labor conferences called by the Workers' Nation-
al Committee were due to meet, the government finally stepped forward with 
an official statement. In an effort to patch up the industrial truce the 
Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, went before the House to explain the govern-
ment's position. The Prime Minister drew attention to two points in his 
address which he felt mitigated the need for strong action from the 
Liberal government. He argued first that the rise in the cost of living 
stated in its most extreme terms which the facts permit, 
is, I think, substantially below the level at which the 
most somberminded and the best informed judgements in the 
country would have apprehended or anticipated if they had 
been told that a war upon this scale . . • • had been con-
tinued for so long a time as six months. 
,Asquith further noted that, even though there had been substantial rises 
in the prices of food and other commodities, that 
The level they have obtained, or are likely to obtain, 
so far as one can form any forecast a.t all, does not 
exceed, and in many respects falls short of, the level 
19r. A. Mitchell, cited in Asquith,££· cit., p. 373. ~litchell 
was a civil servant in the Industrial Commissioners' Department of which 
Askwith was head. 
20The Nation, February 13, 1915~ p. 607. 
which those of us who are living now, and still more those 
who went before us have experienced and been accustomed to 
in times of profound peace.21 
Adding insult to injury to those who had hoped for some decisive 
action, the Prime Minister predicted that by June prices would level off 
as the new crops became available. Asking for patience until then, he 
concluded his remarks by calling on the nation "to make the sacrifices· 
which patriotism and public spirit demand. n22 This was blatant denial 
of the claims of injustice being made by working people throughout the 
country. It was clear that the government was refusing to act and was 
hiding its inaction behind appeals to working class patriotism. 
Feeling somewhat abused, Mr. J. R. Clynes, a Labour M. P. from 
Manchester, rose and took Asquith to task for trying to minimize the 
problem. Clynes charged that whereas most Members of the House were for-
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tunate enough not to feel the effects of the change in the cost of necessi-
ties, the poor were not so lucky. He pointed out that a 10 to 20 shilling 
rise in the cost of nearly all basic commodities had the effect of reduc-
ing many workers to a bare subsistence level, thus wiping out recent ad-
vances made in the average laborers' standard of living. Furthermore, he 
accused the government's policy of allowing a free play of competition 
of being just the opposite of that. Clynes asserted that "What we have 
got is combines, syndicates and ririgs, which arrange for prices for 
themselves. 1123 The Labour M. P. issued the following warning to his 
colleagues in Parliament: 
2lHouse of Commons Debates, February ll, 1915, (cols. 758-759). 
22Ibid., p. 776. 23Ibid. ' p. 779. 
We are as anxious as ar1yone in the country to keep trade and 
business going without disruption, disturbance or quarrel with 
the employers, but it is quite patent to us, who are perhaps 
a little nearer to the conditions of the working men than other 
Members of this House, that a bid truce in industry cannot be 
continued unless some effective relief is given.24 
The implications of the M. P. 's warning were clear, but the general opinion 
among both Liberal and Tory members was that the government could do little 
to curb the rate of inflation. After some debate the House ad,journed, 
agreeing to meet the following Wednesday, February 15, in order to continue 
the discussion. 
Before the House again took up the issue of prices, the meetings 
sponsored by the Worker's National Committee were held as planned, on 
February 13, 1913. 'I'he conferences were held in the larger cities, London, 
Liverpool, Bradford, Cardiff, Leicester, Birmingham, and Portsmouth. The 
trade unionists, socialist societies, cooperatives, and industrial women's 
organizations who came together were angry at the government's insensiti-
vity towards the working class.25 1'he New Statesman pointed out that 
"What seemed to be the cold heartlessness of Mr. Asquith's speech--notably 
his assumption that a rise of twenty percent in prices, after all, a small 
hardship for the ¥age-earners to bear as the result of a world war, has 
considerably embittered those workmen whom it has reached. 11 26 As a result 
of Asquith's statements the meetings on the 13th passed a strongly~worded 
24Ibid., p. 753. 
25.Manchester Gua.Tdian, February 13, 1915. 
26Tlle New Statesman, February 20, .1915~p. 474. 
resolution, which stated 
That this conference expresses its deep indignation and 
disappointment at the refusal of the Government to take 
effective measures to deal with the alarming rises in the 
cost of food and fuel. It appeals to the House of Commons 
to force the Government to take immedia~e steps to relieve 
the unsupportable burden which the cost of the necessaries 
of life is imposing upon the working classes 
The resolution added that the recommendations of the sub-committee on 
prices be accepted by the House in place of "the policy of inaction put 
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forward by the Government. 1127 Several of the meetings proved to be more 
militant than had been expected and these made further demands. The 
London conference congratulated Mr. Clynes on his stand ir. the House and 
proposed the Labour M. P.'s try and force the conference's recommendations 
through the House. In Manchester a resolution was passed that urged a 
nationwide work stoppage if drastic action was not forthcoming. 
The debate in Parliament was renewed on February 17. An amendment 
was moved by Labour, advocating the fixing of maximum prices and government 
control of basic commodities, which might be subject to artificial costs. 
The government, represented by Mr. Runciman, opposed the motion and the 
Labour attempt to secure a division was defeated by the speaker with the 
support of both Liberals and Conservatives.28 The time for talk, however, 
had passed the Commons by. On the previous day (February 16), the first 
real break in the industrial truce had begun. The Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers employed in the Clyde Shipyards, after having their application 
for a 2d. per hour wage increase denied by the owners and ignored by the 
government, went on strike. 
27cole, ~· cit., p. 131. 
28House of Commons Debates, February 17, 1915,(cols. 1151-1224). 
Before the war the Clyde workers had bt!er1 promised a 2d. increase 
per hour, but implementation was delayed when hostilities began. Prior 
to the war, engineers in other districts had secured large wage boosts 
by renegotiating earlier contracts, but the Clyde workers had adhered to 
their original contract dating from 1912. Because of this they found that 
they were earning considerably less than fellow workers in other districts 
and" were at a marked disadvantage when the war came. As the nation wea-
thered the last four months of 1914, the Clyde workers waited patiently 
for the promised raise, which was made increasingly meaningless by infla-
tion. Finally, after months of waiting, on December 16, 1914, the union 
made their application for the 2d. raise. The employers, taking advantage 
of a technical flaw in the application, delayed their response until 
December 30, when they finally informed the union that the demand was un-
reasonable. The refusal issued by the owners had come so late that there 
was not enough time for the union to submit the dispute to the government-
sponsored Central Conference for Arbitration, whose next meeting was not 
scheduled to be held until February 12. This meant that the workers, if 
they waited, would have to go another month without receiving an increase 
in wages .29 
The union's district committee, seeing the cost of the delays, sought 
to bring the issue to a head. They ordered the men to cease work on January 
20 if a settlement could not be reached. The employers became frightened 
of the possibility of a strike and agreed to meet the union at a local 
conference to be held on January 19 the day before the union's deadline. 
29cole, .2E.· cit., p. 148-149. 
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The meeting was held, and following it the workers' representatives post-
poned the strike and decided to sit down once again with the owners in 
order to work out an agreement. At this second meeting on January 22, the 
employers put forward their proposal. They offered an immediate raise of 
a farthing per hour, which would after three months be supplemented by 
an additional farthing. Then after the passage of three more months the 
owners said they would increase the workers' wages by another 1/2 d. 
The labor representatives rejected the offer, demanding the promised 2d. 
advance immediately. The two sides were at loggerheads and the question 
was again put aside, to be submitted at the February 12 meeting of the 
central conference.30 
The membership of the union, unhappy with the long delay and the 
small sum offered by their employers, took the matter into their own 
hands. An unofficial meeting was held and the men in attendance voted 
to refuse to work overtime u.~til a special conference was called to settle 
the dispute. The union officials, fearing that the refusal to work over-
time would be interpreted as a work stoppage, argued that the men should 
wait. They refused and in the larger shops overtime crune to an end. 
Finally on February 12, the central conference met to arbitrate between 
the Clydeside owners and their employees. The employers raised their 
previous offer but refused to increase wages more than 3/4 d. per hour, 
while insisting that the raise be classified as a war bonus and not as a 
permanent adva.nc~. The union negotiators, aware that their constituency 
would not accept the new deal, agreed to recommend the terms of the offer 
30roid., pp. 149-150. 
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to the membership. Apparently afraid of the government's reaction if the 
compromise was turned down, they asked the workers· "to accept a settlement 
which they knew to be wholly unjust and inadequate. "31 The union officials 
sent out ballots with their recommendations, which were not due to be re-
turned until March 9. Again the issue was postponed for nearly a month. 
'rhe result of this added delay was a wild-cat strike, aimed as much 
at the u..~ion's leadership as at the shipyard owners. On February 16, work 
stopped and strikes quickly spread to all the shops until almost 10,000 
men were idle.32 Led by shop stewards who were often socialists, the rebels 
created a new authority called the Shop Stewards Committee. Around this 
committee, the industrial unionists, syndicatists, and guild socialist ele-
ments rallied~ claiming to represent the largest group of Clyde engineers. 
DemandiLg that they exclusively carry on all f'uture negotiations, the commi-
ttee denounced the A.S.E. Executive Committee as not having at heart the 
best interests of the Clyde workers. The leaders of the union, faced with 
open insurrection, forced the issue. The date for the counting of the 
ballots was moved up to February 24, and the results confirmed the member-
ship's disaffection. The men decisively rejected the wage settlement offer 
and their leadership, by a vote of 8,927 to 829,33 The crisis had reached 
a critical stage and it seemed that the government now had no choice but to 
step in and try to restore the industrial truce. 
The Liberal gcverr1ment did act, and to everyone's surprise it acted 
decisively to bring the controversy to an end. Nonetheless, its motives 
for involvement were far different than anyone suspected. The government 
did not involve its elf because it thought the ;:-orkmen were being unjustly 
32The New Statesman, February 27, 1915, p. 498. 33Ha.mmond,.2E_.cit.,p.65. 
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treated; nor was it motivated by a desire to protect the interests of the 
owners or even the fragile industrial truce. The government's actions 
were guided by the stark realization that !!bu3iness as usual" could not 
produce enough shells for the front. As a result~ a new policy came into 
being that treated both domestic industry and labor as a valuable national 
resource which had to be mobilized for total war. 
Britain was short of many of the necessities of war in August 1914, 
but none of these shortages had to be remedied as quickly as the inadequate 
supply of munitions. Machine guns, heavy artillery rifles, and ammunition 
of all sizes were needed immediately if British forces were to be able to 
help slow down the German advance into Belgium a..11d France. Lord Kitchener 
and his War Office staff not only had the responsibility of raising new 
recruits, but also of securing supplies for them. Unhappily,just as the 
War Office was hampered by traditionalism and an abhorrence of civilian 
interference with the raising of volunteers, similar handicaps hindered 
its effort to procure armaments. The policy of the War Office seemed to 
be to prepare for the previous war rather than for the present engagement. 
Just as the military planners of the Boer War had been guided by the men-
tality of the Crimean War, Kitchener and his colleagues were governed by 
their irrelevant experiences in the African veldt. Lloyd George wrote in 
his War Memoirs that 
Todleben's famous earthworks at Sebastopol had no meaning for 
them, nor had the trenches of Magersfontein and the Tugela, where 
our massed troops were slaughtered by riflemen they never saw. But 
the thin red line of Inkerman and the glorious charge which sabered 
the gunners at Balaclava, and the Boer horsemanship which rushed 
Methuen's ca.mp at Klip's Drif't dominated the military mind. Mili-
tary imagination makes up in retentiveness what it misses in agility.34 
34navid Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, vol. 1, 3rd 
ed. (London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1935), p. 113. 
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Most of the leading military 1:'j_gures had made ~heir reputations as horse-
men. French and Haig were cavalrymen, while Kitchener had been a sapper. 
Collectively, their wartime experiences had taught them the value of 
ruobili ty as a more than adequate c01mterweight to gun emplacements and 
high e~losive shells. As a result of this emphasis on speed, lightness 
and mobility, the first munitions orders placed by the War Office were for 
small arms and artillery shrapnel. The high explosive shells being used 
by the Germans against the fortresses of Liege were thought to be experi-
mental and in short supply. The War Office, noting the successes of the 
Belgian tactical retreat, became obsessed with shrapnel as the key munition 
in the arsenal of a light, mobile army. Shrapnel, of course, had been very 
effective against Boer horsemen as they charged British positions on the 
African plains. The military had been caught short of shrapnel shells in 
1900, and Kitchener himself had complained. The War Office, determined 
not to be caught again, ignored all suggestions for other types of artillery 
shells and ordered its contractors to produce as much s:b..rapnel as possible. 
By the first week of September 1914, British general headquarters in 
France was writing the Master-General of Ordinance in the War Office for 
an increased supply of high explosives. This request for 15 percent of 
all shells to be high explosives was repeated again on the 15th and the 
21st of the month. By November 6, as the trenches became deeper, the 
Commander of the Expeditionary Force was asking that fully 50 percent of 
all shells for field guns be high explosives, but the War Office steadily 
refused to meet these demands from the front, declaring that "the nature 
of the operations may again alter as they have done in the past 11 .35 The 
35Ibid.' p. 127. 
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military planners in London rE~fused to listen ':,o their field commanders 
and chose to ignore the fortified trenches stretching across Europe, from 
the Alps to the North Sea. Not only did the War Office not tal~e the advice 
of its own field commanders, but it passively ignored the French General 
Deville, when on October 22 he informed them that the French General Staff 
was giving up shrapnel completely in favor of high explosives. Nothing 
seemed to shake the olympian certainty of the aging veterans in the War 
Office. 
Y10re devastating to British military operations in France than the 
lack of high explosives was a more general insufficiency of all types of 
shells. As early as September 17, Sir John French was writing the War 
Office, warning of the increasing shortage of shells for his howitzers; 
his reserve, he wrote, had fallen to about ten days' supply and further 
stores of ammunition should be sent immediately. The War Office replied 
that it could do nothing to remedy the situation because the manufacturers 
had not yet reached their maximum output.36 By September 28, French was 
writing letters to London almost daily in an effort to draw attention to 
the pending ammunition shortage. The War Office responded by saying he 
could have 15,000 rounds per week. This allotment, French replied, meant 
that his guns could fire less tha.~ seven rounds per day and he pleaded for 
more. French pointed out that 
During the last fortnight there has been an average daily 
expenditure of 14 rounds per gun, notwithstanding the fact that 
these guns, as a whole, have been comparatively speaking, but 
lightly engaged during the action on the Aisne • . • • in order 
to maintain the Army in an efficient fighting condition I am 
36Ibid., p. 128. The French had expected that the British arl!JY would 
be of little use and slow to mobilize. They felt the greatest contribution 
Britain would make would be from her industry. Tne French were surprised 
when the contrary happened. Lord Riddell, S?.E..· cit., diary entry, April 25, 
pp. 81-82. 
compelled to :::·epresent that the proposed rate of amm:uni ti on 
supply cannot possibly 3uf'fice to meet demands. 37 
All through October and November French wrote the War Office, literally 
begging for more shells for his guns. 
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London continued to reply that it was doing the best it could under 
the circumstances of industrial readjustment. Finally, French, exasperated 
at the seeming lack of concern for his position, bluntly wrote the War 
Office on December 31, that 
The present supply of artillery ammunition has been found to be 
so inadequate as to make offensive operations, even on a small 
scale, quite out of the question. Recent experience has shown that 
the ammunition available suffices for scarcely an hour's bombard:rnent 
of a small portion of the enemy's line, and that even this operation 
leaves no ammun~tion to repel a counter-attack or to give assaulting 
columns sufficient support. Owing to the nature of the operations 
in which we are, and shall continue to be engaged, the supply of 
artillery a.mrnuni ti on is the governing factor . . . . It. is on the 
supply of ammunition for artillery that the future operations of 
the British Army will depend.38 
The War Office kept the field reports of shortages secret even from the 
cabinet who were unaware at the time of the gravity of the situation. None-
theless, some members of the government, notably David Lloyd George, had 
already heard rumors of the shell shortage developing at the front. 
Already in September, Lloyd George had urged the cabinet to appoint 
a special committee to look into the production of guns, shells, a..~d rifles. 
Kitchener had objected so strenuously to so-called cabinet interference that 
the matter was dropped, but a~er the War Minister's prestige had faded among 
the cabinet ministers because of his continued ineptness, Lloyd George again 
brought up his proposal. In October the ministers approved his plan, and a 
37Ibid. 
38Ibid., pp. 130-131. 
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committee consisting of Lord Xitchener, Lord Hallane, Lloyd George, Winston 
Churchill, McKenna, Lord Lucas, and Runciman was formed to explore ways to 
meet future munitions needs.39 The new. committee was to meet on six differ-
ent occasions from October 12, 1914~ to January 1, 1915. 
It soon became clear to the members of the committee that the :means 
of securing armaments were less than adequate. The munitions firms were 
ready to accept war contracts, but tl"ey already lacked the manpower to 
deliver on time the quantities needed at the front. A badge system was 
instituted so as to protect able-bodied male munitions workers from over-
zealous recruitment officers and ladies as they handed out white feathers 
on the street corners.40 But the badge system was ineffective in the 
face of the rapidly rising demand for :r.mni tions. The War Office insisted 
that the problems were due not to any organizational problems, but that 
delays in delivery were the result of small unforeseen difficulties, such 
as machinery failures and temporary labor shortages. These, the War Office 
insisted, could be overcome in time. The cabinet committee, on the other 
hand, argued that more manufacturers should be given munitions contracts, 
if the established firms could not keep up with the demand. The War Office, 
still contending that only expert firms were able to produce munitions, 
asked the Board of Trade for help in securing more labor for the armaments 
firms. The request was made in order to stave off increasingly hostile 
criticism from the committee, which military men viewed as enemies challen-
ging their authority. In the end, however, the result of the War Office's 
39Lord Lucas was the President of the Board of Agriculture. He was 
later killed in action. Runciman was the President of the Board of Trade. 
40Lord Beveridge, Power and Influence, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1953), p. 126. Women appeared on busy street corners and passed out white 
feathers to men of military age who were not in uniform as a sign cf coward-
ice. 
tactical retreat was the complete undercutting of its position. Lord 
Beveridge later wrote that 
The Board of Trade, having used all the men on the labour 
exchange registers, canvassed engineering firms throughout the 
country inviting tbem to release men for the armaments factories. 
The chief result was to provoke a Yigorous demand from the firms 
canvassed that, in place of surrendering men, they should be 
allowed to tender for contracts.41 
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The board made its report to the War Office on January 23, 1915. It recom-
mended that the production methods of some of the simpler shells and fuses 
be exhibited in engineering centers throughout the country. This, the 
Board of Trade told the War Office, would show outside firms what was need-
ed, so that they in turn could tell the govern~ent whether they had the 
skill to produce munitions. The War Office had no choice but to go along 
with the proposal and exhibits were slated to begin on March 10, 1915. 
The industrial problem of how to produce sufficient munitions for the 
front was two-fold. Expanded and more efficient production was despa.:rately 
needed; in order to accomplish this more workers were needed. Labor was 
already growing short in key industries due primarily to enlistments and 
the lack of skilled workmen. Production, even if new methods were devised, 
could not be greatly increased unless some answer to the labor shortage was 
found. The first response was to call on the trade unions to suspend their 
shop rules and allow non-union workers, primarily Belgian refugees, women and 
unskilled men (although these too were becoming scarce as a result of enlist-
ments) to work at semi-skilled or skilled positions in the munitions factor-
ies •. The unions of course saw this as a threat to their very existence and 
would ha.ve rejected any proposal that even slightly resembled dilution. 
The second possible alternative was to recall even more men from service in 
41Ibid.' p. 122. 
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the army and put them to work no.king munitions. The recall of skilled 
workers would, some suggested, have to be accompan:i:ed by placing restric-· 
tions on civilian laborers in vital industries in order to keep them at 
the most important jobs. Such a solution smacked of conscription, which 
was not only feared by labor but ran strongly against the grain of British 
volu..".lteerism. 
In an effort to work out some way to accommodate all conflicting 
interests with the needs of the nation, the government appointed the 
Committee on Production in the Engineering and Ship Building Establish-
ment on February 4, 1915. Headed by Sir George Askwith and having as 
members Sir F. Hopwood and Sir G. Gibb, the committee was a collection of 
the government's best industrial arbitrators. Their duties were to 
inquire and report forthwith, after consultation with the 
representatives of the employers and workmen, as to the 
best steps to be taken to ensure that the productive power 
of the emplo;>rers in engineering and. ship building establish-
ments working for governmeet pur:poses shall be made fully 
available so as to meet the needs o~ the nation in the present 
emergency.42 
The appointment of this committee by the cabinet meant that for the first 
time, after months of struggling with the War Office, the munitions question 
was seen as one of organizing both manufacturers and labor. Sir George 
Askwith, the committee's chairman, viewed the committee as having two primary 
goals. First, to make the best use of the available skilled work force, and 
second, if not enough of these could be found for munitions employment, to 
find ways to fill in with semi-skilled and unskilled labor.43 The committee 
issued four reports, from February 16 to March 4, dealing with the subjects 
of (1) Irregular Time Keeping, (2) Shells and Fuses and Avoidance of Stoppages 
42Hammond, 5212.· cit., p. 65. 43Askwi th, .912.· cit., p. 367. 
of Work, (3) Demarcation of Work and (4) Wages in the Shipbuilding 
Trade.44 
Before the committee made their first report public, Mr. H. J. 
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Tennant, Under Secretary of State for War, delivered a speech in Parlia-
ment that suggested that trade union rules be lifted.45 He urged that 
the Labor Members help the government to "organize the forces of labour, 
so that where one man joins the colours, either another unfitted by age 
or disability, or a woman, may take his place. n46 He promised that the 
government was asking that this be done only for the duration of the war, 
but Tennant made no mention of the delicate issues involved. Nothing was 
Said about inflation, excess profits, or protecting the unions during the 
war. The Labour representatives in the House saw Tennant's remarks as 
just one more effort by the government to run the war at the expense of 
the working class.47 Although an error in tact, Mr. Tennant's speech 
seemed to mark something of a turning point in the government's relations 
with the working class and specifically the trade unions. 
Shortly after the under secretary's speech, the first report of the 
Committee on Production appeared, on February 16. Dealing with the prob-
lem of irregular time keeping, the committee's report noted that the 
failure to attain maximum output in the shipyards was due partly to time 
lost by riveting squads. Riveting, the committei:.; disclosed, was carried 
on by squads and when any one man was absent from a squad, it stood idle 
44cole, 2£.· cit., pp. 155-158. 
45House of Commons Debates, February 8, 1915,(cols. 282-286). 
46Ibid., p. 285. 4 7 Cole, .£E.. ci ~. , p. 1 73. 
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until his return. 'l"'he c.:owJJJ.itteE= poir:.ted out '.;hs..t this caused a consider-
able amount of lost time and urged both employers a.nd laborers to resolve 
the problem by working out a more efficient system. If an agreement could 
not be arrived at within ten days, the committee asked that the issues 
be sub!p.itted to them for arbitration. 
The second report of the committee concerned the production of shells 
and fuses. Released en February 20, the study, like its predecessor, dealt 
with the limiting effect of union rules on production. The committee 
wrote that 
Restrictive rules or customs calculated to affect the production 
of munitions of war or to hamper or impede any reasonable steps 
to achieve a m9.Ximwn output are under present circumstances 
seriously hurtful to the welfare of the country,and we think 
they should be suspended during the period of the war, with proper 
safeguards and adjustments to urotect the interests of the work 
people and their trade unions.48 
The committee furthermore recommended in the second part of their report, 
"Avoidance of Stoi: :page of Work," that labor disputes should never be allowed 
to become strikes or lockouts, insisting that employers and trade unions 
should "under no drcumstances allow their differences to result in the 
stoppage of work." In order to secure continued production, the Committee 
on Production proposed that all government contractors and their workers 
ad.here to the following statement: 
With a view to preventing loss of production caused by disputes 
between employers and work people, no stoppages of work by strike 
or lockout should take place on work for government purposes. In 
the event of differences arising which fail to be settled by the 
parties directly concerned, or by their representatives, or under 
any existing agreements, the matter shall be referred to an impar-
tial tribtmal nominated by His ~1ajesty' s Government for immediate 
investigation and report to the government with a view to a 
settlement.49 
48if ammond, ~. cit, p. 71. 49Askwith, !21?.· cit., p. 375. 
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The committee also drew up a s'::.ateL1ent of goc:i :'aith designed to further 
protect the positions of the trade unions, and they suggested that all 
industries sign. The statement assured the unions that "Any departure 
during the war from the practice ruling in our workshops and shipyards 
prior to the war shall only be for the period of the war."50 
The third report issued by the commit.tee in many ways reiterated 
the two reports previously released. It urged that demarcation of work 
be suspended on all government contracts for the dut>ation of the war. 
The second part of the third report dealt with the utilization of semi-
skilled and llllskilled labor in situations where skilled labor could not 
be secured. The committee also proposed that greater use of women be 
made in jobs that they were physically able to perform. 
Before the fourth and final study, concerning wages in the ship-
building trade, was prepared, the government armolUlced that it co:icurred 
with the committee's earlier reports. As a result, the cabinet appointed 
the three members of the Committee on Production as the tribllllal that was 
to a.rbi trate labor disputes. Acting 'Under this authority, ·the committee 
intervened in the Clyde controversy. Unsure of his power to impose a 
settlement, Askwith moved quickly, hoping to bluff his way through. He 
dra~ed a strongly-worded letter and sent it to all parties. Askwith 
wrote: 
From inquiries which have been made as to the position of the 
disputes in the engineering trade in the Glasgow district, it 
appears that the parties concerned have been unable to arrhre 
at a settlement. In consequence of the delay, the requirements 
of the nation are being seriously endangered. 
50Hammond, 2£· cit., p. 72. 
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I am instructed by the Government that ir:iportant munitions of 
war are urgen-::ly required by the Navy and the.Army are being held 
up by the present cessation of work, and that they must call for 
a resumption of work on Monday morning, March i.51 
The letter added that representatives of the several parties were to meet 
with the committee in order to settle the dispute. If the owners and the 
union could not come to terms, Askwith threatened that the committee wouJ.d 
impose a settlement. No mention was made of where the committee had gotten 
such far-reaching powers; in fact, the committee themselves doubted their 
authority. As G. D. H. Cole notes, "The Government was 'trying it on'" and 
left "a loophole for escape should the men prove obdurate." Their "command 
had no binding force; it was at most a threat of future action. 1152 The 
government seems not to have had any clear notion of what it would do if 
the unions or the employers refused to cooperate, but it huffed loudly 
about taking "stronger measures 11 .53 
The government's new tone frightened the Executive Committee of the 
Clyde Engineers Union and they called for a resumption of work. The shop 
stewards leading the strike, acting under the name of the Withdrawal of 
Labour Committee, told the men to stay off the job until March 4, three days 
after the government 1 s deadline. They also instructed the men, once back 
in the shops, not to work overtime until the dispute was settled. Work was 
resumed on March 3, but the discontent remained. On March 6, a conference 
was held, but neither the employers or the union were willing to budge from 
their previous positions. The question was then referred to the Committee 
on Production. The employers agreed that the committee had the authority 
5lAskwith, £1?.· cit., p. 375. 52cole, £1?.· cit., p. 152. 
53 11The Times Cure for Labour Troubles," The New Statesman, March 6, 
1915, p. 525. The Times, March 3, 1915. 
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to settle the question, but ~r.e union, still badly split, put the question 
to their membership. 1ne withdrawal committee opposed the whole process 
and asked the men to vote "no" on the issue, but with only a small number 
of men voting, the ballot was decisively in favor of accepting the govern-
ment's authority. The committee moved quickly and on March 24 settled the 
Clyde strike by awarding the engineers a war bonus of ld. per hour. The 
union complained bitterly that the raise was not sufficient to bring the 
standard rate up to the level paid in other parts of the country and that 
it was well below the amount needed to meet the higher cost of living. 
Despite the union's complaints, the dispute ended. 
The final settlement of the Clyde strike was somewhat overshadowed 
by the government's activities earlier in March. Tne final report pro-
duced by the Committee on Production was c:i.rculated among the cabinet 
ministers on March 8. The committee proposed far-reaching governmental 
controls over war-related industries. They concluded that "The Govern-
ment should assume control of the principal armament and shipbuilding 
firms." They pointed out that 
The general labour unrest of the previous few weeks was accom-
panied by a widespread belief among work people that abnormal 
profits were being made, particularly on Government contracts. 
There were consequent demands for higher wages. It seemed to be 
thought that limitations of profits might be decided to be im-
practicable, and the men were claiming the freedom to ask the 
maximum price for their labour.54 
In order to remedy this situation, the committee recommended that amendments 
be made to the Defence of the Realm Act, which would make it possible for 
the government to assume control 
over the principal firms whose main output consists of ships, guns, 
54The History of the Ministry of Mun:'..tions, cited in Askwith, 
~· cit.,· p. 378. 
equipment or munitions c:' war ..•. Jm Executive Com..ilittee, 
on the lines of the Railway Executive Committee, should be 
established (a) to search for new sources of' ·supply,and (b) to 
exercise continuous responsible supervision.55 
The committee concluded that if such steps were ta.ken, some important 
advantages would be gained. First of all, trade unions would be more 
willing to lift their trade restrictions if it were understood that 
only the government and not private industry would benefit. Secondly, 
a central executive would be better able to (!Oordinate production arid 
utilize labor to its maximum efficiency. Finally, small manufacturers 
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would hopefully do with less labor if they were assured of the national 
need. "Such control," the committee promised, "would enable a confident 
appeal to be made to work people, and would restore national unanimity. 
It would also impress upon the nation that the country was at war and 
industrial resources must be mobilized. 1156 
The recommendations of the committee were promptly accepted by the 
cabinet, but it was decided not to release the report until af'ter the 
government had a chance to meet with industrial and labor leaders.57 Tne 
Treasury Conference sponsored by Lloyd George was to be held on March 17-
19; he hoped to convince those in attendance that they should cooperate 
with the government. Before the conference met, however, the entire tone 
of the nation's understanding of the war seemed to shift. On March 8, the 
Manchester Guardian ran two large photographs of munitions at a naval dock 
yard. The caption under one of these read: "an aspect of the immensely 
55Ibid., cited in Askwith, p. 378. 56Tuid., cited in Askwith, p. 379. 
57The report was never released to the public. See Askwith, 
footnote, p. 377. 
important work of supplying the country's e..l'J:::!:~d forces with the es sen-
tials of war. 1158 The Suectat.or wrote in an artiele: 
Experience shows that greater efficiency and greater profit 
are secured by private than by public management, but in certain 
cases it is necessary to superadd public control to private 
management in order to protect the consumer against possible 
extortion on the part of monopolistic producers. In time of 
wer the whole situation is altered. Then the questions of profit 
and of economy are thrown to the winds. All we have to think 
about is how to secure the materials we want of the required 
quality in the quickest possible time, and with this end in 
view direct ma:c.agement by the State may be essential.59 
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The nation finally seemed to understand the nature of total war and the 
demands that would have to be made upon the civilian population. 
On March 15 the Defence of the Realm Act, Amendment No. 2, became 
law. It was approved essentially without opposition, even though it gave 
the government almost unlimited power.60 The government was empowered 
( c) to require any work in any factory or workshop to be done 
in accordance with the directions of the Admiralty or Army 
Council, given with the object of making the factory or 
workshop, or the plant or labour therein, as useful as 
possible for the production of war material; and 
(d) to.regulate or restrict the carrying on of work in any 
factory or workshop, or remove the plant therefrom, with 
a view to increasing the production of war material in 
other 1'actories or workshops; and 
(e) to take possession of any unoccupied premises for the purpose 
of housing workmen employed in the production, storage, or 
transport of war materia1.61 
The measure was the strongest ever taken in Britain and, if proposed before 
58Manchester Guardian, March 8, 1915. 
59 11The Defence of the Realm," The Spectator, March 13, 1915, p. 391. 
60House of Connnons Debates, March 9, 1915, (cols. 1281, 1283, 1293, 
1296). 
6l11nefenC'e of the Realm Act, Amendment No. 2," Sessional Papers of 
the House of Loras, Public Bills, Vol. 3, 1914-16. 
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the war, it would have been d>::clc-1.red unconstitutional. In 1915 no one 
questioned the government's need for such far-reaching powers. Lord 
Landsdowne remarked that the "Government waE amply justified in Mking 
for powers to deal with labour employed in factories and workshops." 
He added that he trusted "it would not be necessary to exercise the 
powers; but if the occasion arose, he felt sure that they would be ex-
erc;ised fearlessly" because there "should be some power in the Govern-
ment of the country to intervene if abuses took place. 1162 Lord Kitchener 
expressed the same sentiments while standing before the Lord's during 
the bill's second reading; he pointed out that the war effort had been 
jeapordized by a lack of home industrial organization and now the govern-
ment at least had the means to increase the munitions output.63 
Armed with the persuaslve n~w powers, Lloyd George and Runciman, 
President of the Boar.d of Trade, called for a Treasury Conference. The 
purpose of the meeting was to "consider the general position in reference 
to the urgent need of the country in regard to the large and larger increase 
in the output of munitions of war, and the steps which the government pro-
pose to take to organize the industries of the country with a view to 
achieving that end."64 Nearly all those invited came the first day. Be-
sides government officials there were representatives from thirty-three 
trade unions, among whom were some of the largest: engineers, shipbuilders, 
iron and steel and other metal trades, wood workers, laborers, transport 
workers, boot and shoe makers and woolen mill workers. The Miners' Feder a-
62The Times, March 16 • 1915, Lloyd George, ~· cit., p. l 71. 
63Ibid., :tt.:arch 16, 1915. House of Lords Debates, March 15, 1915, 
(cols. 719-724). 
64Hammond, ~· p. 75. 
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tion also sent represisata.tjves, hut they wi thd:rew after the first day 
because they were opposed to, and unwilling even to ccnsider, compulsory 
arbitration. 65 
Calling attention to the newest Defence of the Realm Act, L:oyd 
George made an appeal to the workmen and their employers to sink their 
differences and concentrate their energies on production. He went on to 
explain that the govern.~ent did not propose to ta.ke over the factories 
and put admirals and generals in charge; he claimed that the government 
would not have to use its new powers if there was "perfect cooperation 
between employers and workers . 1166 After three days of meetings , all but 
the engineers, whose members were still on strike at the Clyde Shipyards, 
agreed to recommend to their members a resolution that provided that no 
stoppages in munitions-related industries would take place during the war. 
The conference also accepted the authority of the Committee on Production 
in all disputed matters. Furthermore, the unions agreed to a relaxation 
of trade rules where 11it is imperatively necessary". Overtime, the em-
ployment and training of semi-skilled labor, and the hiring of women was 
approved by the unions, with the provision that all labor be paid at pre-
vailing district rates. Lloyd George, in turn, promised the trade union 
representatives that these war-time measures would only be enforced until 
the war came to an end. He further agreed that the government would 
endeavor to see that the trade unions were in no way weakened by their war-
time concessions.67 Tne next day Ben Tillet, the radical leader of the 
65cole, 2£· cit., p. 216. 
66The Spectator, March 20, 1915, p. 391. 
67The Nation, March 27, 1915, p. 819. 
London dockers, published a w.anifesto in The Times. He a.eclared that 
Every delay in manufacture of guns and ammuhition or in trans-
port will cost many lives, some of which are our members, and we 
cannot afford to lose them. Humanitarianism as well as honour 
imposes its obligations upon us to succor our brothers who are 
fighting to make our homes and our women folk and our children 
safe • • • • These men at the front and on the sea are protect-
ing us against the ravages of bombardment and looting and it is 
up to us to honour them.68 
Out of the Treasury Conference ca.me a new willingness on the part of 
66 
labor to make sacrifices for the national interest. The radical social-
ists screamed that the unions had surrendered to the government, as 
indeed they had. 
The failure of the Amalgamated Society of Engiueers to sign the 
document was seen by the government as a serious omission, in view of 
the strength of the u."lion in the munitions factories. 69 The re pre sen-
tatives of the union felt that the agreement did not sufficiently safe-
guard their members, and they complained that it did not effectively lay 
out the government's promise to curb profits. Complicating the union's 
stand was the continuing Clyde dispute. The union leadership, already 
badly split from their rank and file membership, might well have been 
stalling until a settlement was reached. The government, however, wanted 
their signatures on the agreement and Lloyd George and Runciman asked to 
meet again with the engineers on March 25. The Clyde dispute was settled 
on March 24, the day before the meeting, and the union's executive 
committee, reassuming their leadership role, worked out a separate agree-
ment with the government. This new document was similar to the earlier 
68The Times, March 20, 1915. 69Harnmond, !?.£.• cit. , p. 77. 
one, though it contained what the union felt were more explicit safeguards. 
The major new provision in this amended version added that "profits will 
be limited with a view to securing that benefit resulting from the relaxa-
tion of' trade restrictions or practices shall accrue to the state. 11 70 
The conclusion of the Treasury Agreement marks the end of a flurry 
of government activity during March, which resulted in the scrapping of 
"business as usual". Fer months, the Liberal government hesitantly played 
the role of a.11 interested mediator trying to balance the needs of industry, 
labor, and the war with some justice. This proved to be a futile effort, 
but by the end of March, the government had become the most powerful of 
the three quarreling partners. It had increased its own power, not be-
cause it wanted to, but because war-time pragmatism demanded it. Neces si-
ty let ideology a...~d liberal dogma go by the boards. Even so, the govern-
ment did not replace its "business as usual" policy immediately with one 
that made full use of its newly acquired unilateraJ. powers. The Liberals, 
constrained by Asquith's inability to act decisively, refused to make 
effective use of their recently granted authority, and instead used it as 
a supplement to their older policy. As a result, April began with the 
government empo~ered to take charge but refusing to act, waiting, hoping 
that threats would produce sufficient munitions and maintain the indus-
trial truce. 
Beginning on March 10, British forces in France, having saved shells 
for weeks, launched an offensive at Neuve-Chapelle. After only three 
days, Sir John French wrote Kitchener that he was forced to stop his 
70!bid., p. 78. 
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attacks on the German lines b0cause his force.3 were fatigued and "above 
all by the want of 8.r"umuni tion." In a Via.rch 16 communique, he wrote the 
War Office that "The supply has fallen short, especially in 18-pounder 
and 4.5-inch, of what I was led to eA-pect a.Dd I am, therefore, compelled 
to abandon further offensive operations until sufficient reserves are 
accumulated. 11 71 This note was follmved up by one on March 18, in which 
French stated that the scale of offensive operations demar!ded a huge 
increase in the supply of ammunition if any results were to be obtained. 
He added bluntly that up until March the combined effect of mud and the 
lack of shells had limited British operations. Not allowing the subtle-
ty of his remark to be misunderstood, he cl~imed that 
The weather and the state of the ground have no longer to be 
reckoned with as limiting the scope of our operations .• 
I desire to state with all tee weight of m;.v authority as 
Commander-in-Chief of the British .A:rmy in France, that the 
object of His Ma,iesty' s Government cannot be attained '.Ulless 
the supply of artillery a.r:m.unition can be increased suffi-
ciently to enable the Army to engage in sustained offensive 
operations and I further desire to impress on them the very 
serious nature of the effort that it is necessary to make to 
achieve this end.72 
Kitchener replied angrily to this letter by insisting that the Commander 
had wasted ammunition by using in the first sixteen days of the month, 
which included the short-lived offensive, from 200 to 220 rounds per gun, 
or about 13 rounds per gun for each day. 
The cabinet knew nothing of these letters from the front, but the 
ministers were well aware of the staggering casulty figures. The total 
ground gained during the Neuve-Ccapelle offensive came to little more than 
one square mile~ and British losses amounted to 12,894 officers and men. 
7111oyd George, ~· cit., p. 169. 
Addison wrote in his diary on March 10, the fi:rst day of the battle of 
Neuve-Chapelle, that 
The adequate supply of munitions of war is the most pressing 
question just now. More and more is coming to the front. L. G. 
can scarcely contain himself about the War Office. I do not 
know any of the details, but, apart from what is generally 
known, all the indications that have come to us at the Board 
support the view of War Office methods and their lack of vision.73 
Despite the absence of confirmed information, rumors began to float through 
the government bureaucracy and hints that a problem existed were given in 
the press,74 There was "vague talk" that the operations at Neuve-Chapelle 
had not been as successful as they should have been.75 
The commotion soon died away for lack of confirmation, and during 
the first few weeks in April, there was a lull in the reports concerning 
munitions shortages. With some digging, the cabinet might have discovered 
the severity of the situation, but with the possible exception of Lloyd 
George, the ministers continued to believe in the illusion painted by the 
War Secretary. In a letter to Asquith, dated April 14, Kitchener informed 
the cabinet that French had asked him to tell the ministers for him that 
"With the present supply of ammunition he will have as much as his troops 
will be able to use on the next forward movement. 11 76 Asquith was especially 
pleased with the report and, wholly believing its validity, he made his 
famous Newcastle speech on April 20. The address was extremely optimistic 
and laid stress on the need for patriotic volunteerism among all of the 
73christopher Addison, Four and a Half Years, vol. I, 3rd ed., 
(London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 193~-), diary entry, March 10, 1915, p.69. 
74sir John French, 1914, (London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1919), 
pp. 354-355. 
75Addison, ~·cit., diary entry, March 29, 1915, p. 71. 
7611 oyd George, .212..· cit. , p. 1 73. 
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nation's interests. He ignc:r~d the new powers held by the government, 
thus giving the distinct impression that there wohld be no need to use 
them because everything was going so weli.77 The following day Lloyd 
George was called on to defend the government's munitions policy before the 
House of Commons. Several members roundly criticized the War Office and 
Lloyd George found that he had to defend its actions. He ended his remarks 
on· a note of optimism, pointing out that the nation had already made signi-
ficant progress. He emphasized that there was no reason to think that 
it would not continue to meet the new challenges of the future.78 
This false illusion was crushe~ the very next day when the Germans 
opened a fresh offensive at Ypres, using poison gas for the first time in 
the war. Huge gaps were made in the allied lines and the general staff 
in France found that they could not cover the retreat of thousands of out-
flanked infantrymen because of a le.ck of artillery shells. As a result, 
the trapped infantry units were doomed to die. Although the government 
censors blocked the reports, the public grew anxious over British "unpre-
paredness to cope with a foe that had at his disposal the resources of 
science directed by a skilled and highly organized industrialism, and who 
was resolved to make the most ruthless use of all of his advantages. 11 79 
In an effort to relieve the pressure on British troops at Ypres, Sir 
John French decided to attempt a counter attack at Festubert on May 9. The 
77The Spectator, April 21, 1915, pp. 577-578. 
78House of Commons Debates, April 21, 1915, (cols. 277-374). Lloyd 
George , £e_. c it • , p . 174 • 
79Lloyd George, .9.I?..· cit., p. 176. The British, up to this point in 
the war, had displayed only occasional outbursts of hatred for the Germa...~s. 
For the first time, with the introduction of gas by the Germans, a sustained 
hatred is evident in the popular press. The Germans became Huns, the bar-
barians of the Western world. 
losses were staggering a..'1d. no significant gabs were made. T'ne British 
commander wrote later that his "mind was filled with keen anxiety." 
After all our demands, less than 8 per cent of our shells were 
high explosive and we had only sufficient supply for about 
40 minutes of artillery preparation for the attack. On the 
tower of a ruined church I spent several hours in close obser-
vat.ion of the operations. Nothing since the Battle of the Aisne 
had ever impressed me so deeply with the terrible shortage of 
artillery and ammm1ition as did the events of that day. As I 
watched the Anders ridge, I clearly saw the great inequality of 
·the artillery duels, and, as attack after attack faL!.ed, I could 
see that the absence of sufficient artillery support was doubling 
and trebling our losses in men.BO 
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The British commander could no longer stand still while the War Office ig-
nored his demands. He decided to circumvent Kitchener and make a public 
appeal even if it meant his removal from command. French returned to his 
headquarters and found there a telegram from London. It ordered him to 
ship fully twenty percent of his scanty reserve supply of ammunition to 
the Dardanelles. This reinforced his decision and he gave orders that the 
complete story of the shell shortage be given to Colonel Repington, the 
military correspondent for The Times. French also directed that copies 
of the information be carried personally by his private secretary, Brinsley 
Fitz Gerald, and another aide, Capitain Frederick Guest, to England, to be 
put before Lloyd George, Arthur Balfour, and Bonar Law. 81 
On May 14 ~ The Times released its story and laid bare the long hidden 
truth about the shell shortage. Soon all the papers were filled with the 
news that "The want of an unlimited supply of high explosives was a fatal 
8
°French, ~· cit., p. 356-357. 
81Ibid., p. 157. Lloyd George,~· cit., p. 177. 
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bar to our success. 1182 At the same time First Sea Lord Fisher, after weeks 
of personal conflict with Winston Churchill over the Dardanelles campaign, 
informed the cabinet that it was his intention to resign.83 Asquith, a.11ti--
cipating demands from Parliament, called t.be leadership of the opposition 
to Downing Street in order to see if a coalition goverrunent could be con-
structed. The arrangements went with remarkable speed and on May 19, 1914, 
it was announced that a new ministry would be forthcoming. On Ma.y 26, the 
coalition cabinet was completed and unveiled to the public. 
The fall of the goverrunent that had ruled Britain since the beginning 
of the war was a confirmation of what should have been understood in March. 
The nation needed more resolute leadership than the Liberals alone were 
willing to provide. The shell shortage, labor unrest, and even Lord Fisher 1 s 
resignation were only component parts in a much larger issue that had been 
developing for some time. 1~e Liberal ministry was swept from its monopoly 
on power because it had consistently failed. to consider the home front as 
if it were part of the war effort and relegated it to the back seat. They 
failed to treat it with the seriousness and energy required of commanding 
generals. The maJority of Englishmen in March would have probably accepted 
the goverrunent's authority, had it been exercised. When the Liberal mini-
stry failed to capitalize on this, it lost the confidence of a large portion 
of the British population. By May, dissatisfaction with the existing gover:i-
82The Times, May 14, 1915. The Times was at that time owned by 
Northcliff, who 5 Lord Riddell says, "spoke in contemptuous terms of Asquith 
and Kitchener. He says that the forme:r· is indolent, weak and apathetic. 
He exercises no control over the va.-rious departments. He will never finish 
the war." Northcliff was more thar: pleased t'o help make his prophecy come 
true by printing the story of the shell shortage. Lord Riddell, S?.E..· cit. 5 
diary entry, April 20, 1915, p. 78. 
83Peter Fraser, Lord Fisher, (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1973), 
pp. 279-287 • Llo~rd George, 2£.· cit. , pp. 198-207. 
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ment had grown to such proportions that the Liberals were not able to 
ride out the storm and they W(~re forced to bring tpe opposition into the 
cabinet. 
The new coalition government moved strongly to deal with the home 
question. The entire job of securing mw1itions was removed from the War 
Office and placed U..'1der the control of a Ministry of M1lllitions, which was 
created on June 3. David Lloyd George, because of his long-standing con-
cern with the munitions question, agreed to resign as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and take up the ,job of Minister of Munitions. The provisions 
of the Munitions of War Act, which became law on June 23, gave the new 
minister far-reaching and almost dictatorial powers over the men, women, 
and machines of the nation 1 s armaments industry. On J1Ule 3, shortly after 
his appointment, Lloyd George, while on a tour of the nation's industrial 
centers, said in lv:anchester 
It is a war of munitions. We are fighting against the best-
organized community in the world; the best organized whether 
for war or peace, and we have been employing too much haphazard, 
leisurely, go-as-you-please methods which, believe me, would no~ 
have enabled us to maintain our place as a nation, even in peace, 
very much longer. The nation now needs all the machinery that 
is capable of being used for turning out m1lllitions or equipment, 
all the skill that is available for that purpose, all the indus-
try, all the labour, and all the strength, power, and resource 
of everyone to the utmost, everything that would help us to 
overcome our difficulty and supply our shortages • • • • When 
the house is on fire, questions of procedure and precedence, 
of etiquette and time and division of labour must disappear.84 
The implications of the minister's remarks were wider than most of those 
listening and perhaps even the speaker could have imagined. Working people 
for the first time were officially seen as a valuable national resource and. 
not just as victims to be cared :for by distress committees. Their health 
84Lloyd George, 2£· cit., .PP· 226-227. Manchester Guardian, June 4, 
1915. 
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and well being superceded political boundaries a.nd became important to a 
larger audience than socialists, philanthropists, liberal politicians, and 
assorted do-gooders. On this matter, all interests were being welded by 
the necessities of total war. The establishment of the :Ministry of Muni-
tions gave the government, for the first time since the earliest industrial 
reforms began, its own laboratory in which to carry out its social experi-
ments. Furthermore, it had in Lloyd George a man who, possessed of unpre-
cedented powers, could exercise persuasion, pressure, and if necessary 
compulsion, upon employers to see that the newly-discovered national re-
sources were protected. 
CHAPTER III 
TOWARDS AN EFFICIEifi' AND PLANNED NATION 
Writing to Cynthia Asquith from France in the spring of 1915, a young 
friend, Billy Grenfell, complained that "death selects our bravest and best 
. . . . We a.re a nation of foolish and courageous volunteers fighting 
against the luriest of professionals, and we are paying the price. 111 Few 
within British society would have substantially disagreed with the young 
solider's evaluation of the first year of the war. While the future held 
the even more terrifying news of the Dardanelles debacle, Loos, the Somme, 
and the second battle of Ypres, the realities of ten months of total war were 
frightening enough. On Jwie 9, Herbert Asquith announced before the House 
of Commons that, excluding deaths caused by disease, 10,955 officers and 
247 ,114 enlisted men had been killed or seriously wounded. 2 The old con-
temptables no longer existed. Since the outbreak. of hostilities in August 
1914, Britain, led by the Liberals and advocates of "business as usual", 
had simply ~ssumed that her supposed moral superiority over the Kaiser's 
militarism would bring her final victory. The British self confidence and 
the bravery of her soldiers, however, were no match for German high explo-
sives, machine guns, and fortified trenches on high ground. 
By June the illusions had all but faded, and und~r the reconstructed 
lLady Cynthia Asquith, Diaries 1915-1918 (London: Hutchinson, 1968), 
diary entry, June 12, 1915, p. 41. 
2IIouse of Commons Debates~ June 9, 1915, (col. 257). 
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Liberal government of Herbert Asquith, the nation, aided by the incessant 
bombardment of the Nortbcliff press, bega..'1 to reshape its war effort. 3 
The war had become, in most minds, a total test of national resolve that 
pitted Britain's squarely against that of Germany's. The struggle required 
" 
the complete mobilization and organization of material and human resources. 
Confirming this, Herbert Asquith, in a surprise appearance before Parlia-
ment on June 16, firmly insisted that the first concern of the new cabinet 
was to "bring to the service of the state the willing and organized help 
of every class in the cornmuni ty. ,,4 Every corner of British society was to 
be organized and above all wade efficient in order to bring the war to a 
victorious conclusion. 
A large slice of the responsibility in reaching the goal of an orgw~-
ized and efficient Britain was given to David Lloyd George. Stepping down 
from his duties as Chancellor of the Exchequer in order to become Minister 
of Munitions, he took upon himself what he later claimed to be one of the 
greatest challenges of his political career.5 As the first Ivli.nister of 
Munitions, he ws.s given power over the lives of individual citizens that 
far exceeded any that had been previously gran~ed to a mini'ster of the crown. 
The war had become a life or death struggle between workshops and in Britain, 
the foreman in the munitions factories was David Lloyd George. His sole duty 
as Minister of Munitions was to secure an adequate supply of armaments for 
3Lord Riddell, Lord Riddell' s War Diary (London: Ivor Nicholson & 
Watson, 1933), diary entry, June 1915; pp. 99-103. 
4House of Commons Debates, Jnne 16, 1915, (cols. 554-561). 
5David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Llo d Geor e, vol. 1 and 2, 
3rd ed., (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1935 , vol. 1, p. 210. 
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British forces in the field. ine liberal press argued that the lack of 
restraint on the new :ministry and its untrusted minister would impair the 
hard-won rights of workers and the trade unions. On the other side of the 
political scale, the conservative spokesmen harbored a long-standing dis-
like for Lloyd George as author of the Old Age Pensions Act, the Peoples 
Budget, the Parliamentary Act and the National Insurance scheme. Despite 
this widespread opposition, very few failed to agree that he was the only 
man for the job. A solid majority of both liberal and conservative opinion 
might have, for quite different reasons, agreed with the New Statesman's 
editorial assessment of Lloyd George. The New Statesman did not 
in the least quarrel with his appointment to the New Departmerit; 
on the contrary, cf all the recent changes there is none that we 
more thoroughly endorse. But it is certain that at this junc~ure 
he is the best of all possible Minister of Munitions; it is still 
more certain that he would be the very worst of' all possible 
dictators. 6 
All eyes were now focused on the new minister, whose road, strewn with the 
political land mines of conscription, dilution of labor, and confiscation 
of private property, would prove to be an avenue towards the improvement of 
the nation's quality of life, an opportunity of which Lloyd George and his 
staff would take f'ull advantage.7 
The Ministry of Munitions was established by the Ministry of Munitions 
Act, which was approved by the House of Commons on June 8, 1915. The act, 
which gave cabinet rank to the head of the ministry, placed under its author-
ity the undivided administrative control of all armaments production. Prior 
6The New Statesman, June 19, 1915, p. 42. 
711oyd George, £12..· cit., p. 302. 
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to the passage of the act, tnese responsibilities had been spread inco-
herently among the various governmental departments with the bulk of the 
duties allocated to the War Office. The act consolidated these respon-
sibilities by stipulating that the new ministry, if expediency req_uired, 
could with the assent of the cabinet, transfer both statutory and customary 
powers of the departments to itself.8 Despite this broad and sweeping 
authority, specific limitations on the power and duties of the new cabinet 
post remained undefined. These were left by the government to be worked 
out on a day-to-day basis, with the ministry developing procedures and 
taking powers as they were needed to accomplish the end of increased arms 
production.9 The prerogatives of the Minister of Munitions were only 
loosely, if at all, limited by the Ministry of Munitions Act. I,loyd George, 
the almost universally mistrusted Welsh radical, found himself in the posi-
tion of being bound only by the tolerance cf a disenchanted Parliament, a 
wobbly cabinet, and public opinion; all of whom were desperate for victory. 
In a very real sense then, the ultimate bou..~daries of Lloyd George's power 
were those imposed by his own sensibilities.10 
Even before the bill formally establishing the Ministry of Munitions 
had been passed by Parliament, Lloyd George had begun to apply himself to 
the task of putting together the machinery for the new ministry's efficient 
operation. Lacking even a desk for himself, he raided other governmental 
811Ministry of Munitions Bill," Sessional Papers of the House of Lord.s, 
Public Bills, Vol. 5, 1914-16. There can be little doubt that this portion 
of the act, while applica~le to every government department, was specifi-
cally aimed at and resented by the War Office. Ridden, .££.· cit., diary 
entries, July l-3l, l9l5, pp. 107-ll5. 
9House of Commons Debates, June 23, 1915, (cols. 1217-1218). 
lOMinistry of Munitions Bill, .££.· cit. 
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departments for both the su:r:p:;,J.es and personnel that would. be needed to 
get the Munitions Vdnistry off the ground. Setting up a central office 
was not the only obstacle before Lloyd George. From his experiences with 
labor earlier in the year, he clearly understood that their cooperation 
was vital to the success of any scheme aimed. at achieving an increase in 
the production of munitions. Before and just after the passage of the 
bill establishing the new ministry, Lloyd George embarked on a speaking 
tour of all the major industrial areas of the country. His speeches were 
loud, patriotic, and confident; he repeatedly told the working:nen that 
he had come seeking their advice and comments on the shape of his new plans 
for the nation's home front. Whether or not he already had decided on the 
specific programs of his ministry is not clear, but his political tactics 
were superb. Lloyd George faced the workers with his hat in hand, wanting 
nothing less than to instill a sense of participation and rekindle the 
flickering patriotism among those who listened. In Cardiff on June 11, 
the minister announced to his fellow Welshmen that he "ca.me to do business", 
and to tell the workers and employers alike tbe truth about the war and show 
them just what had to be done. He declared in another speech that received 
(as did all his addresses) wide press coverage, that 
I have often heard that time means money. Time here means lives. 
The more shells, the surer the victory, and the speedier the vic-
tory. We want to turn out so much that when the hour arrives we 
shall just crash our way through . . . • Plant the flag on your 
workshops. Every lathe you have, recruit it. Convert your machin-
ery into battalions and we will drive the foe from the land which 
he has tortured and trampled on, and Liberty will be once more 
enthroned in Europe.11 
The following day Lloyd George appeared before a large crowd in Bristol &.'1.d 
llThe Times, June 12, 1915. 
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repeated his earlier assurances that u..11d0r his direction the Ministry of 
Munitions would ask all classes to sacrifice equally. He told his Bristol 
audience, much as he had promised other crowds of workers, they could 
count on this, because it was his intention to consult each interest in 
the nation before taking any proposals to the cabinet.12 
Although he clearly had the power to command, Lloyd George sought 
out and quietly met with trade union leaders and businessmen alike, in 
order to earn their trust and further solidify his position. Soon he was 
able to announce that m&-zy factory owners were volunteering to place not 
only their services but their factories as well under the control of the 
newly established minist:r-.r .13 The majority of trade unions also showed 
a willingness to cooperate by empowering the National Labour Advisory 
Committee to "agree to such measures as, without detriment to the inter-
ests of the workers, wil1 ensure a;:-. adequate supply of the necessary 
munitions for the prosecution of the war with the greatest vigour. 1114 For 
the first time the trade unions, with the notable exceptions of the coal 
miners and the cotton operatives, had a single, although weak voice. To-
gether the nation's business leaders and the advisory cormnittee gave Lloyd 
George their respective opinions and approved his final plans for the 
Ministry of Munitions. On June 23, in the form of the Munitions of War Bill, 
Lloyd George laid the blueprint for the new ministry before the Commons. 
The final draft of the bill had been delayed for a few days due to 
some last minute snags in the negotiations with the trade unions. Nonethe-
1211To Unite the Nation," Tne Ne.ti on, June 19, 1915, p. 375. 
13The Times, June 13, 1915. 
14G. D. H. Cole, Labour in the War (London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 
1915)' p. 173. 
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less, by the time the proposal reached the floor of the House, nearly all 
. . 
business as well as labor interests had been consulted and. had given so::ne 
degree of approval to the strong measure. The bill itself consisted of 
three parts .15 Poorly drafted, there appears to have been little desire t() 
organize the bill into a coherent and logical order. This lack of order 
within the proposal, hawever, did not mute its effectiveness. Making it 
clear that the bill was an emergency measure, Lloyd George approached the 
issues at hand with a shotgun approach. While introducing the bill he 
energetically pointed out that "Any obstacles, any mismanagement, any 
slackness, any indiscipline, a:ny prejudices which prevent or delay mobi-
lization of our resources at the earliest possible moment postpones vic-
tory .1116 The newly appointed minister made it clear that his measure would 
not allow any barricades to block efficient industrial production. 
Lloyd George, trying to give the bill some sense of order, explained 
to the House of Commons that the nation had been divided into ten munitions 
areas. Each of these was to be placed under the control of local committees 
of mami.gement, whose members would be drawn from the district's business 
community. In the central town of each munitions area, an office would be 
staffed by engineering representatives from the ministry. The role of these 
people would be to give technical advice, coordinate production, and to give 
out munitions specifications. Furthermore, the Minister of Munitions re-
vealed to the Members of Parliament that the War Office and the Admiralty 
had consented to supply military advisors, who would be assigned to serve 
in the central office of each area. These, ~loyd George asserted, would 
l5Ministry of Munitions Bill, £E.• cit. 
16House of Commons Debates, June 23, 1915, (col. 1184). 
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keep the mili ta.ry c.losely tied to the production of armaments ~1.d add a 
non-partisan, patriotic flavor to the offices. He.suggested that this 
would aid in further promoting the hard-won but fragile cooperation of 
capital and labor with the government.17 Lloyd George pointed out that 
although the government would have the power to organize all production 
from London, the most efficient method would be to delegate this power to 
the committees of management and assume the role of a central clearing 
house for information. The Ministry of Munitions, he claimed, should pro-
vide "anything of expert advice, specifications, samples, inspection and 
material . • • • but we must rely upon the great businessmen of each lo-
cality to do the organ.ization in those districts for themselves. 1118 
Despite this obvious preference for local management, Lloyd George 
made it clear in the Munitions of War Bill that local control did not mean 
autonomy. The Ministry of Munitions, in order to better exercise its 
function as a source of information and to more f'ully coordinate p:rod1;.ction, 
required accurate and detailed reports from each locality. Wrttten into 
the munitions bill, section eleven of part three~ was the requirement that 
indepth monthly reports to the ministry should be submitted by every work-
shop producing munitions. The section demandeQ that each employer report 
as to 
(a) the numbers and classes of persons employed or likely to be 
employed in the establishment from time to time; 
(b) the numbers and classes of machines at a...;y such establishment; 
( c) the nature of the work on which any such persons are emplo~red, or 
any such machines are engaged, from time to time; 
l7Ibid., (col. 1191). 
18Ibid., (col. 1192). 
(d) any other matters with respect to which the Minister may desire 
information for the purposes of his powers and duties. 
The bill also gave the Minister of Munitions the further power to 
"arrange with any other government department for the collection of any 
such information. 1119 In this way the new ministry could draw freely on 
a.nd utilize all the data collecting agencies of the government in order 
to reach its goal of sufficient shell production.20 
In speaking before the Commons of the importance of information, 
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Lloyd George concluded that accurate and wide-ranging data was essential 
for peak production. He stressed tha.t by keeping a running account of in-
ventories of raw materials, machines, and workers, the ministry would be able 
to ensure smooth, steady, and increased production.21 The minister also 
added for his Liberal and Labour critics that with this vast a.mount of infer-
mation, his staff would be able to detect manufacturers who were holding back 
goods in a.n effort to create artificial shortages and force prices higher. 
The practice, which Lloyd George admitted to the House had been occurring in 
some circles, was not only taking unfair advantage of the nation's consumers 
and the government, but causing immeasurable harm to the war effort. He 
asserted that "Those practices must, in the vital interests of the nation, 
be brought to an end because, if there is a shortage of materials in any 
one particular, the whole business, of turning out the necessary output 
stops. 1122 The minister's assurances helped to soothe those who agreed with 
19 11Munitions of War Bill," Sessional Papers of the House of Lords, 
Public Bills, Vol. 5, 1914-16, section ll, part three. 
20Not only would Lloyd George be able to make better informed deci-
sions concerning munitions production, but he clearly must have understood 
the political advantages of such a weapon. 
21House of Commons Debates, .June 23, 
l9l5, (col. 1193). 
22Ibid., (col. 1193). 
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the necessity of the bill, but felt that the bulk of the burden was fall-
ing upon the shoulders of the working class, while businessmen were reap-
ing huge profits. 
Lloyd George's Mu..ri.i tions of War Bill also enabled the Minister of 
Munitions to completely take over some armaments firms and to closely 
control the rest. Section four of pa.rt two of the bill declared that 
If the Minister of Munitions considers it expedient for the purpose 
of the successful prosecution of the war that any establishment i:i: 
which munitions work is carried on should be subject to special 
provisions as to limitations of employers profits and control of 
persons employed . • • . he may make an order declaring that estab-
lishment to be a controlled establishment.23 
New munitions factories were beginning to spring up throughout the country 
and older firms in many cases had added new shops to their existing factor-
ies. Lloyd George insisted that these should be placed directly under the 
authority of his ministry, to be run by local managers as controlled es tab-
lishments. 
The six clauses listed under section four of part two outlined the 
specific powers that the Ministry of Munitions could exercise over the plants 
designated as controlled establishments. First, control and regulation of 
the net profits of each shop was placed in the ministry's hands. All money 
deemed to be in excess of a reasonable profit was placed at the disposai 
of the Exchequer.24 Second, all disputes involving labor, such as wage 
rates, had to be submitted to the Minister of Munitions and the Board of 
23Munitions of War Bill, .£12.· cit., section 4, pa.rt two. 
24Ib. d + . Ti . f .... h . d d 
_1_., sec Jion 5, part two. nis was one o •J e me.Jar eman s 
of the trade unionists at the time of the Treasury Conference, earlier 
in the year. 
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Trade for binding arbitration.25 Third, any rule, practice, or c:ustom 
not having the force of law, which the government ·considered to restrict 
production or suspend employment, vas declared j_llegal. This clause had 
the effect of removing from the trade unions the power to strike, and any 
person or group failing to comply with the anti-strike provision of the 
third clause was automatically subject to criminal prosecution. The re-
maining three clauses simply echoed the threat of prosecution by the 
government of those violating any of the bill's provisions. 
Thus Lloyd George, in section four of part two of the Munitions of 
War Bill, was attempting to tie together the issues of industrial profit, 
trade restrictions, and the right of trade unions to strike.26 1'he first 
was to be tightly regulated and the second a...!d third were simply outlawed. 
Good draftmanship should have dictated that the profit and labor issues 
be treated separately, but Lloyd George undoubtedly had a political point 
to make by tying the two so closely together. Apart :from the poor draft-
manship and the possible political message contained within section four, 
the proposal meant nothing less than absolute government control over a 
sizable portion of British industry and labor. 
25This was in accordance with section 1 - 4 of part one of the bill, 
which established the negotiating and appeal procedures. Lloyd George 
clarified this before the House by ex~laining that only the major disputes 
would be submitted to the central office while, to expedite matters, most 
issues involving single shops or individuals would be decided by local 
and regional tribunals. 
26The combination of interrelated political issues, as in this section, 
is only one example of the disorderly and surprisingly careless draftman-
ship of this bill. 
86 
Lloyd George le~ little doubt about how he intended to utilize 
his ministry's vast powers. While presenting the bill to the Commons, 
he drew the Members' attention to idle machinery sitting in store houses, 
unused because of a lack of skilled workmen. He said that the first step 
that had to be taken in order to increase munitions output was "to secure 
the necessary skilled labour, in order to fill up the workstops, which 
have plenty of machinery at the present moment. 1127 In outlining his 
ideas, the Minister asked that positions that could not be filled by 
experienced workers " . should be ecked out as much as possible by 
unskilled labour." He added that 
There is a good deal of work which crui be done by unskilled men 
looking after it. I was told by a firm in Bristol, which was 
undertaking to turn out shells, that if they were allowed to use 
unskilled labour, they could double their output, because they 
could have a night shift and could use exactly the same machinery. 
That happens very often. You have not enough skilled labour to 
utilize the machinery except during the day.28 
Lloyd George assured the Commons that under the Ministry of Munitions, not 
one ounce of the natiorl' s erergy would be wasted in the struggle to in-
crease production and win the war. As if to underline the intention to do 
whatever was needed to insure enough armaments, Lloyd George had written 
into the bill the specific powers over labor that the new ministry was 
assuming. In an amendment to the earlier Defence of the Realm Acts, the 
bill added that the Ministry of Munitions was empowered to 
regulate or restrict the carrying on of any work in any factory, 
workshop, or other premises, or the engagement or employment 
of any workman or all or any classes of workmen therein, or to 
remove the plant therefrom with a view to maintaining or increas-
ing the production of munitions in other factories, workshops, or 
27House of Commons Debates, June 23, 1915, (col. 1196). 
28Ibi~., (cols. 1200-1201). 
premises, or to regulate and co:i.trol the S'.l.pply of metals and 
material that nay be required for any articles .r'"'or use in war .29 
Workmen in munitions factories were required to wear badges and sanctions 
were imposed against any individuaJ. who left a factory without the consent 
of the employer.30 
The debate on the Munitions of War Bill was longer than it might 
have been, had the government been more popular in the House. The debate 
was used by opponents and supporters alike to vent their unhappiness with 
the government's conduct of the war.31 Finally, on July 1, 1915, the bill 
received the consent of' the House with only a few minor amendments. The 
government, or rather Lloyd George, was now in the munitions business, free 
to take whatever steps that were needed in order to improve the output of 
munitions. 
There was very little in the Munitions of War Act which had not 
already been implemented or previously suggested. It simply consolidated 
the Treasury Agreements a.~d the Defence of the Realm Acts, while accepting 
nearly all the recommendations of the Committee on Production. The result 
was to place under the control of a single authority with almost absolute 
29Munitions of War Bill, .21?.· cit., clause d, section 10, part three. 
30Ibid., sections 6-9, part two. Lloyd George proposed the enlist-
ment of a mobile workers' army which could be transported from one factory 
to another whenever necessary. 
31The passage of the bill was a foregone conclusion. The debate over 
it, however, caused the government some embarrassment. 'Yne tone of the 
debate was anything but friendly, reflecting Parliament's un."fiappiness that 
positive, forceful action (such as the bill be fore them) had been delayed 
for so long. F'urthernore, some Members were extremely distraught over the 
way in which they believed the government had hidden the shell problem. 
Nonetheless~ Lloyd George did use this displeasure to his adva.Dtage by 
insisting that 11 llllless the new Ministry of Mrmi tions has an absolui:;ely free 
hand in the matter of giving and arranging orders, his appointment will be 
perfectly f'utilP. 11 House of Commons Debates, June 23, 1915, (cols. 1205-
1266). . 
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powers the legal authority to ad·vise and coordinate the activities of men 
as well as machines. The passage of the act officially confirmed the 
growing conviction that in the interests of the nation, machines of flesh~ 
blood, and bone were not so very different from those that were made of 
steel,. fed on coal, and belched smoke. Both were home resources in the 
test of total war and each needed to be organized, exploited, and used to 
their maximum efficiency if victory were to be achieved. 
By the early fall of 1915 Lloyd George's Munitions Ministry had 
grown to become one of the busiest departments in the government. Shell 
production was steadily increasing and the short fall, despite continued 
rising demand, was shrinking as each week passed. It had been discovered 
that high explosives, now e.lmost in exclusive use at the front, were pro-
duced by a relatively simple proce3s and most engineer:.ng firms had the 
machinery and skill to manufacture them. This expanded production could 
not be handled by skilled union men alone, so by the authority of the 
Munitions of War Act, more and more unskilled workers were brought into 
factories. Because of the shortage of men resulting from the growing de-
mands of the military, these new legions of unskilled workers were increas-
ingly made up of women.32 Female labor flooded heavy industry on a scale 
never before contemplated. This was especially true in the national fill-
ing and explosive factories, which were set up in August and exclusively 
controlled by the Ministry of Munitions. With this expansion of the 
female labor force in the munitions factories, and in every corner of 
British industry~ the Ministry of Munitions became acutely aware of the 
32As early as March women had been asked to register with the gov-
ernment if they were willing to be called upon to work in essential war 
industries. Those women who had volunteered were being called upon in 
ever-increasing n-umbers. The Times~ March 18-20, 1915. 
seamy health and safety conditions which were present in many plants 
doing government contract work: inadequate venti~ation and lighting, 
few if S..."J.Y sa..~itary facilities, faulty safety precautions, and excessive 
work hours which tended to compou."1.d all the other deficiencies. 
Although the working conditions had certainly improved over the last 
hundred years, the conditions in factories were still inadequate for the 
protection of the workers 1 health. The war, with its sudden demands for 
increased production had put a stop to any improvemen~s that were being 
made and this served to increase the health problems by taxing already 
strained sanitary facilities. Excessive overtime and the new inexper-
ienced .female workers further aggravated the situation. The presence of 
women in the heavy industries gave the reformers a sentimental issue with 
which they could argue for better conditions. In most establisJ:1men ts, 
Lloyd George wrote, "rough and unseemly condi t.ions prevailed and had hither-
to been put up with the men workers, but it was recognized as impossible to 
ask women to submit to them."33 Backed by the almost unlimited power of 
the Ministry of Munitions, Lloyd George and his lieutenants combined the 
issues of female labor and national efficien~y to make major improvements 
in the working conditions of all factory workers. 
On August 12, 1915, Christopher Addison, who had gone with Lloyd 
George to munitions as his top assistant and political ally, scheduled a 
meeting of government officers interested in public health. In attendance 
were Sir Thomas Barlow, a physician, Mr. Bellhouse and Dr. Collins, both 
from the Home Office, Sir 3eorge Newman from the Board of Education, Sir 
Walter Fletcher from the Medical Research Council, and Professor Boycott, 
33Lloyd George,~· cit., vol. 1, p. 302. 
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who had worked previously on various medical committees. Addison domi-
nated the conference, suggesting to its participants that "It might be 
worth wM.le in our endeavour to increase the output of munitions to see 
whether something could be done to sustain and improve the physical effi-
ciency of the workers, to examine the supply of food, facilities for 
meals, hours, fatigue, ventilation, and kindred matters. n34 At the same 
time, on Addison's reco:rnmendation, Lloyd George appointed a female in-
specter to the ministry's staff. Her duties were to tour all the new 
national factories as quickly as possible and inform the board of manage-· 
ment in each about the special needs of women workers and suggest improve-
ments.35 The first step, limited as it was, provided information to 
owners who had never employed women, and brought some immediate resuJ.ts 
in many factories. Looking beyond this beginning, Addison and his ad hoc 
committee had a much more comprehensive plan in mind. 
A sequel to the August 12 meeting was held on September 19, during 
which a permanent committee was proposed to study all employment conditions 
within munitions factories. Addison wrote in his diary that 
It has become manifest that new varieties of occupation in 
connection with explosives and dangerous materials a..'1d the in-
troduction of women and unskilled workers into all sorts of work 
will soon bring up a number of questions affecting the health of 
workers, and I asked Lloyd George to let me appoint a number of 
people whose sole business it would be to make inquiries and give 
us advice on matters affecting the health of people employed in 
munitions works.36 
Lloyd George readily agreed and, upon Addison's recommendation, appointed 
34christopher Addison, Politics From Within, Vol. I (London: Herbert 
Jenkins, Ltd., 1924), p. 212. 
35Lloyd George, ~· cit., Vol. 1, p. 302. 
36Addison, Politics From Within, p. 213. 
Sir George Newman to be chairman of the Health of the Munitions Workers 
Committee. Other members of the committee were: 
Sir Thomas Barlow, M. D. 
G. Bellhouse, Factory Department, Home Office 
Professor A. E. Boycott, M. D. 
J. R. Clynes, M. P. 
E: L. Collins, Factory Department, Home Office 
W. Morley Fletcher, M. D. ,:tf..edica..l Research Coirl!ll:ittee 
Professor Leonard E. Hill, Medical Research Committee 
Samuel Osborn, J. P. , Sheffield 
Miss R. E. Squire, Factory Department, Home Office 
Mrs. H. J. Tennant 37 
The committee was a strongly liberal one and Newman, encouraged to uti-
lize his personal discretion in all matters, undertook to "advise the 
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Ministry as to the conditions of employment that are likely to be produc-
tive of the largest output. 11 38 With this directive in hand, the committee 
was able to expand the area of its concern from women in factories to the 
much larger question of how environmental conditions within factories 
affected industrial output. 39 
The committee went to work quickly and they produced their first 
report in November.. Memorandum number one was an examination of Sunday 
labor and attempted. to determine the overall efficiency of increased work-
ing hours. 40 The committee had toured the large industrial centers of the 
37christopher Addison, Four and a Half Years, 2 vol., 3rd edq 
(London: Hutchinson and Co., 1934), Vol. 1, diary entry, September 
19, 1915, p. 126. 
38sir George Uewman, cited in Addison, Poli tics From Within, 
p. 213. Both Addison and Lloyd George made it clear to Newman that 
he was free to ma.~e a broad examinaticn of all factors affecting the 
health of the munitions workers. 
39Philip Whitwell Wilson, "The War and Social Revolution," 
Fortnightly Review, September 1, 1915, pp. 757-764. 
40emd. 8132, "Report on Sunday Labour," Ministry of Munitions, 
Health of Munitions Workers Comntlttee, Memorandum No. 1, November 1915, 
Sessional Parers of the House of Lords, Reports From Commissioners,Vol.56, 
1914-16. 
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nation and had compiled evidence presented to them by employers, workers, 
a.nd other interested persons. During their tour th.ey f'ound that Sunday 
labor was of special concern to nearly all who were interviewed. The study 
released by the committee revealed tha"t the war had increased not only week-
day overtime, but had made Sunday labor a regular part of industrial life. 
Although there was no general rule, most factories appeared to ask their 
workers to work on Sundays and some were requiring workers to put in full 
twelve-hour shifts or more. Despite the long hours, there was no proof 
that production had significantly increased. :Much to the committee's 
surprise, several employers even testified that production had decreased. 
A representative from one engineering firm told the travelling committee 
members that his company had even reduced the average work week from 78~ 
to 65~~ hours by cutting down on weekend labor. He noted that it was his 
opinion that production per man hour had increased, more than making up 
for the lost time.41 Several other firms gave the same report and the 
committee wrote in their first memorandum that 
Though accurate figures of this kind are not generally avail-
able, statements that reductions in Sunday work, have not, 
in fact, involved any appreciable loss of output, and even 
the less observant of the Managers seem to be impressed with 
the fact that the strain is showing an evil effect • • . • 
It is becoming increasingly realized that there are limits 
to hours of labour beyond which no commensurate output is 
obtained. 42 
In this manner, the cormnittee merged their unmistakeable social concern with 
those of the national war effort. They concluded the report by noting 
that "-It is of primary importance in the interests of the Nation that they 
should be allowed that rest which is essential to the maintenance of their 
health. 1143 
41Ibid.' p. 4. 
42Ibid. 43Ibid.' p. 6. 
Fully aware of their unique position as an advisory body to the 
Ministry of Munitions, the commit.tee emphasized their conviction that 
Some action mud be ta..1<:en in regard to continuous labour and 
excessive hours of work if it is desired to secure and main-
tain, over a long period, -Che maximum output. To secure any 
large measure of reform it may be necessary to il:1pose certain 
restrictions on all controlled establishments, since competi-
tion and other causes frequently make it difficult for1 indi-vidual employers to act independently of one another.4i 
Tlie committee insisted that direct and speedy action was needed if a 
general collapse of munitions production was to be avoided. They noted 
that, owing to the strong patriotic spirit of the times, long hours had 
not caused the degree of individual breakdown that might be expected 
under normal circumsta.11ces. Nonetheless, they found definite evidence 
that a general fatigue was beginning to slow even the older more exper-
ienced workers, as well as the managers and foremen.45 
A report entitled "Memorandum Number Three", issued in November, 
dealt with the necessity of making canteen facilities available to 
workers inside large factories. Hot food and a clean environrnent in 
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which to eat meals, the report pointed out, would provide nourishment and 
a restful atmosphere for workers who had heretofore had to eat cold food 
at their work positions.46 This report was generally included in the 
memorandum issued by the committee in December as Memorandum Number Two.47 
Concerned with promoting welfare supervision in each factory, the report 
44Ibid. 45Addison, Politics From Within, p.214. 
46cmd. 8133, "Report on Industrial Canteens," Ministry of Munitions, 
Health of ~hmitions Workers Commit-tee, Memo;randum No. 3, Nov. l9l5. 
Sessional Papers o~ the House of Lords; Reports from Commissioners, Vol. 
56, 1914-16. 
47Cmd. 8151, aReport on Welfare Supervision," Ministry o:f Munitions, 
Health of Munitions vforkers Corrw..J.ttee, Memorandum No. 2, December, 1915, 
Sessional ~apers of the House of Lords, Reports From Committees, Vol. 56, 
1914-16. 
solidly linked adverse working and living conditions with poor individ~al 
ef'f'iciency. It argued that, "Varied and complex influences are today 
adversely af'fecting the efficiency of munitions workers, and among them, 
certain conditions, outside the ordinary underta.."lcings of factory manage-
ment, ·appear to be almost more important than the immediate or technical 
environment in which work is carried on and the length of hours during 
which workers are employed. 11 48 The report went on to list some of the 
outside f'actors that it claimed were adversely affecting production, such 
as a shortage of low cost housing, inef'ficient public transportation, a 
lack of' canteen provisions, and the general ill health among many employ-
ees. 
Through their study of industrial centers, the committee found that 
the sudden influx of workers in a...'1d about large munitions plants had great-
ly overtaxed the existing housing accommodations. Houses that were intended 
f'or a single f'amily of ten were discovered to be sheltering several f'a.mi-
lies. Moreover, it was revealed that in some areas conditions were so bad 
that many beds, which were intended for one person, were often occupied by 
severa1 people, day and night.49 The committee found that these poor hous-
ing conditions had an adverse effect on the capacity of' workers to attain 
maximum efficiency. They further noted that the lack of proper housing 
had not only caused overcrowding, but had compelled many workers to find 
shelter long distances away from their place of employment. This meant 
that they were forced to travel every morning and evening to and from the 
f'actory in overcrowded and delay-ridden trains. The committee pointed out 
48Ibid., section 1, p. A2. 49~., clause a, section 1, p. A2.. 
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that the failure of public transportation to meet the new demands made 
upon it cost both employers and employees time and efficiency. Memora.~­
dum Three reported that "Cases have come to the knowledge of the committee 
where workers have to leave home daily before five A.M., and do not return 
before ten P .M., thus leaving barely six hours for sleep. 11 50 It was sug-
gested that if improved and more plentiful housing could not be found in 
and around factory areas, then improved transit facilities were needed to 
cut down on the workers 1 travel time. The committee urged all large fac-
tories to compile accurate data concerning distances traveled by their 
workers and to devise from this information cooperative arrangements among 
workers. Furthermore, it was suggested that the information be turned over 
to the proper local authorities and transit companies for action on a 
larger scale. 
Although the committee's work revealed to tbem that the large issues 
of housing and public transportation were factors in the efficieneJ• of 
munitions workers, they also understood that these were beyond the pale cf 
the ministry's effective control. After looking somewhat longingly at the 
wider social issues and interdependencies, the second memorandum tu...-:ned 
towards the munitions factories them.selves. Incorporating much of the con-
tents of the third memorandum on canteens, the committee, in their second 
report, asked that hot meals be provided for workers within the confines 
of the workshops. Frequently, they had found, in the course of their study, 
that arrangements for heating foods brought by indi vid.ual workers W"ere 
insufficient. Comparing the laborers to soldiers, the committee argued that 
50Ibid., clause b, section 1, p. A2. 
Workers who are poorly lodged may be u.1able to obtain appetis-
ing and nourishing food to take with them; others living long 
distances from the factory may have little or' no time to spare 
for meals, and thus have to rely on what they can carry with 
them to sustain them during the day. Yet the munition worker, 
like the soldier, requires good rations to enable him to do 
good work.51 
Moreover, pointing out that many of the workers were young boys and girls, 
the report insisted that welfare advice and assistance was required in 
large plants in order to improve f'eeding arrangements and working condi-
tions in general. 
In order to provide this advice, the committee urged that the Mini-
stry of Munitions ask 'all factory managers to employ welf'are supervisors. 
The sole duty of these special off'icers, who were to be neither responsible 
to management or labor, was to promote individual welfare in order to in-
crease production. The committee suggested that as an independent agent 
within each plant, the welfare supervisor's duties should be wide and far-
ranging. Some of these responsibilities were: 
To be in close touch with the engagement of new labour, or 
when desired, to engage the laborer; 
To keep a register of available houses a.:::id lodgings; to inform 
management when housing accommodation is .inadequate; and to 
render assistance to workers seeking accornJnodation; 
To investigate records of sickness and broken time arising 
therefrom; and in case of sickness to visit, where desired, the 
houses of workers; 
To investigate, and advise in case of slow and inefficient 
work, or incapacity, arising from conditions of health, fatigue, 
or physical strain.52 
In addition to these duties, the committee in their report asked that 
welf'are supervisors assist managers in areas ranging from the improvement 
of sa.ni tary conditions to the organization of' recreational and educational 
51Ibid., clause c, section 1, p. A2.. 
52~., clause d, section 1, p. 4. 
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activities. Stressing the importance of having a welfare officer inside 
each workshop, the committee noted that it should· "not be regarded as 
something outside the ordinary factory management or extraneous to it, but 
as a vital and integral part of the whole discipline and right organization 
of the business, to be shared in by all. 11 53 Emphasizing this, the com..'Ilittee 
provided evidence of increased production as a result of welfare supervision 
and sternly warned er:i.ployers that "Without some such special arrangement, 
there cannot fail to be diminished output, discontent, and unsmooth work-
ing."54 
During January 1916, a series of new reports followed in rapid sue-
cession the earlier documents released by the committee. These studies 
dealt in detail with Employment of Women, Hours of Work, Canteen Construe-
tion and Equipment, Industrial Fatigue and its Causes, Special Industrial 
Diseases, Ventilation and Lighting of Munition Factories and Workshofs, 
and finally Sickness and Injury. In addition, an appendix to the third 
report on canteens was produced which provided diagrams and blueprints 
for canteen construction.55 Ea.ch report, as did the three released in 
late 1915, contained within it the clear assumption that all factors affect-
ing the physical condition of workers were tied to output and overall effi-
ciency. The work of the committee had begun to make it clear to those 
reading their reports, that since the outcome of the war depended largely 
on the productivity of British workshops, British workers could not be 
53Ibid., clause d, section 1, p. 4. 54Ibid., section 5, pp. 6-7. 
55cmd. 8185, 8i86, 8199, 8214, 8215, 8216, Ydnistry of Munitions, 
Health of Munitions Workers Committee, Memorandum Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10, January 1916, Sessional Papers of the House of Lords, Accounts and 
Papers, Vols. 5-6, 1916. 
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allowed to function at less than peak efficiency. Machinery could main-
tain its maximum output only so long as it was greased, fed fuel, and kept 
from rusting. The work of the Health of Munitions Workers Committee, whose 
final report was entitled, Industrial Health and Efficiency, had joined 
humanitarian and wartime concerns.56 This was done in such a way that the 
nation had to ask itself' if it could do less for its human machinery than 
that made of steel. 
Based partly on the strength of the November and December reports and 
certainly a knowledge of the preliminary studies of the committee's January 
reports, Lloyd George introduced before the House on January 4, 1916, a 
bill designed to amend the original Munitions of War Act. After some minor 
changes in the Lords, the bill was completed and was finally approved on 
January 19. 'I'he amending bill served to broaden and further define the ex-
tensive powers of the Ministry of Munitions. Contained within it were some 
new important sections that gave the minister the power to establish and 
require munitions contractors to acL"!J.ere to safety, sanitation, and welfare 
. ~7 
standards deemed necessary./ This broad power, among other things, allowed 
the Ministry of Munitions, without specific Parliamentary approval, to exer-
cise control over all conditions of employment in all workshops which employed 
women, semi-skilled, and unskilled labor for the purposes of producing muni-
tions.58 In addition, the amendment contained within it an important pro-
vision which me.de it incumbent upon the Ministry of Munitions to inspect all 
56cmd. 9065, "Industrial Health and Efficiency," Ministry of Munitions, 
Health of Mu.nit ions Workers Commi ttce, Final Report, 1918, Sessional Papers 
of the House of Lords, Reports From Commissioners, Vol. 15, 1918. 
57 11Munitions of War .Amendment," Sessional Papers of the House of Lords, 
Public Bills, Vol. 5, 1911+-16. 
58Ibid., clause 1-2, section 6, p. 3. 
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workshops in order to ascertain whether or not the basic requirements 
were being met.59 
With the full approval and encouragement o~ Lloyd George, Dr. 
Addison and Dr. Newman used the new powers of the ministry to impose on 
controlled establishments the recommendations of the Health of Munitions 
Workers Committee. As early as October 1915, canteens had been estab-
lished in national factories, and with the backing of the Munitions Minis-
try new canteens were being quickly added to older factories. Lloyd 
George personally pushed the owners of controlled establishments to do 
the same and he even went so far as to convince the cabinet to allow all 
employers to write off construction costs as "a trade expense 11 .60 Given 
this tax break, the committee reports, and the personal pressure applied 
by Lloyd George, many employers in early 1916 began to construct canteen 
facilities. The results were immediate. By mid-1916 more than 500,000 
workers in both national and controlled workshops were able to obtain 
cheap, hot, nutritious meals under decent conditions and to sit in a com-
fortable room without having to go beyond the factory walls in inclement 
weather.61 
Shortly after the environmental measures suggested by the Health of 
Munitions Workers Committee were imposed by the ministry within most 
munitions workshops, a new factory bill was drafted. The bill, entitled 
the Police &c.(Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, was a catch-all measure 
that easily passed through the House in late July 1916.62 Dealing with a 
59~., section 17, p. 9. 6libid.' p. 217. 
60Addison, Politics From Within, p. 216. 
6211Police &c.(Miscella.neous Provisions Bill)," Sessional Papers of 
the House of Lords, Public Bills, Vol. 3. 1916. 
large variety of seemingly unrelated issues,part two cf the act con-
tains within it provisions designed to secure and improve factory con-
ditions throughout Britain. The first clause of section seven states 
that 
Where it appears to the Secretary of State that the conditions 
and circumstances of employment or the nature of the process 
carried on in any factory or workshop are such as to require 
special provisions to be made at the factory or workshop for 
securing the welfare of the workers or any class of workers em-
ployed therein in relation to the matters to which this section 
applies, he may by Order require the occupier to make such rea-
sonable provision therefor as may be specified.63 
In describing some of the areas of concern, the act suggested that the 
Secretary of State might order those responsible to make arrangements 
for "preparing or heating, and taking of meal; the supply of drinking 
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water, the supply of protective clothing; ambulance and first aid arrange-
ments; the supply and use of seats in work rooms; facilities fo~ washing; 
accommodations for clothing; arrangements for supervision of workers".64 
Furthermore, the act provided the Secretary of State with the latitude 
to decide whether particular regulations were to be adhered to by an 
entire industry or were applicable only to a slngle workshop. 
Perhaps one of the more significant sections of the act was the 
provision that made each factory owner monetarily responsible for all 
improvements. No longer was the owner of a firm allowed to deduct the 
cost of bettering the working conditions within the workshop from the 
laborer's pay packet, such as had been allowed by the 1831 Truck Act, 
which was still on the books. With the growth of organized labor the 
63Ibid., clause 1, section 7, part two. 
64Ibid., clause 2, section 7, part two. 
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practice had faJ.len into disuse, thoug..~ the inability of owners to make 
deductions in the face of union pressure was sometlmes used to justify 
the lack of improvements. Besides reinforcing the idea that the workers 
were not responsible for their working conditions, the act also required 
that t~ey be consulted by their employees on all questions concerning 
the factory environment.65 The final section of the act made it mandatory 
for an outside medical man to be called upon to investigate all deaths 
and serious injuries occurring within work hours and file a full report 
with the Secretary of State. These reports were to include the circum-
stances of the accident and suggest improvements that might be made to 
prevent similar injuries. 
The factory provisions contained within the police bill were the 
earliest legislative fruit of the work done by Health of Munitions 
Workers Committee.66 During the next two years almost nine hundred fac-
tory canteens were established in workshops employing more than one and one 
half million laborers. First aid and surgical dressing stations became 
coI!lllonplace, as did welfare supervisors. The Home Office issued leaflets 
giving medical and hygienic advice and significant progress was made in 
dealing with the treatment and prevention of special industrial diseases. 
Washing facilities, cloakrooms, seats, and protective clothing made their 
appearance in the tightly regulated munitions plants and in many unrelated 
industries.67 The marked improvements made in the working conditions 
inside factories, and the resulting rise in the quality of the health of 
65sir George Newman, The Building of a Nation's Health (London: Mac-
Millan and Co.~ Ltd., 1939), p. 375. 
66Ib·d <75 
_i_., p. _, • 
67Lloyd George, ~· cit. , vol. l, p. 388. 
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working people, is reflected in the Factory Inspectors' Reports of 1917 
and 1918.68 
Protected by the extraordinary powers of the Ministry of Munitions, 
industrial welfare gathered strength and brought rapid changes to British 
industry. Until 1918 the Health of Munitions Workers Coimllittee continued 
to gather information, issue reports, and make constructive recoilU!lenda-
tions. The majority of these were fully implemented in the national fac-
tories and the controlled establishments that became a national model of 
enlightened management. Other industries followed this lead in varying 
degrees, marking, as Lloyd George noted, "the recognition of the fact that 
the producer is not simply a person employed for so many hours and paid such 
a wage, but a fellow human being, with physical needs and weaknesses in-
separable from his ability to work. 1169 'I'he advances made had been accepted 
and instituted in response to a national emergency, not out of a particular 
humanitarian concern. Except for a relative handful of tireless and dedi-
cated reformers, few thought of the changes as anything more than wartime 
necessities. Nonetheless, the speed with which the wartime reforms were 
made gave many social activists a new hope. Carried by this tide of opti-
mism, Lloyd George observed that "It is a strange irony, but no small com-
pensation, that the making of weapons of destruction should afford the 
occasion to humanize industry. Yet such is the case. Old prejudices haYe 
vanished, new ideae are abroad; employers and workers, the public and the 
68emd. 9108, "Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and 
Workshops f'or 1917," Sessional Pa-oers of the· House of Lords, Accounts and 
Papers, Vol. 14, 1918. Cmd. 340, "Annual Report of the Chief Inspector 
of Factories a11d Workshops for 1918," Sessional Papers of the House of Lords, 
Reports From Com.missioners, Vol. 28, 1919. 
69Addison, Politics From Within, p. 224. 
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state are favorable to new methods. 1170 
Despite the success of the movement to improve industrial working 
conditions, Lloyd George clearly over-estimated the reach of its achieve-
ments. Beyond a relative ha..~aful of reformers and the industrial commu-
nity, few outsiders were aware of the improvements being made in worksho~ 
conditions; it simply was not the type of issue that elicited public 
attention when the press was filled with war news. At the same time that 
the social technicians in the Ministry of Munitions were devising schemes 
to use their new-found engineering powers, public attention was becoming 
excited bJr a much more sensational problem. As early as mid-1915 the 
combined problems of a high rate of infant mortality, a steadily declining 
number of births, and the prospects of a lengthy, life-demanding war were 
thrust into the public eye. 
Accompanying the casualty reports announced by Herbert Asquith on 
June 9, 1915s was the startling figure that fully forty percent of those 
listed as wounded were permanently disabled and unfit to return to work. 
Population comparisons, which had received considerable attention before 
the war, were re-examined and those who took the time to plough through 
old census figures were horrified. The last census had been conducted 
in the United Kingdom during 1911. It revealed that the rate of popula-
tion increase in the nation was falling off dramatically. The census re-
corded that the number of people living in the country, not including the 
Islands in the Seas, was 45,216,665, with 21,942,883 male and 23,273,782 
female residents. The off-shore islands, including the Isle of Man and 
70Lloyd George, .2£.· cit., vol. 1, p. 308. 
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the Channel Islands, were populated by a total of' 148,934 people, divided 
into 69,989 males and 78,945 females,71 In the ten-year period since the 
last census, England and Wales had· shown a population increase of 10.9 
percent, Scotland a.n advance of 6 .1+ percent, while Ireland showed a 1. 7 
percent decline in her population. This made the overall increase in the 
United Kingdom between 1901 and 1911 only 9.1 percent.72 The rate of 
increase for England and Wales, the most populous areas of the nation, was 
less than in any period since the institution of a regular census in 1801. 
Similarly, the advance for Scotland was lower thaz1 ru1y reporting period 
except that marked by the census of 1861, which showed an increase of only 
6 percent.73 
A comparison showed that while Britain's population growth was de-
clining, that of other major powers was increasing rapidly. The German 
empire's population was advancing at a rate of 15.2 percent, Austria's 
census statistics revealed that her population was increasing by 9.3 
percent, and the United States registered a 2l percent rise. France, 
Britain's chief war partner, was the only prominent nation which fell be-
low the United Kingdom, with a nearly staticnary advance of only 1.6 per-
cent. Together, Britain and France had a population of about eighty-five 
million people in 1911, while Germany and Austria-Hungary had a total 
amounting to nearly ninety-five million and a higher birth rate.74 These 
71 11census of England and Wales," Administrative Areas, Counties, 
Urban and Rural Districts," Sessional Papers of" the House of Lords, 
Census, Vol. 60, 1912. 
72Thomas Hannan, "One of the War's Warnings: Take Care of that 
Child," The Nineteenth Century, July 1915, p. 141. 
73Ibid,, pp. 142-143. 
74census of England and Wales, vol. 60, ~·cit., pp. 11-12. 
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population statistics proved to be little coilifort to those who lu1derstood 
that the war was one of attrition. 
The unavoidable conclusion to be drawn from the census comparisons 
was that British human resour~es must be used more efficiently and waste 
cut to make up the disadvantage in numbers. The 1911 census that had 
disclosed to many people that the central powers had more "cannon fodder" 
than the Allies, also pointed out that many lives were being needlessly 
destroyed by controllable factors. It revealed that during 1911, the 
number of births in the United Kingdom reached 1,104,707, of which 881, 
138 were delivered in England and Wales. The same year there were 527, 
810 deaths in these two areas. Of those dying in England and Wales, it 
was discovered that 114,600 were children under one year of age. 'Ihis rep-
resented 21.7 percent of the total death rate or a child mortality rate of 
130 deaths for each 1,000 births. This rate was unusually high because 
the winter of 1910-1911 was extremely harsh. Nonetheless, the ten-year 
average was well over 100 per 1,000, with the ~ate for the entire United 
Kingdom averaging 125 deaths for every 1,000 births. These high figures 
were dwarfed by those that revealed that the death rate among illegitimate 
children reached 245.29 per 1,000 births for the entire United Kingdom in 
1911. It was further shown that the bulk of all deaths were caused by 
disturbances of the digestive organs resulting from improper feeding and 
malnutrition. Among the specific causes of death among children were such 
diseases as bronchitis, pneumonia, lung infections, rickets, convulsions, 
whooping cough, measles, scarlet fever, diptheria, and typhoid, either pre-
ventable or curable by a combination of a proper diet, care and sani ta-
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tion.75 
This information, which was readily available before the war, had 
at the same time only raised the ire of dedicated social reformers. By 
mid-1915, the reaction was not so limited, since civilians as well as 
soldiers had become pawns in the world's first total war. The needless 
waste of any life became in many minds a misspent national resource. 
Writing in the July 1915 issue of the Nineteenth Century, a conservative 
commentator, the Reverend Thomas Hannan, observed: 
It is accepted on all sides as the teaching of History that the 
continuous drain on the manhood of a nation made in long and costly 
war produces physical exhaustion or deterioration on a national 
scale . • • • It is easy to realize:- that the present war will have 
an adverse effec~ u~on both the nurriber and quality of our population, 
unless some method can be adopted to lessen the influence of the loss 
of large numbers of those who are physically the finest examples of 
the manhood of our country. It will be by the most assiduous atten-
tion to the care of child life in the next few yea:cs that the rav-
ages of the war in that direction can be in any degree repaired.76 
Hannan went on to note that because the bulk of the deaths among children 
were caused not by the ravages of nature but by want, squalor, and impure 
food, many could be prevented. The national interest would be best served, 
Hannan implied, by saving the lives of children, so that they might be 
better utilized in the factories or at the front. 
The issue of child life was the kind that could draw wide public 
attention because it was simple, clear-cut, and emotional. The reading 
public was bombarded from all sides with information concerning child life 
and its importance to the nation. Private charities moved to establish 
75Hannan, ~· cit., p. 143. In response to a question concerning 
infant mortality and birth rates in the Commons, the Government provided 
Members with a chart revealing similar information. House of Commons 
Debates, June 15, 1915, (cols. 551-552). 
76Ib'd 
_i_., p. 137. 
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baby saving organizations, which were designed to provide money to the 
poor for proper food and to distribute maternity information. They also 
opened clinics and served low-cost baby meals and maintained day nurseries 
for working mothers. Adds appeared in many popular journals appealing for 
funds. One typical advertisement, signed by a Dr. Barbara Tchaykovsky, 
appeared in the August 1, 1916, issue of the New Statesman. Making her 
pitch on several levels, Doctor Tchaykovsky wrote: 
We need ~5,000 a year to carry on our relief funds, our res-
taurants, day nursery, clinics, and we appeal to every patriot at 
home and at the front to help us in the task we have set for our-
selves of maintaining, as far as in us lies, the welfare of the 
race in one of the poorest districts of London, where the infant 
mortality rate has risen from 112 in 1913 and 127 in 1914 and to 
152 per 1,000 in 1915.77 
In all probability the writer would have been interested in the baby-saving 
project in peace time, but the war made her appeal to "patriots" more 
practieal. 
The war had the effect of binding a variety of interests together. 
J. Cessar Ewa.rt, a confirmed Tory imperialist, who had no previously re-
corded concern for child life or for east London, wrote dramatically that 
history indicated that "racial stocks with a redundant fertility tend to 
flow from the ancestral home to take possession of new territory. While, 
on the other hand, when, in any given race, the birth-rate falls below the 
death-rate, it is only a matter of time until that race is supplanted by 
another. 1178 The evidence for the end of British domination was clear to 
Ewart~ wbo contended that there were 100,000 fewer births, owing to the 
77The New Statesman, August 5, 1916, p. 421. 
78J. Cessar Ewart, "The Saving of Child Life," The Nineteenth 
Century, July 1917, p. 117. 
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great absence of men, in 1915 than in 1914. T1:e tragedy of this situation 
was compounded by his assertion that in 1915 .a...'1 average of 9 British sol-
diers perished hourly at the front. This, he argued, was disastrous enough 
for the future of the race, but it was exceeded by his estimate that in the 
United Kingdom 12 babies under the age of one year died hourly. 79 
Child welfare had been lifted from a contested political and econorr~c 
issue to one on which nearly everyone agreed. Some action had to be taken, 
if not for humanitarian reasons, then in the national interest. 'I'he first 
week in October 1917 was declared National Baby Week during which public 
attention was focused on the issue of not only child life, but public health 
and the prevention of disease. The public attention that was gained did 
little but create a new topic of conversation.BO Nonetheless, for the first 
time, the usually munda..."le issue of public health had caught the popular 
imagination, so as to become part of a general call for the reconstruction 
of British society after the war. Reconstruction emerged mid-way through 
the war as a magic term, having no precise definition, but with a constitu-
ency that stretched across the entire political spectrum. 
As long as plans for reconstruction remained vague, nearly everyone 
in Britain seemed to come to support it. Articles and speeches about what 
post-war plans should be, emanated from every corner of the British political 
world. The issue of reconstruction carried with it the combined baggage of 
79Ibid., p. 118. 
801ord Rhondda served as Chairman of the •National Baby Week Council, 
whose purpose was to study the conditions of infancy and maternity which 
led to the hig..~ rate o!, inf'ant mortality. DUring Baby Week the council 
produced publicly a series of recommendations aimed at cutting the death 
rate among children. Despite the public attention that these captured, no 
official action was taken and Baby Week. slipped by without any appreciable 
gains being made. "From Hospitals to Health," The New Statesman, October 
27, 1917, p. 81. 
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hope, fear, and practical politics, which were welded into an unwieldy 
. 
mass. The Athenaeum wrote somewhat dreamily from its leftist viewpoint 
that 
Reconstruction is a consecration of the materia~, mental, and 
spiritual resources of the nation to the fulfillment of a great 
purpose. That purpose is the realization of the ideal Britain 
for which men have laboured and suffered, fought and died. When 
much of the best blood in the country went to fight for Britain 
it was not for a country of slums and senseless luxury, of 
industrial injustices and vested interests, but a country seen 
in a vision, a land of truth, righteousness and freedom, a place 
of infinite possibilities .••. Reconstruction offers an 
unparalleled opportunity for overhauling our whole national life 
and moulding it in accordance with the purpose and ideals of a 
new age.Bl 
The editors of The Athenaeum and others of like mind considered recon-
struction to be a new beginning. Some of their fellm~ countrymen took a 
less expanded view of reconstruction which was formed by political prag-
mat ism. 
Labor unrest, or the threat of it, had never ceased to be a severe 
and worrisome problem. Even though Lloyd George and successive Ministers 
of Munitions effecti'Vl'.:ly checked the unions by forbidding strikes and sus-
pending trade rules, the radicals within the labor movement continued tc 
lead small strikes and work stoppages. Many saw the continuing efforts of 
the government as only temporary dams, blocking the raging torrent of 
working-class revolution. "This w:ar," wrote one commentator in January 
1917, "is a volcano in which all the political, social, and economic ele-
ments of our life are seething and boiling under the crust for a great 
eruption in which the old order will disappear for good. 1182 The same 
8111The M:!a.ning of Reconstruction," The Athenaeum, January 17, 1917, 
p. 9. 
82nr. c. Arthur Shadwell, "The Coming Revolution," The Nineteenth 
Century, July 1917, p. 40. 
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"II.Titer continued by saying that "The Government might stop it but only 
by changes which would be revolutionary in character. 11 83 In addition, 
future prospects of several rr:il.li.on soldiers coming home after the war 
only added to the fear of social upheaval. A wounded middle class sol-
dier wrote that 
Every man is doing his bit and his best, but at the back of his 
head rebels against what he thinks is an arbitrary military spirit 
and the knowledge that the country at home has not sought ou~ ener-
getically the slackers earning large wages and hiding themselves 
as it were in munitions works, coal mines, etc., while he runs the 
great life risks for ls. a day. He swears hard and long that he 
will have an easier time when the war is over. I do not think he 
knows how, but very vaguely says he is not going to be a 'bloody 
mug for the employer ru1y more'; and he views with grea~4 dissatis-faction the material gap between employer and workman. 
In the mire and the blood of the trenches, class and rank had tended to 
disappear. The war became a great leveller of men. Many working-class 
soldiers received temporary officer commissions as the slaughter of sub-
lieutena...~ts created a desperate need for men of higher rank. Large numbers 
of Conservatives, even though they had opposed far-reaching social reforms 
in the past; saw the mixture of disenchanted veterans and a revolutionary 
working class as a dangerous combination.85 Many came to realize that 
concessions wot:ld have to be made if some part of traditional English 
society was to survive the immediate post-war period. 
Even the religiously anti-socialist far right in British politics 
had to come to grips with the issue of social concessions to the lower 
83Ibid., p. 58. 84Ibid.' p. 50. 
85on September 25, The Times began a eeries of four articles entit~ed 
the "Ferment of Revolution", in which the paper warned that labor unrest 
coupled with disencha..'ltment over the war could overthrow the entire poli-
tical, social, and eeonomic order. 'Ihe Times, September 25, 1917. 
orders. Motivated by his own heightened fears, Lord Syndha.m of Comb 
wrote, in a half-hearted jump onto the reconstruction bandwagon,that 
Dangerous fallacies and alluring promises have been made 
spread broadcast among the people who have neither the time nor 
the knowledge required to analyse them. That is the peril of 
Socialism, which claims to have found the cure of all hwr.an ills 
by methods that have left the darkest stains u:pon history. Only 
by the harmonious co-operation of the best brains of all classes, 
working unselfishly for the common good, can our problem of 
reconstruction be solved, and never was there such an earnest 
desire to seek the solution in the spirit of good-will and mutual 
concession.86 
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National opinion had grasped on to the idea of reconstruction. For reasons 
motivated by often contradictory concerns, the left, middle, and :r.ight of 
British politics each accepted the idea because the notion of a new Britain 
offered every one the chance to remold the country in their own im.a.ge. 
David Lloyd George, who became Prime Minister in December 1916, shrewdly 
evaluated the merging of political perspectives on the vague notion of a 
national reconstruction. Lloyd George's political life had been consis-
tently dominated by his tactical desire to join diverse interests on a 
fragment of common ground under his personal leadership. The issue of re-
construction offered him another opportunity to build a broadly-based 
political following. 
On March 18, 1916, the cabinet had established the Committee on Re-
construction with Herbert Asquith, then still the Prime Minister, as its 
chairman. The committee did almost nothing, meeting only six times in 
their nine-month existence.87 Although not dead inside government circles, 
reconstruction seemed to be going nowhere until, as Prime Minister, Lloyd 
George told a labor conference in Manchester on Maren 6. l9l 7, that the 
861ord Sydenha.m of Comb, "The Peril of Social.ism," The Nineteenth 
Century, March, 1918, p. 471. 
87Lloyd George, Q.E.· cit., vol. 2, p. l97. 
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time had come to begin rebuilding the nation. Speaking to the labor rep-
resentatives, he said: 
There is no doubt at all that the present war . • . • presents 
an opportunity for the reconstruction of the industrial and econo-
mic conditions of this country such as has never been presented in 
the life of, probably, the world. The whole state of society is 
lll?re or less molten and you can stamp upon that molten mass almost 
anything so long as you do so with firmness and determination. 
He added that it was his belief that the settlement of the war would 
direct the destinies of all classes for some generations to come. 
The country· 'Wil.l be prepared for bigger things immediately after 
the war than it will be when it begins to resume the normal sort 
of clash of self-interests which always comes with the normal 
work-a-day world business affairs and concerns of the world. I 
believe the country will be in a more enthusiastic mood, in a more 
exalted mood, for the time being--in a greater mood for doing big 
things; and unless the opportunity is seized immediately after the 
war, I believe it will pass awa.y.~8 
Lloyd George insisted that things must be done on a bold and daring scale, 
ready to cut away the pa.st and look fo!"..rard to the new world. "Audacity", 
he told the labor meeting, "is the thing for you. Think out new ways; 
think out new methods; think out even new ways of dealing with old prob-
· 1ems. Don't always be thinking of getting back to where you were before 
the war; get a new world. 11 89 
In order to fulfill these vague promises for the creation of a new 
post-war world, Lloyd George, on July 17, 1917, appointed his most loyal 
lieutenant, Christopher Addison, as Minister of Reconstruction without 
88The Times, March 7, 1917. 
89M. B. He.mmond, British Labor Conditions and LegiSlation During 
the War (New York: Oxford. University Press., 1919), p. 271. 
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portfolio.90 Although the Prime :rl..inister's motives for moving to create 
a Ministry of Reconstruction at that particular time are not clear, three 
issues seem to have dominated his thinking. First of all, the war was 
not going particularly well and this reality was complicated by a deep-
seated-war weariness, encouraging a desire to make an inconclusive peace 
with Germany. Labor unions were trying to reassert their power and the 
number of strikes were rapidly rising. Lloyd George understood that 
this uneasiness would only damage the war effort further. He was forced 
by this situation to attempt to rekindle the lost spirit of sacrifice and 
the easiest way to do this was to focus public attention on the idea of 
a reconstructed Britain.91 Equally as menacing was the growing prospect 
of a large-scale mutiny in the army. In May the French army had revolted, 
a dislocation which threatened for a short period to give the Germans the 
victory in the west. The mutinies were so widespread that the French 
Minister of War, Paul Panleve, secretly reported that only two divisions 
between Soissons and Paris were reliable.92 
From a personal political viewpoint, Lloyd George appears to have 
seen in reconstr~ction an issue with which he might rebuild the shattered 
Liberal party. The split with Herbert Asquith had divided the party into 
two warring factions, making the party completely ineffective in the poli-
90By creating a Minister without portfolio, Lloyd George gave the 
Ministry of Reconstruction something of an unknown quantity. It apparent-
ly had all the powers of a full-fledged ministry, but lacked some measure 
of the prestige normally attached to a ministry. "Reconstruction," The 
New Statesman, August 4, 1917, p. 413. 
91Bentley Gilbert, British Social Policy 1914-1939 (Ithaca, N. Y.: 
Cornell University Press,1970), p. 7, 
92Ibid. 
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tical. arena. In reconstruction, Lloyd George had an issue that had wide 
appeal among Asquithia.n Liberals as well as his own Liberal contingent. 
Finally, the establishment of the Ministry of Reconstruction gave him the 
chance to move Christopher Addison from his position as Minister of Mimi·-
tions. Addison was not a particularly good administrator and while at 
munitions he had allowed the ministry to drift into often bickering 
factions and had antagonized some of the most powerful trade unions, most 
notably the .Amalgamated Society of Engineers.93 This made him a da.!gerous 
liability to Lloyd George. The Prime Minister had wanted to replace 
Addison for a long time with Winston Churchill, who had been in the poli-
tical wilde~ness since the Dardanelles Campaign in 1915, but who had far 
greater administrative skill than Addison. Reconstruction gave Lloyd George 
an easy escape from this political problem. Addison had unimpeachable 
radical credentials which made him the most logical and politically desir-
able choice to head a ministry whose task was to remold Britain.94 
93Addison was more than pleased to go to the newly created Ministry 
of Reconstruction and did not realize that ~or some time Lloyd George had 
been politely trying to move him from munitions. Addison, Four and One 
Half Years, Vol. 2, diary entry, July 17, 1917, p. 412. 
94Gilbert, 2£· cit. , p. 98. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH 
Christopher Addison's appointment to the Ministry of Reconstruction 
gave him a platform from which he could personally pursue his long-stand-
ing desire to see a ministry of health established. Through his work in 
the Ministry of Munitions he had come to more fully realize the importance 
of broadly-based, powerful central authorities in implementing social 
improvements. The Ministry of Munitions had made great strides in the 
area of industrial welfare, but i.t only applied preventive_ medicine within 
the area of its authority. It could do nothing about poor housing, sani-
tation, and maternal care. Addison dreamed of a ministry of health which 
would have wid.e powers to cure disease and to prevent its ravages. With 
the proven success of the industrial welfare movement and the heightened 
public interest in solving health problems, Addison moved to the Ministry 
of Reconstruction expecting rapid success. 
Before the war, the implementation of a ministry of health armed 
with broad and persuasive powers was thought by serious reformers to be 
essential to the improvement of the condition of the nation's poor classes. 
This was particularly true among the Fabian reformers who were interested 
in the prevention of poverty, not only because of humanitarian concerns, 
but because they sa:w the poor as a wasted resource. The Fabians argued 
that sickness often caused poverty and poverty gave rise to sickness; 
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they claimed that it was the state's d~ty, a.nd in it's own self-interest, 
to put an end to these intertwined problems. As early as 1907 when school 
medical inspection was established, these reformers, led by Sir Robert L. 
Morant, Sir George Newman, Margaret Mc:M.illia.YJ., and Sidney and Beatrice 
Webb, had begun to plan for the day when all national public and personal 
medical activities would be concentrated in a single ministry for health. 1 
Their planning rarely drew the interest of those outside the small circle 
of Fabians and their friends, and when the war came the ministry of health 
was forgotten as the nation rushed into battle. Health ministry advocates 
took up other causes; Newman accepted a post on the Board of Liquor Control. 
Almost forgotten, Morant struggled to maintain the machinery of the Nat-
ional Health Insurance in working order. 
The new Minister of Reconstruction, Christopher Addison, assumed the 
role of Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education when the war 
broke out. Later he was asked by his political mentor, Lloyd George, to 
become the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Munitions. Accept-
.ing the offer, Addison was entrusted by Lloyd George with the responsibill-
ty of keeping intact the minister's connections with his former radical 
friends. When the government was reconstructed for a second time in 
December 1916, Addison himself became the Minister of Munitions. From 
this position, he was allowed by Lloyd George to oversee most of the 
Liberal domestic appointments in the bureaucracy of the coalition govern-
· 
1Bentley Gilbert, British Social Policy 1914-1939 (Ithaca, N. Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 101. 
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ment.2 While exercising his powers of selection, Addison was responsible 
. 
for several appointments that were significant to the struggle for the 
ministry of health. The most important of these was Addison's nomination 
of David Thomas, Baron Rhondda, who became President of the Local Govern-
ment Board on December 10, 1916. 
In his political work for Lloyd George, Addison had kept close ties 
with both Robert Mora..."lt and Sir George Newman. When the presidency of 
the Local Government Board became vacant, Addison saw his opportunity to 
eliminate one of the major stumbling blocks on the road to unified health 
services. He asked Morant and Newman to recommend candidates for the post 
who were in favor of the establishment of a health ministry. The three 
decided that what was needed was a "big organizer with both a respected 
name and proven political skill".3 In Rhondda the three found a man whom 
they believed would be sympathetic to their plans, a business man who had 
no distinct political ties, ambitions, or liabilities. Addison and his 
friends felt that Baron Rhondda was forceful enough to overcome the tra-
dition-bound and sometimes sedentary nature or the Local Government Board's 
bureaucracy. 
2Britain had three large central bureaucracies, the Local Government 
Board, the Board of Education and the National Health Insurance, that often 
had no clear lines of demarcation separating their authority. As a result, 
they often duplicated each other's work, leading to competition and hosti-
lity between authorities. Arthur Newsholme, The Last Thirty Years in 
Public Health (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1936), pp. 195-203. 
3christopher Addison, Four and One Half Years, vol. 2, 3rd ed., 
(London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1934), diary entry, December 9-10, 
1916, p. 278. 
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On January 16, 1917, Acidison arranged to lunch with Rhondda and 
Newman, in order to introduce the two men. During the meeting at the 
Reform Club, Addison urged Rhondda "to go whole hog at the L.G.B. and 
arrange for the creation of a big Public Health Department."4 Prior to 
the meeting, Addison had sent Rhondda a copy of a memorandum which he, 
Newman, and Morant had drawn up during the summer of 1914. Shelved be-
cause of the war, it argued that there was a definite need for the con-
centration of government health agencies into a single powerf'ul ministry. 
The document showed that despite the wide variety of curative services 
available to the poor, few services assumed the responsibility for pre-
venting disease and sickness. The memorandum pointed out that this was 
especially true in the field of child and maternity services, which was 
partly responsible for 50,000 need.less deaths a year.5 Doctors Addison 
and Newman. put this problem before Rhondda in strong businesslike terms, 
and he was deeply impressed by information revealing to him that 1,000 
children, whose deaths could be prevented, died each week. By the end of 
the meeting, Baron Rhondda had given his assurances to Addison and Newman 
that he would do all he could to see that the nation's health services 
were reorganized. 
Addison and Newman were pleased and they told Morant that the birth 
of a ministry of health was now within easy reach. On January 23, Addison 
recorded in his diary that he 
had a talk with Fisher on the relations of the B. of E. with 
the L.G.B. and. on the general programme of the health supervision 
4christopher Addi son, Poli tics From Within, vol. 2 (London: Herbert 
Jenkins, Ltd., 1924), pp. 55-56. 
5 Adm.son, Four a.i.-id One Half _Years, diary entry, January 16, 1917, 
p. 317. 
of children. Rhondda h11.s taken up very ",;'c_:rmly the suggestion 
that there should be a big consolidation of health services. 
Fisher is prepared to co-operate in any way, and in the end, 
I hope, all health matters, excepting children attending nur-
series, will be dealt with by the L.G.B. Rhondda is the sort 
of' man to get things done.6 
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The :f'ollovring day, January 24, Rhondda wrote to Lloyd George and asked to 
meet with him in order to discuss the reorganization of his department. 
Addison f'ully expected that R..~ondda would inform Lloyd George of his de-
sire for a major overhaul and consolidation of the nation's health servi-
ces and then easily push the changes through the cabinet. This, however, 
proved to be a gross miscalculation of the situation and the reformers' 
elation was premature. Addison's personal judgement was clouded by the 
quick and generally unopposed success of the health measures imposed by 
the Ministry of Munitions. In his optimism he overlooked the differences 
between the two situations. The welfare measures of the Ministry of Muni-
tions were confined to an area in which the ministry had almost absolute 
powers, backed both by the law and public support. On the other hand, the 
proposed consolidation and expansion of the existing health services threa-
tened to upset long-established and well-entrenched bureaucratic and private 
interests. Moreover, Rhondda was weakened by the very factors which were 
·assumed to.be his strengths. As a successf'ul businessman, he had grown 
used to making unilateral decisions, and this made him somewhat susceptible 
to Addison's belief that all he needed to do was issue an order calling for 
major reform. Neither man understood the subtle movements of bureaucratic 
6Gilbert, ~· ci!_., p. 101. This mem<;:>randum has been lost, but 
:fortunately Dr. Gilbert has managed to .piece together its contents from 
both Dr. Addison's published diaries and the as yet unpublished Newman 
diaries. 
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political in-fighting. 
Shortly after these meetings, Rhondda asked his Chief Medical Offi-
cer, Dr. Newsholme, to prepare a special report for the Local Government 
Board on child mortality in England and Wales. 7 The report red.uced England 
and Wales to the smallest local authorities and presented a summary of 
child mortality in each area. The report concluded by asserting that.the 
local authorities, with the energetic aid of the Local Government Board, 
should do more to secure the improved health of working-class mothers 
and their babies,8 Towards this end, Rhondda inserted into his budget 
an additional ~200,000 for increased attention to maternity and child wel-
fare. 9 This allotment and the report caused a sharp reaction among the 
representatives for the industrial insurance companies. They were fearful 
that the local authorities, by moving strongly into the maternal and child 
welfare field, would cut into the highly profitable work the private com-
panies did tinder the provisions of the National Insurance Act as approved 
societies. By 1917 there were over 40 million industrial insurance poli-
_cies in force, covering about half of all insured women. These policies 
were handled by no fewer than 70,000 collector salesmen whose livelihood 
depended on their direct contact with the working class. This personal 
7Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, January 23, 1917, 
pp. 320-321. 
Bernd. 8496, "Supplement in Continuance of the Report of the Medical 
Officer of the Board for 1915-16, Containing a Report on Child Mortality 
at Ages 0-5 in Engla.~d and Wales, 11 Sessional Papers of the House of Lores, 
Reports from Commissio~ers, Vol. 30, 1917. 
9Although the report may have had no par~icular impact on Rhondda's 
already deep concern for the high rate of infant mortality, it is interes-
ting to note that in South Wales, Rhondda had the second highest mortality 
rate, second only to Gla.morganshire. Ibid., p. 49. 
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contact was something that was jealously guarded by the companies and the 
salesmen. Competition, whether it crune from public administrative units 
or other private companies, was bitterly resented. Lord Rhondda, through 
his swift action to improve maternity care through the local authorities, 
aroused suspicion and fear that these extremely profitable insurance 
businesses would be ruined. Furthermore, as the private companies becrune 
aware of the proposals for a ministry of health, they began to fear for 
th . . t 10 eir very exis ence. 
A memorandum was submitted to the cabinet on March 27, 1917, by Lord 
Rhondda, which pointed out the urgent need for a health ministry. His pro-
posals, which were already known, had even before the cabinet meeting 
caused an uproar among the approved societies. Rhondda, in drawing atten-
tion to the inefficiency inherent in the nation's various health services, 
showed how the overlapping of authorities could be corrected by the crea-
tion of a single agency responsible for the nation's he:alth. However, he 
had unwisely chosen to use as his primary illustration the problems which 
impeded effective maternal and child care, an indelicate choice only adding 
fuel to the fires of the already aroused insurance industries.11 The memo-
randum did not really threaten to replace the private companies with a 
state medical service, but emotions were running high and apparently few 
of the offended interests bothered to read Rhondda's suggestions. 12 He 
lOHouse of Commons Debates, ~.arch 8, 1917, (cols. 645-646). 
llGilbert, .2E... cit. , p. 106. 
12The medical profession was caught up in a heated debate concern-
ing the advisability of the creation of a state medical service. The 
approved societies, meanwhile, saw on the horizon the possibility of a. 
ministry of health sponsored state system that would put them out of 
business. British Medical Journal, January 20, 1917, p. 86. 
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argued for a simple three-clause bill which would establish a ministry 
of health that would supercede all existing authorities in matters con-
cerning public health. Second, the President of the Local Government Board 
asked that the medical and sa...~itorial benefits of the National Insurance 
Act be given over to the proposed ministry. As his final suggestion, 
Rhondda asked that more money be given over to the local authorities to 
broaden their activities. Tne cabinet, uron receiving these recommenda-
tions, referred the issue to a special cabinet committee which was to 
study the proposal. 
Dr. Addison, who was appointed to serve on the special study commi-
ttee, immediately backed Rhondda's proposal. It was his feeling that the 
quick establishment of the proposed health ministry would give him the 
administrative tool he needed to make his own Ministry of Reconstruction 
effective. Addison felt that the compromise between national health policy 
and local administration would be acceptable to all interests once tempers 
within the insurance industries cooled. The first meeting of the special 
cabinet committee, however, dashed Addison's hopes for a quieting of 
passions. The committee met on April 12 in Lord Milner's room in West-
minster Palace and quickly degenerated into a bitter battle between Sir 
Edwin Cornwall, who was then Chairman of the Insurance Commission, and 
Rliondda. Cornwall strongly resisted every hint of encroachment upon the 
turf of the insurance companies, while Rhondda, taken aback by this rugged 
defense, only wanted efficient and improved maternity care. Addison reveals 
in his diary that Cornwall was "obsessed with the idea that a ministry of 
health would be inimical to the interests of the approved societies under 
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the insurance act. 1113 Rhondda, retreating somewhat, offered a compromise 
which left maternal and child care out of the control of the proposed 
ministry. Led by Addison, the other members of the committee, Lord If.iilner 
and Arthur Henderson, strongly objected to this compromise because it 
threatened to cripple the proposed ministry severely. Having no patience 
for Cornwall's narrow view, they convinced Rhondda to withdraw his com-
promise suggestion and encouraged the committee to consider the issue from 
the wider perspective of health. Cornwall remained obstinate and the 
committee made little headway in that direction. Nonetheless, before 
adjourning, the committee decided to sponsor a sub-committee headed by 
Dr. Addison, which would compile a report devoted entirely to the health 
point of view. Accordingly, Sir Walter Fletcher, Mr. F. W. Goldstone, 
Mr. John W. Hills, and Mrs. Beatrice Webb were asked to explore the issues 
with Dr. Addison. Finally, the sub-committee prepared a report and pre-
sented it to Milner on May 14, 1917. 
The sub-committee's report, which was written primarily by Addison 
and his young secretary, Michael Heseltine, was very favorable to a large 
central health authority with strong interventionist powers.14 The report 
. was fully accepted by the whole cabinet committee on May 15, over the ob-
jection of Cornwall. Apparently, the more irate Cornwall became the less 
the committee listened to him, thinking that he represented only a small 
part of the insurance industry that had not given the matter the slightest 
13Addison, Politics From Within, p. 222. 
14Michael Heseltine was later to become Cnief Administrator of the 
National Insurance Commission. 
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positive consideration. 1115 Despite this attitude, Lord Milner wanted 
Cornwall's approval of the report, so he called another m.eeting of the 
committee on May 23 in order to try and bring him around. He was sorely 
disappointed again, as Cornwall held fast a...nd refused to be moved by the 
appeals of the other committee members. Tired of bickering with Cornwall, 
Milner sent the committee's report to the full caliinet, endorsing the 
establishment of a ministry of health. The enthusiastic recommendation 
reached the cabinet in early June, but any hopes of a quick approval 
melted away as the issue became tangled in a sticky bureaucratic and 
political web. Cornwall's complaints had continued unabated and the grow-
ing resistance from the entire insurance industry forced Lloyd George, in 
order to avoid a bloody political fight, to delay the matter so that he 
might find a peaceful compromise.16 The reformers, especially Addison, 
had hoped that the Prime Minister would have been more forceful, and their 
spirits fell upon hearing of Lloyd George's decision. The proposed health 
ministry was intended to be the spawning agency for the entire reconstruc-
tion program. The decision made by Lloyd George ended all hope for the 
creation of a health ministry until at least early 1918, thus effectively 
denying the Ministry of Reconstruction the power to implement its plans 
for a "new world". 
The health ministry did not become a reality in 1917 because it 
became securely lodged on a political barb. Some of the blame for this 
aborted attempt must be placed on the small circle of reformers inside 
Lloyd George 1 s government, and especially on Rhondda and Addi son~ They 
l5Addison, Politics From Within, p. 222. 
16Gilbert, 2£· cit., p. 116. 
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both pushed hard for the ministry, but they failed to recognize and deal 
with the vested interests. Each of these men felt from the outset that 
there would be no significant opposition to their measure, which had at 
its base the simple purpose of improving the nation's health. Moreover, 
they ~ere confident that if their powers were not strong enough they could 
rely on Lloyd George to give the proposal the boost it needed. This assump-
tibn proved to be a major political miscalculation. The Prime Minister 
was shrewd enough to see the political advantage of paying lip service to 
reconstruction and doing as little as possible. A kind of political fusion 
had occurred and in 1917 nearly every interest in the nation cried out for 
post-war planning for a reconstructed Britain. Lloyd George saw this 
glossy surface of opinion extending from left to right and he found that 
it would support his political ambitions. His consuming interest was to 
keep the nation in the war and to avoid divisive controversy. As long as 
reconstruction remained vague and ill-defined it would serve him well as 
a link between all interests. A particular issue, such as the proposed 
ministry of health, meant that the Prime Minister might be forced to 
alienate some portion of public opinion, thus threatening the delicate 
balance within the long cultivated fusion party. Therefore, once the 
question of the health ministry became embroiled in heated political con-
troversy, Lloyd George chose to skirt the issue by refusing to make a 
firm decision. 
Although the representatives of the approved societies had managed 
to have the issue of a health ministry deferred, most had continually 
asserted their agreement in principle with the idea. During the summer of 
1917, Kingsley ~ood, the most influential spokesman for the entire insurance 
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industry, drew up a draft of a Parliamentary bill.that would establish 
a ministry of health. The proposal, which asked that private insurance 
be left as it was and that the Poor Law health service be absorbed into 
the new ministry, became the basis of the industry's negotiating position. 
While Wood was putting together his proposal, Morant had made it his 
business to put the reformers' case before the approved societies. By 
October the two sides were ready to reopen direct and meaningful dis-
cussions .17 Rhondda, who had left the Local Government Board in June, 
had exacted from Lloyd George assurances that "he would not let the Minis-
try wither on the vine". 18 On October 3, 1917, he wrote to the Prime Minis-
ter that he felt that the time had come to try again • 
• • • the difficulty which made you hesitate to accept my 
proposals for a Ministry of Health last spring, and post-
poned the fulfillment of your promise to me, when I accepted 
the post of Food Controller. 
The insurance people, I understand, are asking you to receive 
a deputation before the end of the recess. Their publicly pro-
claimed desire for a Ministry of Health marks a forward setp, and 
makes it easy for you to give effect to your understanding to me.19 
Addison, too, felt that the time had come to renew the struggle. His 
Ministry o~ Reconstruction was busily putting together post-war plans, 
but he still lacked the mechanism with which he could bring them to fruition. 
l7Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, October 11, 
1917, pp. 436-437. 
181ord Rho~dda became Minister of Food; replacing him at the Local 
Government Board was William Hayes Fisher, a Conservati-:e. Fisher had 
little actual in-government service, but he had a great deal of influence 
in the London County Council and within the Con~ervative Party. He, un-
like Rhondda, was not particularly willing to help the reformers create 
a health ministry. Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 120-122. 
19Baron Rhondda to Lloyd George, cited in Gilbert, Ibid., p. 115. 
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Believing that the approved societies had begun to !'realize the obvious 
truth that anything which went to diminish sickness end to promote the 
good heal th of their members, so far from imperiling funds, would strength-
en them," Addison too renewed his pressure on Lloyd George.20 
The Prime Minister finally agreed to a meeting on October 11 with 
the representatives of the approved societies. Addison, Morant, Milner, 
Rhondda, Hayes Fisher, Cornwall, and Kingsley Wood, among others, were 
present, but the conference yielded very little in the way of real agree-
ment. The industrial insurance forces wanted to confine the proposed 
ministry as much as possible. They insisted that all Poor Law activities, 
except those dealing directly with medical benefits, be excluded and that 
responsibility for housing and sanitation also be left out. Addison, who, 
as Minister of Reconstruction, was beginning to worry about housing prob-
lems after the war, took the lead in insisting that the health minister 
have wide powers to prevent those illnesses caused by inade~uate shelter. 
Poor housing, he objected, was a major contributor to disease and a health 
ministry must be empowered to clear slums and build decent, sanitary 
homes. 21 At the end of this first meeting, with the two sides still wide-
ly separated, Kingsley Wood approached Addison and suggested that the two 
· · b · 122 N th. uld h of them try privately to negotiate an acceptable il • o ing co ave 
been more welcome to Addison,but he insisted that he be assured in advance 
20Addison, Politics From Within, p. 223. 
21Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, October 11, 1917, 
p. 437. 
22Addison, Politics From Within, p.223. 
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that Wood had the full auth-:·:~ity of his cons•~:.tuency to make a deal. 
The approved societies agreed to this a..~d J. H. Thomas, leader of the 
Railwaymen's Union, was appointed as the moderator. 
The first attempt of this small negotiating committee to arrive at 
some sort of common ground was on November 5, 1917. Lloyd George had 
given his blessing to the idea, but had again warned Addison that unless 
the two parties could come to an absolute agreement, he would not back 
the establishment of the health ministry. 23 Addison, somewhat distraug..lit 
by Lloyd George's failure to push the issue, proceeded cautiously and 
the first several meetings were cordial, lacking the bullheaded passion 
of those held earlier with Cornwall. Nonetheless, it soon became clear 
that the major obstacle to agreement was the Poor Law. Addison's proposal 
gave the ministry of health the general power to absorb all the medically 
related programs of the Local Government Board, including the Poor Law 
medical service. The representative oi' the insurance industry insisted 
that the Poor Law be separated from the scheme.24 Furthermore, Wood 
23Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, November 5, 1917, 
p. 442. 
24The insurance industry, representing in some measure the fears of 
their working class customers, saw the older Poor Law as more than just a 
competitor. The worKing classes had long chosen private insurance over 
public aid because of what most felt was the degrading nature of Poor Law 
relief. Thus, the insurance industry tried to use its position to finally 
destroy the Poor Law, which its patrons held in such low regard by separa-
ting it from any- new health scheme. They argued, not without some truth, 
that if the Poor Law were incorporated into the new ministry the working 
class might be reluctant to support its programs. Reformers pointed out 
that the hatred of the Poor Law was so intense among the working class 
that many people refused to take shelter in workhouses during the air 
raids on London. Frank Honigsbaum, The Struggle for the Ministry of Health, 
Occasional Papers on Social Administration, Number 37. (London: G. Bell 
& Sons, 1970), pp. 4o, 46-49. 
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reiterated his industry's earlier demand that the new ministry, when 
established, be responsible for sanitation, but not housing. On this 
final point, Addison managed to persuade Wood that if housing were placed 
out of the new ministry's reach it would be severely crippled in its 
dealings with the nation's health. Nonetheless, the Poor Law issue re-
mained unsettled. Dr. Addison privately agreed as a radical that the 
new ministry should be dissociated as much as possible from the hated 
Poor Law, but from a political point of view, this was an impossible 
proposition for the gover~ment to accept. Leaving the Poor Law out of 
any new health administrative agency would undoubtedly lead to the Poor 
Law's ~Jrther decay and eventual break-up. Addison was well aware of 
the entrenched strength of the Poor Law Division in the Local Government 
Board and "of its ancient ties of sympathy and mutual interest among the 
thousands and thousands of borough and urban district councilors through-
out England and Wales who had provided for nearly a century the grass 
roots support of English liberalism. 1125 Addison realized that Lloyd George, 
both for reasons of sentiment and practical politics, could ill afford to 
enter into a deal that, if accepted, would directly challenge the power 
of the Poor Law interests. Some other way had to be found. 
A second meeting, which took up most of the morning, was held by 
the negotiating team on November 8. The Poor Law dominated the conversa-
tion, with Addison arguing that it could not be disregarded in any health 
scheme. He pointed out that parts of the Poor Law medical service, espe-
cially its infirmaries, were very good, and their inclusion would greatly 
benefit any attempt to practice preventive medicine on a large scale. 
25Addison, Four and One Half Years, 
diary entry, November 5, 1917, p. 442. 
26Ibid., diary entry, ~fovembe:r 
8, 1917, p. 443. 
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Ccu.11tering this, J. H. Thomas insisted that the public support for the 
large-scale programs Addison proposed was vital and this might not be 
forthcoming if the department concerned was making expa.rided use of the 
old and unpopular Poor Law. Four days later, on November 12, another 
meeting was held and this time it became clear that no agreement could 
be fotmd on the issue of the Poor Law and the negotiations came to a 
standstill. 27 
In December, however, this situation changed dramatically as the 
possibility of a compromise was raised. On December 19, a Report on the 
Transfer of Functions of Poor Law Authorities in England and Wales, was 
signed by the Local Government Committee of the Ministry of Reconstruc-
tion.28 Issued publicly as the McLean report in January, the committee 
recommended that in order to secure better co-ordination of public 
assistance in England and Wales, the Poor Law Board of Guardians be 
abolished and that their duties and personnel be distributed among the 
other responsible local authorities. The report argued that the nation 
was faced with unnecessary 
overlapping functions and areas, and by conflicting principles 
of administration. The resulting confusion has been aggravated 
by the growing popular prejudice against the Poor Law--a prejudice 
which does less than justice to the devoted work of the Guardians, 
and the continuous improvement in Poor Law administration, espe-
cially in respect of the children and the sick. For the last de-
cade Parliament has been unwilling to entrust the Boards of Guardians 
with new functions, and the provision for new services has had to be 
27Gilbert, 9E.· cit., p. 116. 
28cma.. 8917, "Report on Transfer of 1i'unctions of Poor Law Authori-
ties in England and Wales," Ministry of Reconstruction, Local Government 
Committee, 1917. Sessional Papers of the House of Lords, Reports from 
Commissioners, Vol. 25, 1917. 
made by ether local autho:rities--in some cases new local 
authorities--often for the increase of the co~fusion and 
overlapping. 29 
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This was essentially the same conclusion Beatrice Webb had arrived at in 
her influential minority report included in the findings of the Poor Law 
Commission of 1910.30 Dr. Addison, who had been ideologically ill-disposed 
to the inclusion of the Poor Law anyway, fully accepted the conclusion of 
the committee. 
Relinquishing his previous position that the Poor Law should be in-
eluded in the proposed health ministry, Addison now called openly for its 
disbandment. He immediately secured the conditional acceptance of the 
insurance community, and devoted most of his time during the first two 
months of 1918 to securing the support of Lloyd George and the cabinet 
who finally declared that the establishment of a health ministry was a 
matter of the utmost urgency.31 In the meantime, Addison had given Sir 
Francis Liddell, Mr. M. L. Gwyer, Morant and Heseltine the task of dra~-
ing a bill. Closely resembling the approved societies' proposals as 
drawn up by Kingsley Wood the previous summer, the major difference was 
that the Poor Law medical service was placed under the control of the 
proposed ministry rather than being set adrift. By mid-March Addison was 
confident that he had gained for Lloyd George the unanimous consent of the 
insurance industry and thus the establishment of the ministry of health.32 
29Ibid. ' p. 4. 
30cmd. 4983, "Memoranda by Individual Cormnissioners on Various Sub-
jects," Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and RE;lief of Distress, Memora.'1da 
by Mrs. Sidney Webb, 1919. Sessional Papers of the House of Lords, Reports 
from Commissioners, Vol. 80, 1910, pp. 113-327. 
31Ibid., pp. 225-226. 32Honigsbaum, 2E.· cit., p. 47. 
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The Poor L9.w Division of the Local Government Board and the local 
authorities had generally ignored the almost year-long battle between 
the government and the insurance peop:e. They were rudely awakened by 
the realization that the new heal th agency, if established, would be 
dominated by their rivals, the insurance industry, and that they were 
being left out. Like a sleeping giant, they had begun to awaken to the 
dangers of the MacLean report. By the third month of 1918, the serious-
ness of the threat to the Poor Law was realized and the bureaucracy and 
friends of the Poor Law Division began their belated counter-attack. 
William Hayes Fisher, who had replaced Rhondda as President of the Local 
Government Board, had for months been dragging his feet on all questions 
concerning the proposed new ministry. He insisted that if there was to 
be a health ministry, it could be no more than :a restructured Local 
Government Board, expanded to include the National Insurance Comm.ission-
ers. 33 He insisted that it be devoid of any new interventionary powers, 
which of course would eliminate all hope for an active, prevention-minded 
ministry. Since the publication of the MacLean Report, Fisher had been 
working quietly behind the scenes among his Conservative constituency in 
order to foil Addison's negotiations. He had informed Lloyd George that 
should he accept the MacLean Report, and thus the proposed health minis-
try, the Tory M.P.'s would oppose the passage of any bill. 34 Addison was 
well aware of this warning and from January to the third week in March, 
while intensely negotiating with the insurance industry, he was engaged 
in a running battle with the Poor Law Division of' the Local Government 
33Honigsbaum, 91?..· cit., p. 47. 34Gilbert, ££· cit., p. 121. 
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Board, the local authorities, and Fisher. Despite this battle and the 
increasing level of hostility from the Poor Law bureaucracy, Addison felt 
that once he had worked. out the "kinks" i.n the health ministry proposal 
with the insurance industry and Lloyd George accepted the MacLean Report, 
the Poor Law opposition would be overwhelmed. He wrote in his diary that 
once a scheme had been worked out, "it would experience no special oppo-
Here again, Addison, with his unending optimism, had underestimated 
the strength of his opposition and the weight of wartime circumstances. 
On March 21, 1918, Lloyd George accepted the MacLean Report,now ready to 
see that the health ministry was created.36 The Poor Law people had long 
feared that thi.s might happen. Seeing in the Prime Minist_er 's actions 
their own destruction, under Fisher's leadership they recoiled with strong-
ly worded personal attacks on Addison, who was charged with "offensive 
actions" towards their interests and with "spreading" lurid tales about 
the trouble the ministry bill would cause in Parliament.37 
Despite the increasing intensity of the opposition, and armed with 
the Prime Minister's acceptance of the MacLean Report, Addison met on March 
25 with the approved societies, who wanted assurances that the health minis-
try would not be entangled with the Poor Law. The meeting concluded on 
friendly terrr£ and Addison, later in the day, dictated a cabinet minute 
on the proposed bill.38 Within this memora...~dum he noted that nearly all 
35Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, March 22, 1918, p.498. 
36Gilbert, ~· cit. , p. 122 37Honigsbaum, ~· cit., p. 47. 
38Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, March 25, 1918, pp. 
498-499. 
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parties had come to agr.ee on the major principles of his proposal for a 
:ministry of health. He added, however, that Fisher was still an obstacle, 
pointing out that the President of the Local Government Board retained 
three main objections. First, he insisted that the name of the new minis-
try be "The Ministry of Health and Local Government. 11 • Next, he disapproved 
of the dominant influence in the :ministry being that of the national in-
surance interests. Finally, Addison noted that Fisher opposed any break-
up of the Poor Law administration and insisted that all local health acti-
vities of the Poor Law remain as they were, untouched by the new ministry. 
This of course was unacceptable to Addison, and he urged the cabinet to 
move on the issue "as soon as possible 11 .39 
Addison had spent nearly a year negotiating with the insurance in-
dustry, a..~d the opposition of Fisher and the Poor Law interests threatened 
to wreck his plans. Neither interest really cared to see any change unless 
some advantages could be gained over the other. Addison had spent too much 
time working out a deal with the insurance people to see it now go by the 
board because of the sudden intervention of the Poor Law establishment. 
After months of delicate negotiations, Addison considered that his dreams 
of a powerful health :ministry had already been compromised by the seemingly 
endless delay. He now found himself entangled in a hopeless struggle with 
two vested interests, one private and one official. The slightest movement 
to please one inevitably caused an uproar among the supporters of the 
other.40. Addison felt that the time had come to force the issue, a..~d with 
39Addison mentions this memorandum only in passing in his March 25, 
1918, diary entry. For a more detailed account, see Gilbert,££· cit., 
pp. 122-123. 
l~Oibid., p. 128. 
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the Prime Minister's acceptance of the MacLean Report on hand, he prepared 
to bring the issue to a head, despite Poor Law opposition. The Doctor's 
plan was simple: he decided to place the issue "before the cabinet and 
allow their favorable opinion, led by that of Lloyd George, to overwhelm 
Fisher and the Poor Law bureaucracy. 41 
Addison's plan to force the issue through was interrupted by a new 
serious German offensive on the Western front. On March 21, 1918, the 
German army launched its last great attack of the war in the hope of 
gaining a breakthrough. Although an attack had been expected for months, 
the British lines were caught unprepared for such a large-scale effort. 
Within hours, the attackers had broken a section of the southern part of 
the line and a wedge was driven between the front lines of the 5th and 
3rd British armies. Lloyd George decided the situation was so critical 
that an extra 300,000 men would be requested from the .Americans to supple-
ment the sagging British positions.42 War news from the front dominated 
the cabinet to the exclusion of all else. Even Addison found it difficult 
to concentrate on his work dealing with reconstruction, and it was clear 
that the health ministry would have to wait for a more opportune and less 
anxious moment.43 
At first thrust the German offensive made significant gains, but it 
ended on March 28, with the British still holding; renewed attacks on 
41Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, March 25, 1918, 
pp •. 498-499. 
42Ib·d __ i_., diary entries, March 25-April 6, l9l8, pp. 498-503. 
43Ibid., diary entry, April 1, 1918, p. 501. 
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April 9 and until April 25 continued to pound. the British lines, but they 
had significantly less success with these latter assaults. While the 
second phase of the offensive was raging in France, the cabinet became 
embroiled in the delicate question of Irish conscription, again absorbing 
time needed to deal with matters of domestic social policy.44christopher 
Addison understood the urgency of the war and the Irish question, but 
by mid-April he felt that the delays imposed upoD him by the cabinet's 
unwillingness to pay attention to domestic issues were jeopardizing the 
success of the proposed health ministry, and he told the Prime Minister 
as much during a "short" but "frank" discussion.45 After it was clear 
that no one else in the government was going to take the initiative, 
Addison moved to rekindle the issue on April 24. He wrote that 
After having ploughed through a maze of negotiations with 
departments, Local Authorities, Approved Societies, and Medical 
Men, I completed the draft of a Bill setting up a Ministry of 
Health and the Memo. to the Cabinet reconL~ending it. In the 
long run, I daresay, time may have been saved, but it has made 
unlooked for calls on my patience and pertinacity.46 
The Doctor sensed, as did most people, that after the failure of the German 
offensive, the war would soon be ending. If this happened and there was no 
ministry of health, he worried that it might then be too late for recon-
· struction. Addison's memorandum, therefore, reminded the cabinet of 
Rhondda's call for a health ministry on March 27, 1917, and the promises 
44A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 1914-h5, (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1965), pp. 100-102. 
45Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, April 11, 1918, 
p. 309. 
46Ibid., diary entry, April 24, 1918, p. 515. 
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that were made to him in response to his appea.l. 4 7 
In recommending his draft proposal to the cabinet he forcefully 
claimed that there 
is a ~~de spread recognition of the urgent need for a measure 
to be framed on these lines, which will concentrate in a single 
central Department the responsibility for the main health services 
of the country and will enable further services to be transferred 
to the Department in due course. 
He added to this that 
Without such a Ministry we are fighting with divided forces against 
evils which menace the nation's health, some of them already upon 
us, others certain to arise as a result of the war. We have to 
repair the ravages of battle, and the diminished resistance to 
disease caused by excessive work and strain among non-combatants; 
we are faced already by a grave shortage of hospital accommodation 
even for men discharged from His Majesty's forces; we ought to 
provide for the harmonious development of extended health services 
for mothers and infants; we ought to be forearmed against the spread 
of dysentary and malaria and other diseases which may follow the 
return on demobilization of the millions who have been exposed to 
such infections.li.8 
With regard to the Poor Law services, the political barb on which the 
health ministry was caught, Addison urged that the MacLean Report be fully 
adopted. This meant, he pointed out to the cabinet, that all functions of 
the Poor Law rels.ting to the care and treatment of the sick and infirm 
"should be made a part of the general heal th services of the community. 11 49 
These proposals, Addison insisted, were matters of utmost urgency and should 
be dealt with as soon as possible. This of course was an open challenge to 
Fisher and his position that the Poor Law remain intact and unchanged. 
47Ibid.' diary entry, April 24, 1918, pp. 515-516. 
48Ibid.' dia..-7 entry, April 24, 1918, p. 516. 
49Ibid. 
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The President of the Lc,,:.-3.l Government E.J2rd, whose support even among 
Conservatives had been eroding since January, was not long in responding.50 
On May 13, Fisher sent his own memorandum to the cabinet, outlining his 
objections to Addison's plans for the consolidation of all health service 
under a single banner.51 Fisher charged that the agreement of the insur-
ance industry had been purchased at too high a price and he threatened to 
rally his Tory friends against the measure unless major changes, more to 
the advantage of the Poor Law, were made. This memorandum brought in turn 
an angry retort from Addison, who claimed that his negotiations had not, 
as Fisher insisted, "put the Minister in shackles." Furthermore, Addison 
pointed out that Fisher was picking on side issues of no real consequence 
in order to obstruct the whole measure.52 This angry exchange of memoran-
da between the two men did not elicit any response f'rom the cabinet, pre-
occupied as it was with the war. As June approached, Addison felt that he 
was losing the initiative and seems to have doubted whether or not he 
would ever achieve success.53 
50Fisher and the defenders of the Poor Law were stunned on January 
10, and then on January 14, 1918, when a letter, signed by a group of ten 
leading back-bench Tories, appeared in The Times attacking Fisher for hold-
ing up the Ministry of Health. The group, led by Waldorf Astor, called 
for a ministry very similar to the one that was being pushed by Rhondda 
and Addison. This of course was met by Fisher and his fr~ends with bitter 
accusations of treason to the Conservative cause. The Times, January 10 
and 14, 1918. Gilbert, .QJ2.. cit., pp. 119-120. 
51Gilbert, ~· cit., p. 123. 
52Addison, Four and One Half Years, dia!"'J entry, May 28, 1918,. p. 534. 
53Ibid., diary entry, May 29, l9l8, pp. 534-535. 
139 
At last, Addison persuaded Lloyd George to place the question of 
the health ministry on the cabinet's May 28 agenda. The cabinet, because 
of what it felt to be more pressing issues, delayed its discussion until 
the following day. By June 3, the matter had been postponed four times 
and Addison was near:::.y be:side himself. Furious at what he considered to 
be Fisher's intolerable attitude, the cabinet's failure to make any deci-
sions on home affairs, and the Prime Minister's failure to come to his 
aid, on June 3 Addison wrote in his diary that domestic issues were drift-
ing without any guidance. He noted that 
Their minds are so engrossed--and rightly so--with war issues 
that they are not able to give effective consideration to Home 
Affe~rs. For all that, this and many other matters of home im-
portance are the business of Government and must be dealt with. 
The worst of it is that L. G. seems to play up to the obstruction-
ists at the expense of his friends. I am probably his best friend 
in the Government, and ought to be able to rely upon him for sup-
port, especially as he is continually urging me to get on with 
the very matters of policy that he holds up, for want, not only 
of decision, but of consideration • • • • I must know where I am.54 
Addison, as the caretaker of radical liberalism inside the coalition gov-
ernment, and also the nation's chief organizer for post-war planning, felt 
that he had to try and salvage the fading dream of a new Britain. Moreover, 
as Lloyd George's close personal friend he was compelled to try and save 
the Prime Minister from himself.55 For these reasons he decided to resign. 
On June 5, Addison wrote Lloyp_ George a long and angry letter, in 
which he bluntly told the Prime Minister: 
Things are now heaping up in such a way and so many matters are 
nearly ripe for decision that, with what, I am afraid, I must 
54Ibid., diary entry, June 3, 1918, pp. 535-536. 
55Gilbert, SE..· cit., p. 124. 
characterise as the brusque treatment which I received from you 
on Thursday last, I am compelled to enquire wnat hope there is 
of my being able to deal with them. With a substantial measure 
of support from yourself, this can be done--without it and 
without the possibility of obtaining the consequential decisions, 
there is only muddle and disappointment before us, and the loyal 
support which I have always endeavoured to afford you will become 
of no avai1.56 
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Reminding the Prime ¥~nister of the promises he had given to Rhondda the 
year before, Addison suggested that a harder line should be taken with 
Fisher and his I'ory f'riends. "The departmental obstruction to the Health 
Ministry," Addison told his old f'riend and political ally, "comes only 
from a Department which in my view, is perhaps the least helpful of all 
our Departments--either to you personally as Prime Minister, or the Gov-
ernment as a whole."57 
Dr. Addison was afraid that Lloyd George might be offended by the 
letter, but he had come to believe that the issues involved had to be dealt 
with before the end of the war. The risk of a negative reaction seemed to 
be worth taking. To the Minister of Reconstruction's relief, Lloyd George 
was not the least bit upset and replied immediately to the letter, asking 
Addison to see him the following day. The two men met in the early evening 
and the Prime Minister renewed his pledge to see that a health ministry was 
created and promised Addison his full support. During the meeting Addison 
suggested that since the cabinet found it difficult to deal with domestic 
issues on a regular basis that some other method should be devised.58 
56Addison, Four and One Half Years, di~.:ry entry, June 5, 1918, 
pp. 538-539. 
57~q_., diary entry, June 5, 1918, pp. 538-539. 
58Ibid.' diary entry, June 6, 1918, pp. 539-540. 
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Several days later, probably as a result of Addison's letter and 
the subsequent meeting, Lloyd George established a Home Affairs Committee 
in order to care for domestic policy. .Among its members were Addison, 
Stanley Baldwin, H. A. L. Fisher, and Hayes Fisher; George Cave, Home 
Secretary, served as Chairman. On June 9 the committee met for the first 
time and of the first five meetings, held between June 9 and July 29, 
three were devoted exclusively to discussions about the proposed ministry 
of health. Baldwin and H. A. L. Fisher were solidly behind Addison, while 
Hayes Fisher continued his sniping attacks for the Poor Law interests. 
George Cave showed some initial opposition to the ministry, but soon 
Addison and the others managed to convince him of the ministry's imper-
ta.nee, and he moderated his position. 
The overwhelming support of the committee for a health ministry did 
not crush the now almost singular opposition of the Local Government Board. 
The issue became bottled up in the committee and despite repeated pleas 
for help from Addison, Lloyd George showed little or no willingness to come 
to the health ministry's aid. Addison wrote on July 23 that 
L. G. gives no help, and there is no denying that during the last 
two or three months, he has lost a great deal of support, or at 
all events of driving enthusiasm amongst some of his best friends 
in the Administration, including myself. He appears to have no 
real conception of the strength of his own position in the country 
and is timid to the last degree in his dealings with the Tory Pa.rty.59 
Addison, frustrated and feeling deserted by his old friend, was finally 
coming to understand the texture of politics within the Lloyd George govern-
ment at the time of the armistice. The promises of peace were promises of 
social reform and this was impossible in a delicately balanced fusion party. 
59Ibid. 9 diary entry, July 23, 1918, p. 552. 
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Lloyd George had become a prisoner in a glass house of his own making. 
Within it he could do no more than carefully pace the floor, always aware 
that if he walked too far in one direction, the glass would break. and the 
entire structure would collapse. Any dilution of post-war planning would 
meet with the resistance from the left and thus would weak.en Lloyd George's 
claim to the leadership of radical liberalism. On the other hand, if no 
concessions were made to the Conservatives, even mild reform measures might 
never be approved by the House of Commons.60 Moreover, the peace, which 
most knew was nearing, would bring with it Parliamentary elections, and the 
Prime Minister, faced by the increasing opposition of the Asquithian 
Liberals, needed unity among the interests of his coalition ministry.above 
all else. Therefore, the Prime Minister fotIDd it easier to do nothing. 
No matter how much he might personally have favored a health ministry, it 
was just not practical politics.61 
The lack of aid from Lloyd George and the stormy arguments with Hayes 
Fisher gave Addison little choice but to try and renegotiate a new ministry 
of health bill. The Poor Law remained at the heart of the problem and Hayes 
Fisher refused to be moved from his position that it must be kept intact, 
one way or the other. Addison spent the remainder of the summer trying to 
work out a new compromise settlement. The pivotal idea in Addison's propo-
sal was that the administration of all heal th ser.vices in the nation should 
be brought under one roof. In order to please Fisher he proposed to the 
insurance people that all statutory declarations about the break-up of the 
Poor Law be dropped and that it be left alone but incorporated into the 
6oGilbert, .2£.· cit. , p. 125. 61E · · b "t 50 .om .. gs aum, .2£.· ~·, p. . 
ministry. The representatives of the industrial insta'ance companies, led 
by Kingsley Wood, readily accepted this proposal. Their primary concern 
all along had not been for the destruction of the Poor Law or even its 
reform, but with the competition that might arise from improvements made 
in its services. Addison's new proposal promised that this would not 
happen. 
By ma.king this concession to Fisher, Addison knew that the friendly 
societies and the labor unions would rise to oppose the "Poor Law taint" 
of the ministry. Both of these interests had, by and large, allowed the 
industrial insurance representatives to represent their cause, believing 
that their concerns were similar. Feeling somewhat betrayed, they launched 
their own offensive against any health ministry which left the Poer Law 
intact. Even though the committee had approved of his new proposal and 
had voted to pass it on to the cabinet, Addison found himself caught again 
between two irreconcilable forces, both of which could destroy the effect-
iveness of the health ministry.62 The Doctor was frantic. He realized 
that no amount of negotiation was going to find enough common ground on 
which the warring interests could stand. By early October, fearful that 
with the war grinding to a halt the health ministry would be left high and 
dry, Addison decided that one side would have to be discredited.63 Fisher 
and the Poor Law bureaucracy were his natural choices. He wrote a letter 
62Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, August 9, 1918, 
p. 559. 
63Tlle German Government delivered a note asking i'or Armistice terms 
on October L., and on November 7, 1918, a German delegation passed through 
the Allied lines. Addison, sensing the end to the war, wrote in his diary, 
"I am not going to see the war end, and our being unable, at least, to tell 
these splendid men what we are going to do to help them over their imme-
diate difficulties." Addison, Four a..-rid One Half Years, diary entry, October 
10, 1918, p.584. 
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to Lloyd George on October 29 and asked Bonar Law to deliver it to the 
Prime Minister in France. "I am bound," Addison said, 
to tell you that the more successful you are in France, the 
more perilous is the state of affairs here. 
Unless, with regard to these vital and most urgent matters 
which I have placed before the War Cabinet and some of which 
a.re long outstanding, I am placed in a position within the next 
few days to obtain decisions and act upon them, nothing can save 
this country from chaos and disaster.64 
The implications of Addison's letter were clear to all those who were 
apprised of the situation. The Doctor was asking the Prime Minister to 
choose between himself and Fisher, between a health ministry, or none 
at all. 
Lloyd George, who was in France to plan for the Armistice and peace 
negotiations, beat Addison to the punch. On October 29, the same day as 
Addison wrote his letter, the Prime Minister decided, for reasons that are 
not all together clear, that Fisher had to go.65 From Paris he had 
written a letter of dismissal to Fisher, but while being carried to London 
the note was intercepted and read by Bonar Law. He returned the 1.etter to 
Paris, where he told Lloyd George that it was too harsh and must be 
64Ibid., pp. 584-585, diary entry, October 29, 1918. 
65An epidemic of influenza hit the southern part of the country very 
hard in June and contrary to the usual pattern of the summer flu, it spread, 
with a second, more severe wave striking the country in the fall. Not un-
til the third week of October did Fisher and his Chief Medical Officer, 
Arthur Newsholme, issue advice to the local authorities. The death toll 
was very high and the Local Government Boa.rd received a great deal of cri-
ticism from the medical community. This made it easier and less politically 
risky for Lloyd George, who had fought a bout w-lth the flue himself, to 
dispose of' the troublesome Fisher. Honigsbaum, ~·cit., p. 51. Addison, 
on the other hand, suggests Lloyd C~orge finally just got tired of Fisher's 
failure to complete the new Parliamentary Register and of his obstruction-
ist attitude. Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, November 4, 
1918, p. 586. 
145 
modified. Fisher, he warned, had too many Conservative friends who might 
cause a political row and threaten the upcoming peace negotiations. The 
Prime Minister, accepting Bonar Law's arguments, eilowed him to soften 
the tone of the letter.66 The new letter made Fisher a Peer, Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster, and Minister of Information, in order to 
sweeten the request for his resignation from the Local Government Board. 
Fisher, of course, could do nothing else but resign, and while there was 
some grumbling in the back benches, the way now seemed clear for Addison 
to proceed.67 
Addison wanted to be appointed to replace Fisher, but Lloyd George, 
in order to keep him free for election duties, made Sir Auckland Geddes 
the temporary President of the Local Government Board.68 Addison was 
pleased with the turn of events, and with renewed confidence he moved 
quickly to finalize his ministry of health bill. Contacting the friendly 
societies and the trade unions, he announced that he had no i!;.tention of 
maintaining the Poor Law as it was and that the health ministry would. not 
have a Poor Law taint, even though the bulk of the Poor Law's medical 
services would be incorporated into the new department. Still suspicious, 
the unions and friendly societies gave their partial approval of the 
scheme. 69 The industrial insurance companies presented no problem, because 
66Gilbert, 2.E.· cit. , p. 130. 68Honigsbaum, ~· cit., p. 51. 
67Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, November 4, 1918, 
pp. 586-587. 
69The f'riendly societies and the labor unions would have preferred 
the complete dissolution of the Poor Law. Because of this, despite their 
basic approval of the plan, they threatened to make a political issue of 
the Poor Law taint on the proposed ministry. Gilbert, S2£· cit., pp.131-132. 
Honigsbaum, .2£· cit., p. 50. 
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their fears of competition had been quelled nearly six months before. 
All seemed to be in order and on November 7, Addison finally introduced 
his bill before the Commons. The measure proposed little more than a 
change in the name of the Local Government Board to the Ministry of Health 
and the tra..~sfer of the National Insurance Administration to the minis-
try.70 1he proposal was well received, but because of the coming election 
(due on December 14), it was withdrawn in order to wait for a new Parlia-
ment. Nonetheless, the coalition cabinet was firmly committed to the 
establishment of a ministry of health.71 
During the election campaign each interest, having a stake in the 
establishment of a ministry of health, tried to influence candidates, but 
it was too late and there was little gained or lost by any side. The 
coalition won a convincing victory in the "coupon election" and the Minis-
try of Health Bill was assured of an easy passage through Parlirunent. The 
new coalition government moved Addison f'rom the Ministry of Reconstruction 
to the Prestdency of the Local Government Board on January 10, 1919; for 
the first time he held an administrative position from which he could speak 
with authority.72 Beginning in February, Addison undertook to clear the 
last obstacles before the Ministry of Health Bill and manage it through the 
70House of Commons Debates, November 7, 1918, (cols. 2340-2343). 
7lAddison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, November 7, 1918, 
p. 589. 
72Gilbert, ££.· £it . , p. 132. 
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House of Commons, this time with the full support of Lloyd George.73 The 
battle was over, and after more than two years of internal struggle, the 
bill received Royal assent on Ju..~e 3, 1919. Three weeks later, Addison 
was appointed as the first Minister of Health. 
73Addison was determined to tie up all the loose ends. For this 
reason, he surprised many of his supporters by leaving medical research 
beyond the authority of the Health Ministry. Dr. Addison realized that 
he could hardly afford to incur the wrath of the anti-vivisectionists 
who had, as far back as 1876, and as recently as 1914, managed to cripple 
research. Shortly after the passage of the bill~ however, Addison moved 
to bring medical research under the guidance of the Ministry of Health. 
CHAPTER V 
THE FAILURE OF SOCIAL PLANNING 
Christopher Addison had hoped to get the reconstruction program 
under way by late 1917 so that the victorious soldiers, upon their return 
home, would be able to see some immediate fruits of their sacrifices. 
Under his direction, hundreds of reconstruction committees dealt with a 
wide variety of post-war plans; but because of the failure to establish 
a health ministry, most of the schemes withered while awaiting an imple-
menting agency. 1 Only the plans for housing and slum clearance survived. 
until 1919, and it became clear that housing would be the issue upon which 
Addison as the Minister of Health would test the nation's commitment to 
comprehensive social planning. 
Reformers had long been concerned with the connection between inade-
quate housing and sanitation, and disease. 2 The pre-war Liberal government 
had experimented with several small-scale, publicly financed housing schemes 
and during the war the Ministry of Munitions had attempted to exert pres-
sure on local authorities to deal with sub-standard housing near munitions 
plants. As the tide of war turned in favor of the allies, many in Britain 
lPhilip Abrams, "The Failure of Social Reform 1918-1920," Past and 
Present, No. 24, April 1963, p. 43. 
2:8eginning with Edwin Chadwick's sanitarx report of 1842, social re-
formers produced endless studies on this subject. In this tradition the 
most notable contribution in the early twentieth century was Charles 
Booth's examination of living conditions in London's east end. 
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found it unthinkable to bring the victorious army home to slums and dis-
ease after it had fought a great and sacrificial war in defense of 
liberty. This argument was continually thrust into the arena of public 
debate and politidans of every stripe seemed to subscribe to some sort 
of housing scheme as a means of repaying the millions of soldiers and 
workers who had shouldered the burdens of the war.3 The trade unions 
had, during their 1917 conference, called for a million new housing units 
to be built following the war and throughout 1917 and 1918 both the 
Liberal and Conservative press kept public attention focused on the 
issue.4 In the general election of 1919 the housing question became a 
dominant theme in all party platform.s and most candidates agreed with 
Lloyd George when he announced that the task of the grateful nation was 
"to make Britain a fit country for heroes to live in. 115 This met with 
the hearty approval of the electorate who, as 'I'he Times pointed out, 
recognized that 
health and housing are merely aspects of the same question, the 
prevention cf disease rather than its cure are showing the aim 
of modern medicine. The women voters especially are showing an 
interest in this subject. Thanks to the efforts of the promoters 
of 'Baby Week' and the National Health Society, mothe~s have be-
come alive to the fact that the prevention of epidemics concerns 
them v;itally .•.. The great surprise of many meetings has been 
the intelligent, even enthusiastic, interest shown in regard to 
these topics and the clearly expressed determination of large 
numbers of electors to be put off no longer.6 
For the first time in Britain's history social planning on a massive scale 
3Bentley Gilbert) British Social Policy 1914-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1970), p. 142. 
411Labour and Its Voice," The New Statesman, .January 27 :t 1917, pp. 
389-390. 
5The ~' November 21~, 1918. /" 0 Ibid, December 9, 1918. 
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became a much-talked-about election issue.7 The war had served to clari-
ry in the public mind the notion that ill health reduced human efficiency, 
just as poor maintenance impaired the production capacity of machinery. 
By the election of December 14, 1918, the majority of national opinion in 
Brita~n seemed committed to large-scale social planning that would ensure 
that the nation's hum.an resources were well housed and healthy. 
Led by Lloyd George, the coalition candidates were swept into the 
House in overwhelming numbers. Only three days later the new government 
underscored its commitment to build homes fit for heroes by announcing 
the availability of heme construction loans to all local authorities. 
This first step, however, was little more th~~ an indication from the gov-
ernment that it intended to make good on its promise for a comprehensive 
housing scheme. Despite this early start the shape of the government's 
program remained largely unformed. As the new President of the Local 
Government Board, Christopher Addison was made responsible for drawing up 
a bill which would add flesh to the coalition's campaign pledge, 
By February, confident of the passage of the Ministry of Health Bill, 
Addison began to apply his energies to the problem of building homes fit 
for heroes. He quickly drew up a legislative proposal entitled the "Housing 
and Town Planning Bill", which was popularly known as the Addison Bill, and 
laid it before the cabinet. Much to Addison's personal disappointment, no 
immediate action was taken and despite the government's pledge the conser-
vative elements inside the coalition cabinet repeatedly delayed consideration 
7Frank. Honigsbaum, The Struggle for the Ministry of Health, Occasional 
Papers on Social Administration, No. 37 (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1970), 
p. 52. 
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of the proposal. 8 Frustrate:.l, Addison appealed to Lloyd George fer help 
while the Prime Minister was in England during a break in the peace nego-
tiations in Paris. Lloyd George was shocked by the cabinet's inaction 
and on March 3 he met with it and forcefully insisted that a full-scale 
housing scheme be launched immediately. Citing the political confusion 
on the continent a...~d the dangers posed by Bolshevism and anarchy, Lloyd 
George demanded that the cabinet fulfill its reform promises. He noted 
that during the war when the nation needed munitions, the government got 
them, but he pointed out that "when it came to the question of providing 
houses, the government was still talking and meanwhile people were without 
homes."9 Action, the Prime Minister asserted, must be taken immediately 
if the public confidence in the new government was to be maintained. "The 
people," he told the cabinet, "are bent on social reform--I am sure of 
that. rrlO 
Faced with Lloyd George's unwillingness to consider anything less 
than an all-out assault on the housing problem, the cabinet lent its com-
plete support to Addison's housing proposal. With this unanimous backing, 
Addison introduced the Housing and Town Planning Bill into the House on 
April 7, 1919.11 During his address to Parliament, Dr. Addison pointed 
out that there was "no dispute in any quarter that the matter is of the 
utmost importance, from the point of view of not only the physical well-
9Ibid.' p. 143. 
lOLord Riddell, Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference 
and After (London: Victor Gollanex, 1933),,diary entry, April 11, 1919, 
p. 50. 
llHouse of Commons Debates, April 7, 1919, (cols. 1713-40). 
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being of our people, but of our social stability a.11d industrial content. 1112 
The Members of the House, Addison suggested, could vote for the bill on 
the basis of humanitarian concern or out of self-interest, but either way 
the result would be the sa.me--new homes. This double-edged argument in 
favor.of the housing scheme and the acknowledged support of the cabinet 
cleared the way for the housing bill in the House. The lack of signifi-
cant resista...11ce to the measure increased the nation's hopes that the slums 
would soon be cleared and new homes raised in unprecedented numbers.13 
The Addison Housing Act, which received final approval on July 31, 
1919, had two major sections. The first of these made it the duty of each 
local authority to provide housing wherever needed within their juris-
diction.14 To accomplish this, the act required each responsible local 
authority to make periodic detailed housing surveys of their areas and 
to formulate plans for solving any deficiencies. These reports were then 
required to be forwarded to the Minister of Health who was responsible 
for overseeing the individual housing schemes. Having shouldered the 
nation's local authorities with solving the nation's housing problems, 
the second part of the act promised Treasury funds to retire all debts 
incurred by the local authorities above the revenue provided by the penny 
rate.15 In this manner the government gave up the advantages of central 
l2Ibid., (col. 1713). 
l3The government was to provide money for at least 500,000 new homes, 
all of which were to be built within three years. The New Statesman, 
April 12, 1919, p. 35. 
14"Housing and Town Planning Act," sections 1-4, part one, Sessional 
Papers of the House of Lords, Public Bills, vol. 4, 1919. 
15~., sections 5-6, pa.rt one. 
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borrowing in favor of local control. It promised to back all loans re-
gardless of their cost and, in its eagerness to get the program underway, 
the government indicated that it would approve on sight nearly all proposed 
home building schemes. In the early summer of 1919, the cost estimates 
for the housing proj€ct ran to only ~71 million. 16 Its most avid backers 
argued that surely this was not too much for a victorious and grateful 
nation to pay for homes fit for heroes. 
By the time Christopher Addison assumed the reigns of the .rJ.inistry 
of Health it appeared that all the pieces were in place and the road had 
been cleared for the ministry to flex its administrative muscle. Parlia-
ment was on the verge of giving its final approval to the Housing and Town 
Planning Bill and Addison had persuaded Morant and Newman to come into 
the new ministry as his chief advisors. Most importantly, popular senti-
ment was thirsting for action on the housing scheme. The Times reported 
that since the government's announcement about the availability of money 
for housing the previous December, less than six new houses had been 
built."One may travel f'rom one end of the country to the other," the paper 
noted, "without finding any visible sign that the task has ever been done. 11 
The London paper complained that 
Slums, the festering sores which increasingly poison the nation 
that neglects them remain untouched. For lack of houses young 
men who have come back from the war are unable to 'settle down' 
and to acquire that special consciousness of citizenship which 
belongs to householders. New houses are wa~ted and they are 
wanted now.17 
Late in June, Addison, in an effort to exploit this strong sentiment, set 
16Gilbert, £E.· cit., p. 143. The estimate was made by Lloyd George. 
l7The Times, June 19, 1919. 
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out on a nationa: tour to encourage local authorities to submit their 
plans to the Ministry of Health. The newly appointed minister claimed 
during his appearances that with some hard work, 100,000 houses could 
be erected by the following June and this annual total could be increased 
to 200,000 units during the second and third years of the program. 
Addison's optimism was matched by that of The Times, which, in a series 
of· lengthy articles dealing with the housing scheme, declared that a 
"strong sense of public duty would see the proposition through. 1118 
Despite the fanfare with which the post-war housing program was 
launched, its progress from the beginning was impeded by serious obstacles. 
Shortly after his nation-wide tour, Addison began to receive reports from 
local authorities that they were unable to hire enough union tradesmen to 
work on the approved schemes. Addison was surprised by these reports 
because he and his fellow planners in the Ministry of Health had assumed 
that labor was in plentiful supply. The collapse of the gradual military 
discharge plan thrust several million men onto the job market and by the 
fall of 1919 the 1.lnemployment rate was climbing rapidly.19 Addison could 
not understand why, under these conditions, the local authorities were 
unable to locate enough men to work on their housing schemes. After an 
investigation the Minister of Health discovered that the shortage was not 
one of :manpower but a lack of journeymen and apprentices in the building 
trade unions. Prior to the war the building trades had been severely de-
l.8Ibid., June 21, 1919. 
l9P1an.s :for a gradual demobilization had been drawn up by the Minis-
try of Reconstruction, but these failed in the face of demonstrations by 
active troops asking for their discharge tickets. Charles Loch Mowat, 
Britain Between the Wars (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 22-23. 
155 
pressed and many workers had dese:;.~ted the construction industry in order 
to find steady work in other skilled or semi-skilled trades. Because of 
this situation, few new apprentices were accepted into the building trad~s 
u.~ions in an effort to reserve the sagging market for the established 
tradesmen.20 During the war, nearly all civilian building ca.me to a 
standstill, and being members of an unprotected trade, construction work-
ers enlisted and later were conscripted in large numbers. In 1917, the 
Ministry of Reconstruction recommended that the building trades be exempt 
from military service and that men serving at the front be released from 
the colors. The request was denied and the depletion of the nation's pool 
of skilled building tradesmen continued unabated.21 The 1901 census re-
corded a total of 73,012 masons and 256,000 joiners practicing their trades 
in England and Wales. This picture had changed dramatically by 1920 when 
the Board of Trade estimated that the total number of masons and joiners 
practicing their trades in England and Wales had been reduced to 128,509.22 
Even though on the surface it appeared that Britain had a plentif'ul supply 
of labor which could be used to build houses, the number of these men with 
construction experience and the all-important union card was too small to 
meet the needs of the housing scheme.23 
Dr. Addison realized that the only way to ease the shortage of skilled 
20christopher Addison, Politics From Within, Vol. 2 (London: Herbert 
Jenkins, 1924), p. 216. 
21Gilbert, 2.E..· cit., p. 145. 22cited in Gilbert, p. 145. 
23E. D. Simon, The Anti-Slum Campaign (Landon: Longmans, Green & 
Co., 1933), p. 12. 
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labor was to persuade the trade unions to accept a large number of new 
apprentices. In a series of meetings throughout the fal.1 months of 1919, 
Addison met with union leaders, but he quickly learned that they were not 
as pliable as he had hoped. T'ne unions flatly refused to relax their 
trade restrictions and accept a large number of apprentices, who mig..~t 
in the future depress the trades job market once the housing scheme was 
completed. This unwillingness by the trade unions to increase their mem-
bership kept Addison in a constant rage. He insisted that the building 
trades were too concerned with short-term gain and not considering the 
needs of the nation, of which they were a part. This argument, however, 
did little to sway the unions who, against the backdrop of a slumping 
economy, became more adamant in their refusal. In December 1919 Addison 
asked Lloyd George to come to his aid, but even the presence of the 
Prime Minister at a meeting failed to break the resistance of the unions. 24 
The negotiations deteriorated as did Addison's patience, and by early 
1920 forced dilution on the war-time model seemed to Addison to be the 
only solution to the labor shortage which was preventing houses from being 
built. The ~linister of Health, however, lacked the authority to act al.one, 
so he appealed to the cabinet for the power to force the unions to relax 
their trade rules. Hesitant to increase industrial tensions, the cabinet 
refused and Addison had no choice but to again trJ and negotiate a com-
promise with the building trades. 25 In a running series of conferences 
24The Nation, December 20, 1919, p. 411. 
25Dr. Addison unfortunately made it his habit to lecture the Conser-
vative-dominated coalition cabinet on Liberal principles and the proper way 
of doing things. This, Lord Curzon once said, made him a "notorious bore". 
Lord Beaverbrook, The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George (New York: Duell, 
Sloan and Pearce, 1963), p. 41. 
157 
throughout 1920, Addison failed to budge the unions from their protection-
ist stance. In September 1920, he was forced to report to the cabinet 
that his efforts to arrive at a compromise had been a complete failure 
and that many local schemes were stalled for a lack of labor. Addison 
revealed to the cabinet that in the pre-v"i.ous March there had been only 
3,645 bricklayers at work on government sponsored housing projects in 
the entire nation.26 Union rules allowed each Journeyman to lay only 
400 br.icks per day and at that rate, Addison told the cabinet, it would 
take ten years to complete 40,000 new homes.27 Despite this information 
the cabinet who had been totally committed only a year before to see that 
homes fit for heroes were built, refused to come to Addison's aid. It 
insisted that the Minister of Health had not only failed to arrive at a 
compromise with the trade unions, but that he had completely alienated 
the local authorities and financially mismanaged the entire housing scheme. 
From January 1919 onward, Addison had been continually entangled in 
a struggle with the local authorities who were at the srune time "tradition 
bound and financially carefree" ,28 The local authorities were totally in-
experienced in matters of construction, yet the duty of carrying out the 
most ambitious housing scheme in British history was laid on their re-
lucta.nt shoulders.29 Christopher Addison was the man appointed to oversee 
the program and in the eyes of most local authorities, he represented 
Liberal radicalism which they uniformly mistrusted. As if this wasn't 
enough, Addison was viewed as solely responsible for the damage done to 
27Ibid., p. 146. 
29christopher Addison, Four and One Half Years, vol. 2, 3rd ed., 
(London: Hutchinson and Co., 1934), diary entry, -Dec. 2, 1918, p. 597. 
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the Poor Law by the cr.eati.on of the Ministry of Health. Addison under-
stood the resentment the local authorities felt towards him, but not its 
depth and intensity. He had hoped that once he assu..~ed the leadership 
of the Z.Unistry of Health, the conservative local authorities would accept 
their-defeat and lend their support to his housing scheme. This did not 
happen and they remained hostile to a.~ything connected with the Doctor's 
name. As Addison applied more and more pressure, many local authorities 
simply ref'used to cooperate with the housing progrSJll.30 
Addison had the f'u.11 and complete backing of the cabinet, at least 
until the end or 1919. With this support the Minister of Health felt it 
safe to combine his pleas for cooperation with threats against the resis-
ting local authorities, but his prodding only served to complicate the 
housing scheme's mounting problems. Construction materials were in short 
supply and Addison had not bothered to establish a centralized procure-
ment committee which could evenly distribute them. As a result, local 
authorities were placed in competition with each other and under these 
circumstances prices rose sharply. Manufacturers, hoping to make up war-
time losses, sometimes turned to profiteering by forming rings and held 
necessary materials such as bricks and mortar from the market place.31 
By early 1920 the competition among the local authorities had become very 
intense and prices were pushed still higher. The government was hesitant 
to reapply price controls and enforce anti-profiteering laws which had been 
part of the Defence of the Realm Acts. As a result, many local authorities 
30Gilbert, ~· cit., p. 147. 3lsimon, 2£.· cit., p. 112. 
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reported that even if enough tradesmen were available, they simply could 
not bU}· the necessary materials.32 
The government's refusal to control prices of construction mater-
ials was to its own disadvantage. As Addison applied pressure to the local 
author'ities to get their schemes under way at all costs, they bought up all 
the materials the manufacturers were willing to sell at inflated and stil-
ted prices. Each local authority was left to its own devices and because 
they were not expected to pay for anything above the penny rate, some were 
less responsible than others. For example, the Liverpool Housing Committee 
let a contract for ~2,000~000 to a firm with a paid-up capital of only 
J..3,000. No inqu.iries of any kind were made by the housing committee into the 
financial condition of the firm. When the contractor went bankrupt, despite 
a ~350,000 over-payment, the central government had to pick up the loss and 
got only a handful of houses in exchange.33 Costs, too, varied widely from 
area to area. Lutton, for instance, proposed a scheme that calculated that 
the cost of each house built would be ~350. On the other hand, because of 
the higher price of building materials and land, the local authority res-
ponsible for housing in Brighton submitted a similar plan for houses to be 
constructeq at a cost of ~900 each. Moreover, the Brighton proposal added 
32simon claims that everything was "done under the worst possible 
conditions", p. 11-14. It was later calculated that the money paid to 
build 176,000 houses under the Addison Act were applied in 1933; 1,000,000 
houses could be built a.11d change half the rent. Cmd. 3937, "Twelfth Annual 
Report of the Ministry of Health," §lessional Papers of the House of Commons, 
Reports from Cc:mmissioners, Vol. 14, 1930-31. 
33The Mancheste:r· Guardian, October 18, 1919. 
160 
an extra ~100 per dwelling for roads and sewers, thus making each small 
two-bedroom working-class a very expensive proposition.34 The result of 
the corruption, mismanagement, and inertia associated with the housing 
scheme was one delay after another and skyrocketing costs which were un-
acceptable to the coalition government. 
Britain, in late 1919, was already entering into its post-war slump 
which followed the initial industrial boom at the time of the armistice. 
In the growing conservatism of English political life, government expendi-
tures and the management of the public purse took on an air of restraint. 
Contemporary economic wisdom viewed the public budget in the same light 
as an individual's. Expendit-:.rres could not surpass incoming revenue and, 
as available capital decreased, belts had to be tightened. Reflecting 
this concern, The Spectator published, on January 17, 1920, the findings 
of the Deniscn House Public Assistance Committee. The group had investi-
gated the cost of public social services to the nation and crone up with a 
total of il2~,000,000 for 1918. The Spectator noted that "Few people rea-
lize what social reform means, wheri represented in rates and taxes or how 
much the state is doing in this way for the masses of the population. It 
is of the first importance that the facts should be made known. "35 At the 
bottom of the same page the journal noted in a single line, "Bank rate, 
6 percent, changed from 5 percent, Nov. 6, 1919."36 This increase meant 
that the cost of "building ''homes fit for heroes" was going to get even 
more expensive and the government would have to pick up most of the bill. 
34Ibid., October 19, 1919. 
35The Spectator, January 17, 1920, p. 67. 
The Housing Finance Committee, in its report :is.ted November 27, 1919, 
estimated that the capital required to build 500,000 houses by 1922 would 
amount to ~429,750,000 for England and Scotland. Each house would cost 
~800 in England and ~850 in Scotland. The houses could not possibly be 
rented at anything near their economic value and the penny rate would not 
even come close to making up the difference. Therefore, the bulk of the 
funds needed both to build the houses and to provide rent subsidies would 
have to come from the public treasury.37 The prospects of adding on this 
additional debt responsibility to the rapidly increasing cost of the other 
state-supported services made the cabinet reconsider its commitment to 
the housing scheme and large-scale social planning. 
The rise in the bank rate was the result of discussions between Sir 
Brian Cokayne, Governor of the Bank of England, and Austin Chamberlain, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, which took place before the end of the war. 
Their concern was centered on the ~1,000 million floating debt which 
caused the government to periodically invade the money markets, thus up-
setting normal financial business. They argued that this was acceptable 
in war-time, but that once peace came the practice would make it impossible 
to preserve England's financial dominance; they pointed out that a tight 
money policy was a necessity.38 The increase of the bank rate from 5 to 
6 percent in November was the first action taken by the two men to imple-
ment their financial policy, Addison was infuriated by the bank rate ad-
vance, seeing it as a threat to the housing scheme. During the last week 
37cmd. 444, "Treasury Committee on Housir~ and Finance," Sessional 
Papers of the House of Lords, Reports from Com.missioners, Vol. 28, 1919. 
38Gilbert, £12.· cit. , p. 149. 
of November he participated in a series of stormy cabinet meetings in 
which he and Chamberlain came into sharp conflict.39 The Doctor admitted 
that by early November only 43,299 housing units had been approved by his 
department, even though 500 ,000 were needed. Moreover, of those schemes 
receiving the Ministry of Health's approval, few had been built.40 Dr. 
Addison insisted that the local authorities were not getting the job done 
because of a lack of initiative and experience, insufficient numbers of 
workmen and materials, and a growing inability to raise money. All ex-
cept the latter could be overcome with some hard work, but the money situa-
tion could only be eased if the government gave added credit support to 
the project. Addison warned that if this were not done, houses would not 
be built in many of the poorest areas of the nation where they were most 
desperately needed. Chamberlain immediately objected to Addison 1 s pro-
tests by point.ing out that the best opinion in the city had urged the 
government not to accept any more indebtedness and suggested that maybe 
41 
the entire scheme should be scrapped. 
The cabinet accepted Chamberlain's opinion and agreed that it 
should encourage the local authorities to make more prudent use of their 
money. Addison was again, as he had been so many times before, wedged 
between strong forces which he was powerless to move by himself. The 
building trades refused to allow the entrance of new apprentices in an 
40cmd. 1446, "Second Annual Report of the Ministry of Health," 
Sessional Papers of the House of Commons, Reports from Commissioners, 
Vol. 13-14, 1921. In March 1920 plans for 161,837 houses and tenders 
for 79,536 houses had been submitted. Of these 13,355 had been begun 
and only 715 homes had been completed. 
41Gilbert, ~· cit. , p. 149. 
effort to preserve their economic position vithin a slumping economy. 
Inflation spurred by shortages and profiteering forced the price of each 
housing 1.Ulit up almost daily. Tradition-bound local authorities often 
simply refused to lend their full cooperation to the liberal housing 
scheme and when they did the result was often inept management. Finally, 
the government, surrendering to traditional wisdom, supported tight money 
policies which not only served to increase the cost of each house, but 
made it impossible for many authorities to get their schemes under way. 
Addison was effectively boxed in and, no matter which way he turned, he 
was met by inflexible resistance. The only way to save the scheme from 
complete chaos and a certain collapse was to improve its financial foot-
ing, but Addison had attempted to do this earlier in the year and had 
failed. 
Seeing his program in deep financial trouble, Addison began early 
in 1920 to encourage local authorities to issue their own bonds to private 
investors as a way of raising capital, but they could not keep pace with 
the bank rate, which again rose to 7 percent on April 14, 1920. Near the 
end of April, 80 percent of the London County Council issue of ~7,000,000 
was still in the hands of its underwriters.42 Others who had tried to 
raise additional capital in this manner found themselves in a similar 
predicament. The whole project was paralyzed and even the liberal press 
began to complain about the "prolonged story of ineptitude". The Nation 
wrote on May 8, 1920 
The municipalities asked for loans to f'ulfill their obligations--
without which indeed :fulfillment was impossible. They were refused, 
and told that they must raise the money for themselves. They could 
not do it. Against the competition of perpetual governn:.ent borrow-
42The Times, April 15, 1920. 
ing at something like 6 percent, the offer of various past 
government loans in the open market at over 7 percent, and 
with a 7 percent bank rate the proposition became grotesque. 
Birmingham and London tried on a large scale and failed.43 
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The complete and swift failure of the bonding scheme left Addison and his 
department in complete turmoil. The only recourse left was to try and 
reduce the construction costs per unit in hopes of building more houses 
with the shrinking real capital still available. Throughout the summer 
and fall of 1920, Addison tried to force costs down by putting pressure 
on the local authorities. These desperate and hurried efforts were met 
by complaints that he was playing the part of the bully; as a result, 
many local authorities simply ignored him.44 
While Addison was fruitlessly trying to salvage some portion of 
the housing scheme, the decision which would bring it to an end was being 
made. In late November 1920, Chamberlain, still intent on reducing t.he 
government's debt, announced that he hoped to cut the floating debt by 
~250 to ~300 million. This was to be accomplished by slashing all depart-
mental budgets across the board by 20 percent and also by fixing an abso-
lute ceiling on the number of houses the government would back.45 Addison 
bitterly objected, insisting that this would be impossible and that the 
taxpayer would be fortunate if the Ministry of Health did not ask for more 
f'unds than it had been previously given. Considering the economic situa-
tion and the condition of the housing program, no one was surprised when 
4311The House Famine and Some Causes," The Nation, May 8,. 1920, 
p. 163. 
44Ibid. 
45Finance Committee Meeting Minutes, Ja..'luary 30, 1921, cited in 
Gilbert,££· cit., p. 152. 
the differences between the two l:len were resol-red sharply and without 
much delay. During a Finance Committee meeting on January 30, 1921, it 
was decided that "There was no alternative open to the government but to 
decide the housing question not on merit, but on financial considerations 
only. ''.46 Government spending had to come down and housing, which was 
proving to be much too expensive and wasteful, became the first victim 
or the post-war economy campaign. On March 31, 1921, Christopher Addison 
resigned as the minister of the department he had fought so long to 
create, marking the failure of the large-scale social planning stemming 
:f'rom the war-time desire for national efficiency.47 While there would be 
some important and even imaginative reforms during the twenties and thir-
ties, most were aimed at particular problems. None of these would have 
the social ideal, ambition, flavor, or desire to engage in comprehensive 
social planning that was evident in the reform sentiment that grew out of 
the First World War. 
The rout of the housing scheme brought to an end the effort to win 
a political victory for social planning in Britain between 1914 and 1921. 
The attempt to massively build houses with state support was more the vie-
tim than the cause of the failure of those forces favoring social planning. 
The decisive defeat of reform occurred long before the war ended and the 
economy campaign began. While it is clear that the war did generate an 
authentic desire for sweeping reform, few outside of the circle of Addison, 
46Gilbert, 2£· cit., pp. 152-153. 
47Ibid., p. 144. While the Addison Act was a dismal political failure, 
it did manage to produce more houses than any other program except the 
Wheatly Act of 1928 during the inter-war period. A total of 170,000 new 
dwellings were built under the act w~th 80,000 of these being completed 
in 1922. 
166 
Newman, Morant, and Rhondda proposed concrete measures to enable reforms 
to be carried out efficiently and effectively. It became comfortable for 
politicians of all political shades to identify themselves with reform 
and it offended no one as long as positive action was not taken to make 
good on their promises. The reality of this situation is most clearly 
reflected in the creation of the Vdnistry of Reconstruction. Christopher 
Addi.son was never allowed to become more than a second-class minister. 
His department, which was charged with preparing plans for post-war re-
form, was incapable of making even the most basic administrative deci-
sions. Action was dependent on the good will of Addison's ministerial 
colleagues who often viewed plans for reform as attacks on their personal 
administrative empires. Addison also had to deal with vested interests 
outside of the government, who demanded that reform be routed around 
their strongholds. Misunderstandir ... gs, rivalries, and distrust among sup-
posedly cooperating agencies and private interests served to delay reform, 
until its success was no longer possible. 
The relegation of the Ministry of Reconstruction to the position of 
a second-class ministry and the constant delays in creating the adminis-
trative power to back the reconstruction plans did a great deal to end 
the prospects of comprehensive social planning. Nonetheless, these are 
perhaps considerations secondary to the larger failure of social reform 
a~er the war. In a very real sense Christopher Addison, Newman, Morant, 
and Rhondda were guilty of misunderstanding the impact of the war on 
English society. They, and especially Addison, saw it as a massive wave, 
which in one great movement had replaced the social tension of the pre-war 
days with a new sense of social harmony. Wa:r spirit represented to them 
the dawning of a new age in which all parts of society would cooperate 
towards a common goal and for the betterment of each citizen. The Minis-
try of Munitions had been able to break all the rules in the interests 
of national efficiency and the final victory it would bring. The reform-
ers were convinced that the same kind of action would be possible when 
dealing with complex and politically explosive social issues. Despite 
these hopes the war-time interest in national efficiency was not strong 
enough to support their optimism or their sweeping plans. Old political 
and social differences proved to be a much more potent force than what 
remained of war-time harmony and common sacrifice. While the nation was 
willing to tolerate economic and social control in the name of victory 
over the Kaiser, no matter how much reform was desired, it would not 
accept rigid centralized control and be swayed by appeals for national 
sacrifice in peace time. Without the impetus provided by total warfare, 
massive social planning, rooted in a desire to use all the nation's re-
sources efficiently, collapsed, drained of its political. vitality. 
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